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Editor’s Perspective 
HISTORY has a number of uses. The one I cite most often is its 
ability to tell us, or remind us, who were are and how we got to 
be the way we are. Just as, individually, we often tell others our 
personal history as a way of telling them who we are, our 
state’s historians recount the history of the state to tell others—
and, perhaps even more importantly, ourselves—who we are as 
a state. History often calls us to recognize that aspects of the 
present that we take for granted as given were actually the 
product of conscious and even controversial choices in the 
(sometimes not-so-distant) past.  
 The three related articles in this issue do this particularly 
effectively. All three are set during the three decades from the 
beginning of World War II to 1970. Many features of Iowa’s pres-
ent political culture were shaped by transformations that oc-
curred during that time. 
 For a century or more, the question of access to alcoholic bev-
erages was probably the most contested issue in Iowa politics. 
As a result, Iowa’s official policy on liquor access vacillated regu-
larly, even as alcohol remained accessible, often extralegally, in 
many locales. Following Governor Harold Hughes’s successful 
campaign—both before and after his election—to legalize liquor 
by the drink, however, that policy has held firm. It’s now a poli-
cy most of us take for granted. In his article below, Jerry Har-
rington relates compellingly how that came to be. 
 Similarly, many of us take for granted Iowa’s status as a 
competitive two-party state. For much of Iowa’s history, how-
ever, the Republican Party dominated the political scene. As the 
nineteenth-century politician Jonathan Dolliver once said, 
“Iowa will go Democratic when Hell goes Methodist.” Indeed, 
between the Civil War and the Great Depression, Iowa had ex-
actly one Democratic governor. Between World War II and 1970, 
however, Iowa became a competitive two-party state, thanks in 
large part, as Wilson Warren argues, to a labor movement that 
moved out of the union halls and away from the bargaining table 
into the larger world of local and state politics. It is perhaps 
worth noting that Wapello County, which is at the heart of 
Warren’s story, flipped from 55–43 percent for Barack Obama in 
2012 to 58–37 percent for Donald Trump in 2016. 
 Finally, many of us take for granted the role of state gov-
ernment in attracting industry to Iowa. But that, too, as Keith 
Orejel shows, is a product of choices made during and just after 
World War II. The Iowa Development Commission, the first 
permanent state agency dedicated primarily to promoting in-
dustrialization in the state, marked an important institutional 
breakthrough in the history of government sponsorship of rural 
industrialization, and, Orejel argues, its emergence was directly 
linked to the agricultural transformation occurring in the state 
during those years. 
 One final note about the contemporary relevance of this pe-
riod in Iowa history. At the conclusion of “Iowa’s last liquor 
battle”—and an intense battle it was—Governor Hughes com-
mented, “It is the peculiar genius of democracy that persons 
with diverse points of view can get together and work out solu-
tions to complex problems that are in the public interest. In my 
opinion, this is exactly what happened with this liquor bill. . . . 
Those who followed the development of this legislation were 
amazed at the way wets and dries, Republicans and Democrats, 
worked together patiently, subordinating their individual inter-
ests to the interest of the state as a whole.” That’s a valuable po-
litical lesson for any time and place. 
—Marvin Bergman, editor 
 
1 
Iowa’s Last Liquor Battle: 
Governor Harold E. Hughes  
and the Liquor-by-the-Drink Conflict 
JERRY HARRINGTON 
THE DEEP, RESONANT VOICE of Iowa Governor Harold E. 
Hughes echoed throughout the packed Iowa House chamber on 
January 17, 1963, as he finished his half-hour inaugural address. 
Facing an audience that included all of Iowa’s representatives 
and senators in Des Moines for the new legislative session, the 
recently elected Democrat had just proposed an aggressive 
agenda for the overwhelmingly Republican legislature. 
 It was the speech’s final flourish, however, that so captured 
the nature of the new governor, a political personality many 
Iowa legislators were just beginning to size up. “It is sometimes 
said that the knack of skillful government is to hang back, do as 
little as possible, and make no mistakes,” Hughes said. “I hope 
there is another way—for between you and me, this prospect 
does not invite my soul.” Promising to “experiment and make 
some mistakes,” Hughes pledged to actively engage with legis-
lators to reform Iowa’s political landscape. Many of the Iowa 
politicians listening to these words undoubtedly believed that 
Hughes would apply this dynamic attitude to an issue that was 
on everyone’s mind and had been at the core of his campaign 
for governor—the question of liquor by the drink in Iowa.1 
                                                 
1. “Harold Hughes, Inaugural Address, 1/17/63,” Speeches—Oct. 1962–Jan. 
1963, box 27, Harold E. Hughes Papers, Special Collections, University of Iowa 
Libraries, Iowa City, Iowa (hereafter cited as HEH Papers); Des Moines Register, 
1/18/63. 
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 Political analysts at the time generally interpreted Hughes’s 
1962 election victory over incumbent Republican Governor 
Norman Erbe as a referendum on liquor by the drink. Citing 
widespread violations of the prohibition of over-the-counter 
liquor sales, Hughes had aggressively campaigned on allowing 
purchase of liquor drinks in bars, social clubs, and other estab-
lishments, complementing the existing legal sale of liquor by the 
bottle through state monopoly liquor stores. Either change the 
law or, Hughes pledged, he would enforce the current one. To do 
otherwise, he said, shows disrespect for all laws. To pass such a 
reform, however, the new governor would need to overcome 
resistance from a conservative, rural-based legislature that had 
long blocked the change. The debate across Iowa in the 1962 
gubernatorial campaign and the subsequent legislative approval 
of liquor by the drink dominated Iowa politics for nearly a year. 
 The liquor-by-the-drink question, however, was more than 
just a single campaign issue and legislative debate. The episode 
marked the culmination of more than a century of political con-
flict within Iowa over its citizens’ access to alcohol. Beginning 
with the state’s first General Assembly, Iowans and their elected 
officials had argued passionately over the issue, prompting so-
lutions ranging from outright prohibition to limited licensing of 
liquor sales in saloons to the sale of bottled liquor through state 
stores. Legalizing liquor by the drink in 1963 effectively ended 
that debate; it was the last political conflict in Iowa when the 
terms wets and drys were used. With that action, Iowans—
through their elected representatives—came to accept legal 
liquor sales in both bottle and glass, as long as the state en-
forced strict licensing laws and regulated the practice. If state 
and local governments collected fees from licenses and taxes, 
that was an added benefit. Political debates after this point were 
not over whether liquor should be openly sold but over such 
issues as the minimum drinking age, allowable alcohol levels 
for drivers, and whether bottled liquor should be sold through 
state monopoly stores or private businesses. Since 1963, limiting 
liquor sales to the general adult population has not been a viable 
political issue in Iowa.2 
                                                 
2. This article focuses primarily on the politics of the liquor-by-the-drink issue. 
It does not attempt to review the religious, moral, ethno-cultural, or social 
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 By the early 1960s, a majority of Iowans—at least according 
to opinion polls—favored liquor by the drink.3 The roadblock 
was the Iowa legislature—especially, many said, the House—
which was fundamentally apportioned by geography, not pop-
ulation, and dominated by more conservative rural interests. 
Hughes’s win and his successful effort to enforce existing liquor 
laws put intense political fire under the feet of recalcitrant legis-
lators. These and other factors prompted enough of them to 
modify their attitudes and support the change, ending this part 
of the state’s long-standing liquor argument. 
 This episode reflects a transitional moment in Iowa history, 
a shift from a rural state to an urban one. For the first time, the 
1960 federal census showed more Iowans living in “urban” areas 
than in “rural.” An expanding urban population, with its greater 
acceptance of liquor consumption, was overpowering more con-
servative rural opposition to easy access to alcohol. The liquor re-
formers’ triumph exemplifies the rise of Iowa’s urban interests.4 
 
LIQUOR ISSUES have been debated in Iowa for as long as it 
has been a state. The first Iowa General Assembly in Iowa City 
passed liquor control legislation in February 1847, giving county 
residents the option to vote on whether or not commissioners 
could grant liquor licenses in each county. In elections held in 
the frontier state on April 5, 1847, every established county ex-
cept Keokuk voted to prohibit liquor sales, but the prohibition 
was often overlooked, and commonly merchants either secretly 
                                                                                                       
conflicts that accompanied this long-standing and hotly debated issue among 
Iowans. All of those aspects of the historical liquor debate in Iowa are certainly 
important, but this study leaves those to other scholars. Iowa churches and 
religious groups are part of this discussion but only as lobbying and pressure 
groups that sought to affect the debate. I use the terms wet and dry, which 
were commonly used in liquor debates. Wets refers to those who supported 
expanded liquor availability; drys were those who wanted to limit liquor use. 
3. Des Moines Register, 5/13/1962.  
4. U.S. Census Bureau, Census of Population and History, Census of Popula-
tion: 1960-VI-Part 17, General Population Characteristics—Iowa. According to 
the 1960 census, 53 percent of Iowans lived in urban areas and 47 percent in 
rural areas. The 1950 census had recorded 47.6 percent of Iowans in urban areas 
and 52.4 percent in rural. The U.S. Census Bureau defined rural residents as 
anyone living outside of urban areas with a population of 2,500 or more.  
4      THE ANNALS OF IOWA 
or openly sold liquor illegally. By the early 1850s, the Maine Law, 
named after a state prohibitory law passed in Maine in 1851, 
was the rallying cry of prohibition forces and became part of 
the Whig Party platform in 1854. The next year, with the Iowa 
legislature under Whig control, both Iowa houses passed a law 
prohibiting the sale of liquor in Iowa and Whig Governor James 
Grimes signed it. On April 2, 1855, Iowa voters approved the law, 
25,555 to 22,645. But, according to historian Dan Elbert Clark, 
local officials “simply folded their hands and paid little heed to its 
enforcement.” In 1857 the General Assembly, responding to that 
reality, passed a liquor licensing law, allowing sales that would 
happen anyway, although prohibition remained on the books. 
Especially with the influx of German immigrants into the state, 
Clark notes, “prohibition seemed to fall into disfavor,” and by 
the 1860s “liquor was sold almost without restrictions.”5  
 Activists rallied in 1877 with a prohibition candidate for gov-
ernor who called for the law’s enforcement. He garnered more 
than 10,000 votes in a losing cause. That campaign—through 
speeches, correspondence, newspaper coverage, and networking 
throughout the state—helped revive the temperance movement 
and expanded support for curbs on liquor traffic. The next year, 
at the Woman’s Christian Temperance Union (WCTU) conven-
tion in Burlington, J. Ellen Foster, who chaired the committee on 
legislation, proposed amending the Iowa Constitution to prohibit 
liquor. That, she argued, would make prohibition a permanent 
part of Iowa law, removing it from the changing winds of year-
by-year politics. That effort gained enough popular support to 
prompt Iowa General Assemblies in 1880 and 1882 to pass a 
constitutional amendment banning the manufacture and sale of 
intoxicating liquor, including ale, wine, and beer. In June 1882 
Iowa voters approved the prohibition amendment, 155,436 to 
125,677, with 75 counties voting in favor. However, a Scott 
County district court that fall declared the amendment invalid 
on a technicality, because the amendments passed by the two 
sessions of the Iowa legislature had slightly different wording. 
                                                 
5. Dan Elbert Clark, “The History of Liquor Legislation in Iowa, 1846–1861,” 
Iowa Journal of History and Politics 6 (1908), 55–87; idem, “The History of Liquor 
Legislation in Iowa, 1861–1878,” Iowa Journal of History and Politics 6 (1908), 339–
74. 
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The Iowa Supreme Court upheld the decision in 1883, throwing 
the prohibition amendment out of the Iowa Constitution.6  
 Not wanting to begin the long, multiyear amendment pro-
cess again, prohibition supporters in the Iowa General Assembly 
passed a law banning intoxicating liquor in Iowa. The law went 
into effect on July 4, 1884, but despite attempts at enforcement, 
many cities, especially Iowa river towns, ignored it. According 
to Clark, “It is a commonly known fact that in many cases mu-
nicipal and county officials were elected solely on the condition 
that they would not attempt to enforce the prohibitory law.”7  
 The issue became a centerpiece of the 1889 gubernatorial race, 
resulting in the election of Iowa’s only Democratic governor 
between the Civil War and the Great Depression: Horace Boies, 
who opposed prohibition. Iowa Republicans, who could certainly 
read election returns, eventually reached a legislative compro-
mise in 1894, passing the unusual Mulct Law. While keeping 
prohibition on the books, it allowed merchants to sell liquor as 
long as they paid fines, or “mulct taxes,” for breaking the law. 
Prohibition remained the rule and violations the legal exception.8  
 In 1909 the General Assembly passed the Moon Law, 
named after its sponsor, Senator Edwin Moon. The act limited 
saloons to one for every 1,000 inhabitants in a community; 
towns of fewer than 1,000 were allowed a single seller, and, in 
communities with more than one already existing saloon per 
                                                 
6. Clark, “History of Liquor Legislation, 1861–1878,” 339–74; Dan Elbert Clark, 
“History of Liquor Legislation, 1878–1908,” Iowa Journal of History and Politics 6 
(1908), 503–608. To amend the Iowa Constitution, two consecutive sessions of 
the Iowa legislature must pass an amendment through both houses; then the 
amendment must be approved by Iowans in a popular vote. In this case, how-
ever, the 1882 session of the legislature passed a version of the prohibition 
amendment that omitted the phrase “or to be used” between “No person shall 
manufacture for sale, or sell, or keep for sale, as a beverage” and “any intoxi-
cating liquor whatever, including ale, wine and beer” that was in the 1880 
version. The courts ruled that passing two different wordings of the amend-
ment violated the process and tossed out the amendment. The courts also 
ruled that the Iowa House had not completely followed the rules in recording 
the amendment in its journal, making the amendment invalid.  
7. Clark, “History of Liquor Legislation, 1878–1908,” 503–608. 
8. Ibid. For a summary of the Iowa prohibition debate in the 1880s and ‘90s that 
includes ethnoreligious alignments, see Richard Jensen, “Iowa, Wet or Dry? 
Prohibition and the Fall of the GOP,” in Iowa History Reader, ed. Marvin Berg-
man (Iowa City, 1996), 263–90. 
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1,000 residents—mostly Iowa river towns—the law allowed 
those establishments to continue. As a result of the Moon Law, 
the number of Iowa businesses selling liquor was cut in half—
from 1,600 in 1908 to 740 in 1912. Another law passed in 1909 
made it unlawful for any person or corporation engaged in the 
“manufacture, brewing, distilling or refining of intoxicating 
liquors” to be involved, either directly or indirectly, in the retail 
liquor business.9  
 The Mulct Law lasted until 1915, when vital portions of it, 
such as those addressing payment and collection of the mulct tax, 
were repealed, effectively killing it. According to Clark, that 
move was a “spontaneous expression of the quiet convictions 
of the people of the State, rather than a response to an active, 
organized demand.” The prohibition statute, still on the books, 
remained state law and established policy, and the legislature 
increased penalties for violations, together with providing addi-
tional means for enforcement. This marked the third time in 
Iowa’s history that absolute prohibition of liquor was state law.10 
 The Iowa legislature passed another constitutional amend-
ment on prohibition in two sessions in 1915 and 1917, with a 
statewide vote set for October 15, 1917. This time, however, 
Iowans rejected placing prohibition into the constitution, voting 
down the effort by 932 votes among over 430,000 cast, the first 
time Iowans vetoed prohibition by popular vote. Soon, however, 
national prohibition became the law of the land with passage of 
the Eighteenth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution.11 
 With the repeal of national prohibition in 1933—an action 
Iowans supported in a statewide popular vote on the federal 
Twenty-First Amendment, 377,275 to 249,943—state political 
leaders faced the challenge of responding to liquor use in Iowa 
in a post-prohibition age. The solution was the creation in 1934 
of an Iowa liquor monopoly, which sold—and controlled—
alcohol through state stores managed by the State Liquor Con-
trol Commission. The only alcohol Iowans could legally pur-
                                                 
9. Dan Elbert Clark, “Recent Liquor Legislation in Iowa,” Iowa Journal of History 
and Politics 15 (1917), 48–50.  
10. Ibid., 57–58.  
11. Edgar Rubey Harlan, A Narrative History of the People of Iowa, 5 vols. (Chica-
go, 1931), 2:274. 
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chase and possess was sold through the state stores. Iowans 
who wanted to buy liquor for consumption off the premises 
had to buy permits, and each purchase was registered with the 
state. Store managers held the right to refuse purchases to indi-
viduals they felt would abuse the privilege. (Prior to repeal, 
beer in Iowa was already legal and had a different distribution 
system. In early 1933 Congress passed legislation redefining 
“intoxicating” under the Eighteenth Amendment, stating that 
this did not include beer with a 3.2 percent alcohol content or 
less. Iowa lawmakers followed suit on April 15, approving the 
same definition on the state level for “beer, ale, porter, stout or 
any other malt liquor” and setting up regulatory guidelines for 
beer brewers, bottlers, wholesalers, and retailers. Retailers with 
state permits could sell beer in stores and serve it over the coun-
ter in glasses in establishments that became known in Iowa as 
“beer taverns.” By law, “intoxicating” liquor could not be sold in 
taverns; nor could it be found on the seller’s premises.)12  
 By the mid-1950s, some Iowans were clamoring for more 
liberalized liquor access laws, specifically the right to enjoy intox-
icating beverages outside the home with friends and neighbors 
at local venues. Iowa legislators acceded to this demand in 1955 
when they passed legislation allowing for “key clubs.” These 
establishments—social settings such as country clubs, VFWs, 
Elks clubs, American Legion halls, and others—were allowed to 
set up lockers where members could place bottles of alcohol 
purchased from the state liquor stores; each member was given 
a key to a locker and, when visiting, could take out bottles and 
consume alcohol on the premises. The establishment itself could 
not legally supply liquor, either by bottle or glass.13  
 By the early 1960s, the legal framework in Iowa for alcohol 
sales centered on the state liquor stores, which sold to Iowa citi-
zens; by that time, there were nearly 190 stores throughout Iowa. 
Liquor consumption was legally allowed in key clubs as long as 
the bottles were brought into clubs by consumers, not club 
managers or owners. Liquor by the drink—serving alcohol in 
                                                 
12. Leland Sage, A History of Iowa (Ames, 1974), 301–2; Daniel Okrent, Last Call: 
The Rise and Fall of Prohibition (New York, 2010), 352; 1933 Laws of Iowa, 53–62; 
1933–1934 Laws of Iowa, 38–60. 
13. 1955 Laws of Iowa, 108–9; Cedar Rapids Gazette, 12/26/1962.  
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glasses and charging for the service—was illegal in the state, 
although, by this time, it was legal in all states surrounding Iowa. 
Bills calling for legalizing liquor by the drink had been intro-
duced in nearly every session of the Iowa legislature in various 
forms since World War II, but was seriously debated only once: 
in 1961 a bill came to the floor of the Iowa House, was debated, 
and soundly defeated, 72–22.14 
 As most Iowans knew, however, the practices in their com-
munities did not reflect the laws on the books, which were 
commonly violated across the state. In 1962 the fiction of Iowa’s 
liquor laws was about to collide head-on with the reality of a 
heated gubernatorial campaign. 
 
ON SUNDAY MORNING, May 6, 1962, Iowans woke to read 
a banner headline in the Des Moines Sunday Register: “‘Liquor By 
Drink’ in 2/3 of Iowa!” According to a story written by Register 
reporter George Mills, assisted by a staff of reporters, liquor 
was sold by the drink in at least 66 of Iowa’s 99 counties, coun-
ties with 2.2 million of the state’s 2.8 million residents. Register 
reporters had combed the state to “make available the facts 
about liquor law observance in Iowa.” They found that “sale of 
liquor by the drink has been more or less commonplace in even 
small towns.” “In most county seats,” wrote one reporter, “you 
don’t need your own bottle. All you need is the money, and 
courage enough to walk into a club and ask for bourbon, after 
telling the bartender you are sick of beer.” In some cases, wrote 
Mills, local law enforcement officials did not “crack down” on 
violators because they believed a majority of citizens opposed 
enforcing the law or did not care one way or the other; those 
officials were often elected and re-elected several times. The 
Register listed a county-by-county summary of eastern Iowa 
counties, citing whether or not they offered illegal liquor sales; 
western counties were listed in a follow-up story a week later.15  
                                                 
14. Twenty-Eighth Annual Report of the Iowa Liquor Control Commission for Fiscal 
Year Ending June 30, 1962, p. 6; Cedar Rapids Gazette, 1/20/1963; Sioux City Jour-
nal, 12/8/1962.  
15. Des Moines Register, 5/6/62, 5/13/62. The Register reported that establish-
ments were not afraid of local or state crackdowns, but they were of federal 
law enforcement. Those selling liquor were required to buy a federal Retail Liq-
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 The defiance of the liquor-by-the-drink prohibition reflected 
public opinion in Iowa. In May 1962 the Des Moines Register re-
ported the results of an Iowa Poll: 55 percent of Iowans favored 
changing state laws so that liquor by the drink could be sold 
legally in Iowa; 37 percent were opposed. This public stance 
had not altered significantly in recent years; in a 1957 survey 54 
percent of Iowans had favored the practice, and 52 percent had 
in 1959. The 1962 poll showed that “city” residents strongly fa-
vored a change (62 percent), but only 42 percent of “farm” resi-
dents reacted positively; 52 percent of those in “towns” favored 
open liquor sales, with 41 percent opposed. Rural Iowans con-
sistently opposed liquor by the drink.16 
 The disparity between city and farm was part of the difficulty 
in translating popular will on the liquor issue into legislative 
change. The Iowa legislature was dominated by rural forces, set 
by a reapportionment plan established in 1904, when legislators 
passed a constitutional amendment creating a House with 108 
members, one from each of Iowa’s 99 counties, with an addition-
al member granted to each of the nine most populous counties. 
The 50-member Senate was apportioned by population, but in 
1928 another amendment prohibited counties from having 
more than one senator; even as counties with large urban popu-
lations grew in twentieth-century Iowa, their Senate representa-
tion was limited. Both chambers—but especially the House—
vastly underrepresented urban interests. For instance, by 1960, 
the six least populated counties (Adams, Ringgold, Clarke, Da-
vis, Van Buren, and Wayne) had a total of six members in the 
Iowa House, representing 52,377 people. The three most popu-
lous counties (Polk, Linn, and Black Hawk) also had six mem-
bers in the House, but they represented 525,696 Iowa citizens, 
nearly ten times the constituency of the bottom six counties. 
                                                                                                       
uor Dealer (RLD) stamp for $54 per year. Between July 1, 1961, and publication 
of the Register story, 1,784 privately operated Iowa establishments had bought 
RLD stamps. The maximum penalty for selling liquor without a federal stamp 
was two years in prison and a $5,000 fine. Those businesses had federal approval 
for an activity that was illegal in Iowa. The Register also pointed out that there 
were 4,700 taverns with Class B beer permits, allowing consumption of beer on 
the premises. Most of the managers of those taverns, claimed the reporters, did 
not sell liquor by the drink and opposed it, seeing it as competition for their 
businesses and putting them on the same side of the argument as the “drys.”  
16. Des Moines Register, 5/13/1962. 
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Urban legislators were simply vastly outnumbered by rural leg-
islators in the Iowa House. Given that liquor by the drink tradi-
tionally had low support among rural Iowans, the construction 
of the Iowa legislature was a high hurdle for those supporting a 
loosening of Iowa liquor laws.17 
 In the early 1960s, the Iowa Republican Party dominated the 
state legislature; in the 1961 session of the General Assembly 78 
of 108 seats in the House and 35 of 50 seats in the Senate were 
Republican. The party’s establishment was traditionally hesi-
tant to change liquor laws—at least according to its statewide 
public pronouncements. When Iowa Republicans met at Veter-
ans Auditorium in Des Moines on July 20, 1962, to pass a plat-
form and mark the beginning of the campaign for state offices, 
Iowa GOP members voted simply to study the issue of liquor 
by the drink, urging the legislature to undertake a “re-evaluation 
and re-approval” of the “present liquor control act.”18 
 
THE IOWA DEMOCRATIC CANDIDATE for governor, 
Harold E. Hughes, did not share that attitude. He supported 
legalizing liquor by the drink. Born in 1922 in the small western 
Iowa town of Ida Grove, Hughes was a star high school athlete; 
he won the state discus championship in 1938 and was selected 
as all-state football guard in 1939. He attended the University of 
Iowa for a year and played on its football team. Marrying Ida 
Grove native Eva Mercer in 1941, he dropped out of college and 
worked a series of jobs until he was drafted into the military 
during World War II. He fought in the battle to take Sicily and 
Salerno in Italy in 1943. After military service, he returned to 
Ida Grove, where he got a job driving trucks; he then managed 
Hinrichs Truck Line in Ida Grove and later worked as a field rep-
resentative for the Iowa Motor Truck Association. Dissatisfied 
with the low rates independent truckers were getting for hauling 
freight, he organized them into the Iowa Better Trucking Bureau. 
                                                 
17. Charles Wiggins, “The Post World War II Legislative Reapportionment 
Battle in Iowa Politics,” in Patterns and Perspectives in Iowa History, ed. Dorothy 
Schwieder (Ames, 1973), 403–430; Iowa Official Register, 1963–1964 (Des Moines, 
1964), 303–4. 
18. Des Moines Register, 7/21/1962; Iowa Official Register, 1961–1962 (Des Moines, 
1962), 96. 
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As the head of the bureau, he butted heads with members of the 
Iowa State Commerce Commission. In 1958 he ran for one of 
the three statewide commission posts and was elected. Initially 
a Republican, Hughes grew disenchanted with the party’s con-
servatism and became a Democrat prior to his election as com-
missioner. He ran for governor simply because he thought he 
could do a better job than any other candidate running. He lost 
the primary on his first try in 1960 but won in 1962.19 
 To those who supported him in his race for governor in 
1962, Hughes was a magnetic personality who often acted in 
ways contrary to those of a traditional politician, frequently 
forceful, charismatic, and direct. He was initially an awkward 
candidate, uncomfortable with small talk and light chatter. As 
he said, “I don’t run up and down the street shaking hands be-
cause I don’t believe it does much good.” He was much more 
comfortable directly addressing the issues in blunt, stark terms 
in his speeches and conversations. A large man, 6’2” tall, 
Hughes was handsome with a full head of dark hair. One of his 
strengths was his personal delivery: his deep, baritone voice 
commanded attention. According to longtime Des Moines Regis-
ter political journalist James Flansburg, Hughes delivered “the 
most telling and moving oratory I’ve ever heard.”20  
 Hughes was also a deeply religious man. He experienced a 
“born-again” Christian spiritual transformation in 1952 when in 
the depths of personal despair. His desolation rose from a serious 
problem with alcoholism that almost destroyed his marriage 
and led him to the brink of suicide. Following a drinking binge 
after his wife and daughters had left him, he sat in his bathtub 
with a gun in his mouth, ready to pull the trigger, when, he later 
claimed, he had a religious experience. At that point, he vowed  
                                                 
19. For Hughes’s personal story, see his autobiography, Harold Hughes with 
Dick Schneider, Harold E. Hughes: The Man from Ida Grove: A Senator’s Personal 
Story (Lincoln, VA, 1979). As the title suggests, much of the narrative centers on 
Hughes as a person, especially the impact of his Christian faith on his life, rather 
than on politics. For a more expansive outlook on Hughes and Iowa politics, as 
well as the impact of his dynamic personality, see Jim C. Larew, A Party Reborn: 
The Democrats of Iowa, 1950–1974 (Iowa City, 1980), especially the chapter on 
Hughes, “The Democrats Reborn: The Rise of Harold Hughes,” pp. 73–126.   
20. Iowa Official Register, 1962–1963 (Des Moines, 1964), 4; Des Moines Register, 
10/7/1962, 11/7/1962; New York Times, 10/25/1996. 
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to give up alcohol, sought help, and became intensely involved 
in the Methodist church, even volunteering as a Sunday school 
teacher. Hughes was open about his alcoholic past, discussing it 
freely when asked about it on the campaign trail. He was care-
ful to say that he was a recovering alcoholic, not a cured one.21 
 Soon after the Des Moines Register exposé on statewide liquor-
by-the-drink violations and after several weeks of careful study, 
Hughes announced that he backed legalization. Accepting the 
Democratic nomination at the State Democratic Convention on 
July 28, 1962, he called it a moral issue. 
It is a moral issue because it involves an issue of official hypocrisy 
that shames the entire state. The real issue is not whether or not 
we shall have “liquor-by-the-drink” in Iowa. Let’s face it. You 
                                                 
21. Hughes, Harold E. Hughes, 102–9; Cedar Rapids Gazette, 11/7/1962; Des 
Moines Register, 10/7/1962. 
 
Harold Hughes (1922–1996), Iowa governor, 
1963–1969. Photo from State Historical Society 
of Iowa (SHSI), Iowa City. 
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know and I know and every honest person in Iowa knows that we 
have liquor-by-the-drink in this state now. . . . The moral issue, 
then, is: Shall we straight-forwardly legalize the sale of liquor-by-
the-drink, enforce the law and really control the liquor traffic in 
this state? Or shall we perpetuate the present wide-open key club 
system that subsidizes the bootleggers and racketeers with reve-
nues that rightfully belong to the taxpayers of Iowa?22 
 Hughes also attacked the incumbent governor for mishan-
dling the state budget, allowing a $46 million surplus inherited 
from the prior administration to shrink to $18 million. Citing 
capital improvement needs throughout the state, Hughes pro-
posed raising new revenues to meet those needs and to provide 
for property tax reform to relieve those stressed on the local 
level. Looking forward to an aggressive fall campaign, Hughes 
said, “What can happen in these three months can shake this 
state out of its coma as it has never been shaken before and get 
it on the forward move again.”23   
 
OPPOSING HUGHES was the incumbent Republican governor, 
Norman Erbe of Boone, running for his second two-year term. 
The youngest of six children of a Boone Lutheran minister, Erbe 
had served on 35 combat missions with the Eighth Air Force dur-
ing World War II and was awarded the Distinguished Flying 
Cross and four air medals. After earning a law degree from the 
University of Iowa in 1947, he practiced law in Boone, served as 
county attorney, and chaired the Boone County Republican Party 
from 1952 to 1956. Elected Iowa attorney general in 1956, Erbe 
gained a second term by little more than 2,000 votes two years 
later. On September 1, 1959, he sought to raise his statewide pro-
file by reaching back to an 1886 Iowa law and announcing that 
he was banning 42 “girlie” magazines as obscene literature. The 
action did little to actually change magazine availability, but the 
controversy and publicity helped Erbe win a close GOP guberna-
torial primary in 1960, and in November he was elected governor.  
                                                 
22. Cedar Rapids Gazette, 11/8/62; “Press Release for Democratic Fund Raising 
Dinner, Newton,” 5/26/1962, Press Releases 1962, box 25, HEH Papers; “State 
Democratic Convention, July 28, 1962,” Speeches—July–Sept. 1962, box 27, 
HEH Papers. 
23. Ibid. 
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 Erbe’s strategy during his re-election bid in 1962 was to avoid 
making waves. The Iowa legislature, not the governor, he argued, 
makes the laws. “I don’t want to come out whole hog for this 
position or that if it doesn’t materialize in the Legislature, “he 
said. “There’s no use doing this unless you know you have the 
votes. . . . My concept of the governorship is that of an adminis-
trator and executive through persuasion. In our weak governor 
system, it’s impossible for the governor to impress his will if the 
Legislature or government departments don’t want to follow.” 
Erbe said that the liquor-by-the-drink issue was up to the Iowa 
General Assembly; he wasn’t going to push the issue. He claimed 
to be guided by the state Republican platform, which only said 
that the issue should be “studied.” He refused to go further 
than that.24  
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 As the campaign progressed, this conservative stance seemed 
a safe bet for Erbe. In the first poll on the race conducted by the 
Des Moines Register and released on October 7, Erbe led Hughes, 
49 to 42 percent, with the rest undecided. Among “city” voters, 
Erbe led 46 to 44; among “town,” 50 to 41; and among “coun-
try,” 53 to 38. However, the polling numbers included an omi-
nous sign for the Erbe campaign: when Iowans were asked who 
would do the best job on “liquor,” Hughes led 46 to 30 percent.25 
 There were indications around the state that opinion on the 
liquor-by-the-drink issue was divided along urban/rural rather 
than partisan lines. At the Polk County Republican Party conven-
tion, delegates representing the most populous county in the 
state passed a resolution in favor of liquor by the drink under 
strict regulation. The resolution “deplored” the “almost complete 
disregard of the present Iowa liquor laws which permit the oper-
ation of phony key clubs.” County Republican meetings in Pot-
tawattamie and Des Moines counties approved similar planks.26  
 Among the businesses at the forefront of the issue—restau-
rant owners—the consensus was that it was time for a change, 
according to Register reporter Nick Lamberto, covering the an-
nual meeting of the Iowa Restaurant Association in Des Moines. 
Ermol Loghry of Iowa City, newly elected treasurer of the or-
ganization, said, “The way we’re bringing up children now to 
wink at the law is not right. . . . We’ve had 30 years of handling 
liquor the way it is now. Thirty years is long enough to see if it 
can be enforced.” Others at the meeting said it was unfair to 
businesses close to the rivers on either side of the state because 
those in Nebraska and Illinois could serve liquor legally.27  
 Hughes aggressively raised the issue everywhere he spoke 
around the state during the 1962 fall campaign. In Erbe’s home 
                                                                                                       
several other Iowa state executive posts elected independently of the governor. 
These included, at the time, the lieutenant governor, the attorney general, the 
secretary of state, the state treasurer, the state auditor, and the secretary of agri-
culture. The Iowa Constitution would later be amended to allow a gubernatorial 
candidate to select, with the consent of the party convention, a lieutenant gov-
ernor candidate who would serve if elected.  
25. Des Moines Register, 10/7/1962.  
26. Des Moines Register, 6/30/1962, 7/3/1962. 
27. Des Moines Register, 10/16/1962.  
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town of Boone, Hughes asked, “Why hasn’t Mr. Erbe done any-
thing about the shocking statewide, open violations of the state 
liquor control laws?” In Davenport, he said, “Since we have it 
[liquor] anyway, why not have the profits go to the taxpayers?” 
Estimating that legalization could bring in as much as $15 mil-
lion per year, Hughes argued that the revenue could be put to 
good use for state capital improvements, though he was careful 
to say that the issue was one of respect for law, not revenue en-
hancement. “To restore respect for our laws is our first objec-
tive. The revenue issue is secondary—but it is nonetheless im-
portant and worth considering.” Addressing “drys,” Hughes 
argued,  
Many good temperance people frown upon liquor tax revenue as 
being ‘tainted’ money. I appreciate the sincerity of their viewpoints 
but it is high time we faced realities. The state is already in the liq-
uor business through package sales in the state stores. The state tax 
commission—amazingly enough—admits that it collects some sales 
tax revenue from illegal liquor-by-the-drink sales in key clubs! If 
the revenue is tainted, we are already tainted. Moreover, the full 
measure of revenues from taxing by-the-glass should go to the 
taxpayers to whom such revenues rightfully belong, rather than 
largely bootleggers and racketeers as is the case at the present time. 
As governor, Hughes pledged on October 3 in a front-page Reg-
ister story, he would enforce the current law prohibiting liquor-
by-the-drink sales “whether the law is changed or not.”28  
 Recognition of the need for additional state revenue arose 
when the Des Moines Register interviewed members of the bipar-
tisan Iowa Legislative Revenue Study Committee and reported 
the group’s consensus that $30 million was needed just to main-
tain present expenditures and the current rate of development 
at the state colleges. Additional funds would also be needed for 
proposed property tax relief. This further raised the profile of 
revenue from liquor sales that Hughes continued to stress. He 
added that he would urge a combination of sources—increased 
sales tax, a broadened sales tax, or increased state income tax—
to meet the state’s needs. Erbe’s response was that he would not 
                                                 
28. “Remarks at Boone, Iowa, Sept. 1, 1962,” Speeches July–Sept., 1962, box 27, 
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make any recommendations until after the committee made its 
final report, which would be after the election. Hughes accused 
Erbe of using that to duck the issue.29  
 Calling Erbe “the Great Vacillator,” Hughes pounded his 
opponent for not generating a plan for property tax relief or 
enforcing the state’s liquor laws. Speaking in Denison, Hughes 
blamed Erbe for the problem. “The plain facts are that as gover-
nor . . . and as attorney general for years, he himself is more re-
sponsible than anyone else for the wide-open illegal liquor traffic 
in this state that corrupts our young people and makes a mock-
ery of our laws.” Hughes scoffed at Erbe’s argument that Iowa’s 
“weak governor” system made the governor answerable to the 
legislature, calling it a “curious spineless concept of the gover-
nor’s role.” “The executive branch has always had the necessary 
authority—and the responsibility—to enforce the law,” Hughes 
claimed. “As usual, Mr. Erbe passes the buck on liquor law 
enforcement to the legislature—but this is an absurd excuse. 
Under our system, the legislature makes the laws; the executive 
branch is supposed to carry them out. The weakness in the 
‘weak governor’ system is Mr. Erbe himself.”30  
 As the campaign moved on, several “dry” supporters saw 
the climate beginning to change and concluded that they needed 
to take a stand in the debate. In late October, the Greater Des 
Moines Evangelical Ministers Association passed a resolution 
opposing liquor by the drink. The group, representing 50 Des 
Moines churches, argued that “alcohol-caused expenses will cost 
a state from $1.33 to $5.75 for every dollar collected on liquor 
tax” and that, among the six surrounding states with liquor by 
the drink, “liquor consumption is more than 47 percent higher 
than in Iowa.” On October 21, the Temperance Legislative Coun-
cil, a lobbying group with members from the Iowa WCTU, the 
Iowa Temperance League, and the Iowa Council of Churches, 
announced its support for Erbe. Responding to potential oppo-
sition to his position from church pulpits, the Hughes campaign 
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in October sent a letter signed by the candidate to more than 
1,000 Iowa clergy, explaining his stand on liquor by the drink. 
Addressing the “thousands of good people who oppose any 
change in the liquor laws because of temperance convictions,” 
Hughes wrote that his advocacy of liquor by the drink is not 
“simply another chapter in the wet-dry issue. It isn’t. It is an 
issue of law and order over crime and confusion. It is an issue 
of honesty over hypocrisy.” More directly, Hughes said in a 
speech in Corning, “It is time that the temperance people in 
Iowa opened their eyes and looked at reality.”31  
 With the campaign moving into its final month, Erbe 
stressed that it was important for Iowans to elect a Republican 
governor to work effectively with an overwhelmingly Republi-
can legislature. Erbe argued that Hughes was irresponsibly 
overestimating the role of a governor in the legislative process. 
“Any candidate who says his election will mean any bill will be 
passed is being considerably less than honest with the voters,” 
he said in Harlan. “The lawmaking rights of our state are only 
within the domain of the legislature.” Hughes responded that 
Erbe was taking credit for past legislation while claiming that 
he could not influence legislation in the future.32 
 In a mailing to the state’s 945 Iowa mayors that was widely 
publicized in the Iowa media, the Hughes campaign pointed 
out that per capita liquor sales in state stores were substantially 
lower in most of the state’s eastern and western border counties 
than in interior counties (where the average was $20.80 versus 
$14.56 in the eastern counties and $11.99 in the west). The point 
was that substantial quantities of liquor were brought illegally 
into Iowa from neighboring states to serve the liquor-by-the-
drink market. Iowa counties and towns were not getting that 
revenue from state liquor stores. “Iowa should either get out of 
the liquor business or get into it right,” Hughes said, adding 
that “cities, towns and counties should share in these extra mo-
nopoly store profits and in license fees.”33  
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 Erbe obtained the Des Moines Register’s endorsement on Oc-
tober 28. Its editorial writers believed that the incumbent could 
get more done because Republicans dominated the legislature, 
which would block efforts supported by Hughes. Other news-
papers supported Hughes. The Davenport Morning Democrat 
noted that “he faces the facts realistically” and “has shown the 
kind of courage and clarity of thinking as a candidate that 
would make him a good governor.”34 
 Beneath the editorials and headlines, Hughes appeared to 
be making inroads, even among those who disagreed with him. 
Harry Beardsley of West Des Moines wrote in a letter to the edi-
tor in the Des Moines Register that even though he opposed liq-
uor by the drink, “I respect Harold Hughes for the intelligence 
and integrity he has shown in trying to think honestly about 
the liquor problem, and for his willingness to state clearly, un-
equivocally and forthrightly what he believes should be done 
about it.” The final opinion poll issued by the Des Moines Register 
the weekend before the election showed Hughes behind but 
gaining. Erbe had a narrowing 52–48 percent lead among those 
already decided; the two were tied among city voters, 46–46, 
with Erbe showing a lead among “town” and “farm” voters.35 
 The result on election day—November 6, 1962—was a solid 
victory for Hughes over Erbe, 430,899 to 388,602. In the lightest 
voter turnout since 1946, Hughes cruised to victory by carrying 
Iowa’s population centers, including Polk County, by more than 
23,000 votes, accounting for more than half his victory margin. 
Among the five counties with populations above 100,000, 
Hughes carried all but one (Scott County) and won seven of the 
top 10 counties and 14 of the top 20. The victory was personal 
for Hughes; all the other statewide elected officers were Repub-
lican, prompting Des Moines Register editorial cartoonist Frank 
Miller to draw a state banquet table with a large donkey, grinning   
broadly at the center, surrounded by smaller, grumpy, and irri-
tated elephants.36  
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 The banner headline in the Cedar Rapids Gazette after the elec-
tion was “Hughes—Liquor Mandate.” That immediate judgment 
may have been too simplistic, however. If some assumed that 
voters in border counties wanted liquor by the drink because 
they were next to states that had it, the evidence is not there. 
Only 9 of the 36 border counties and only 12 of the 19 river 
counties (next to the Missouri and Mississippi rivers) gave 
Hughes a plurality. One commentator, Frank Nye of the Cedar 
Rapids Gazette, wrote that many in the river cities did not want 
legalized liquor by the drink “since this would mean operators 
now paying no license fee would have to do so under almost 
any kind of legalizing act passed by the legislature.” Many, in-
cluding Hughes, said that he won the election because he took a 
strong stand on issues—certainly on liquor, but also on property 
 
Frank Miller cartoon from the Des Moines Regis-
ter, November 8, 1962, in response to the election 
of Republicans to all statewide offices except the 
Democratic governor. 
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tax relief, the need for capital improvements and other concerns. 
“We won because we had a program,” said Hughes, “and be-
cause a majority of the voters believe that we had every inten-
tion of putting this program into effect, if elected.” He added, 
“The liquor issue was to our campaign what a tail is to a dog. 
The tail is an important part of the dog, but the tail does not 
wag the dog—it is the other way around.”37  
 Another important factor in Hughes’s win was a strong 
Democratic organization, especially in urban areas. Democratic 
State Chairman Lex Hawkins, a young, energetic Des Moines 
attorney elected in 1962, helped build the party, especially in 
the more populous counties, and improved the party’s finances 
to get out the vote. In Polk County alone, Democrats moved 
from matching Republicans in party registration to having a 
7,000 voter lead in 1962. Democratic Party workers in the larger 
counties were seen out at 6 a.m., getting supporters to the polls. 
Also, by the early 1960s the Iowa Democratic Party had cemented 
an expanding political relationship with organized labor that 
brought more working class voters to the party; in 1962, Demo-
crats worked with labor leaders close to the election to register 
union members in 16 Iowa cities and get them to the polls on 
election day. In the other campaign, Erbe ran a lackluster effort, 
refusing to take a solid position on liquor by the drink and other 
significant issues, earning the wrath of Hughes’s rhetoric and 
giving potential supporters few reasons to enthusiastically back 
the incumbent. Nevertheless, the consensus among state opinion 
makers was that Hughes’s election had shifted the liquor-by-
the-drink debate by placing in the governor’s chair a strong, 
forceful proponent.38  
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THE NEW DEMOCRATIC GOVERNOR, however, faced a 
Republican-dominated Iowa legislature that—at least on the sur-
face—looked like it would present a significant challenge to pass-
ing a liquor-by-the-drink law. At the same time as they elected 
Hughes as governor, Iowa voters gave the GOP 78 of 108 Iowa 
House seats—all elected in 1962—and 19 of the 27 Senate seats at 
stake, giving Republicans a 38–12 Senate majority. Most political 
commentators believed that the liquor legislation would be much 
tougher to pass in the House, with its overwhelmingly rural 
makeup, than in the Senate. Some, such as the Sioux City Journal, 
doubted that much could be done from the governor’s chair. 
“As governor, Mr. Hughes will be unable to push any legislation 
through the legislature, including his promise of liquor-by-the-
drink for Iowa. This always has been a legislative decision. No 
governor can do much about it, even if he so desires.” In mid-
January 1963 Des Moines Register reporter Nick Kotz estimated 
that the Senate had a majority ready to pass liquor by the drink, 
but the House, at that time, was about ten votes short of passage. 
Former Speaker of the House Henry C. Nelson (R-Forest City), 
who was not a candidate for the office in 1963, came out strongly 
against liquor by the drink, saying that “just because there are 
widespread violations of the present law” is not an argument for 
legalization. Comparing it to speeding on the highways, he said, 
“There are many violations of those laws also.”39  
 But attitudes were starting to change, even before the legis-
lature met in January 1963. The most significant shifts were in 
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the Iowa Republican Party itself. In a secret poll taken for the 
Republican Party in the fall of 1962 by Central Survey, Inc., of 
Shenandoah, 63 percent of Iowans favored liquor sales, with 
only 30 percent opposed; even Republicans favored it 49 per-
cent to 45 percent. Facing such stark numbers, on December 10, 
1962, Republican Party State Chairman George Nagle of Iowa 
City publicly endorsed passage of liquor-by-the-drink legisla-
tion and convinced the Republican State Central Committee to 
also support the effort, although the vote was not unanimous. 
Nagle realized that opposition to this reform was becoming an 
albatross around the neck of the Iowa GOP, and he wanted it 
removed as soon as possible. That attitude was becoming widely 
shared throughout the state party. In a survey conducted by the 
Iowa Daily Press Association among Iowa Republican Party 
chairmen and vice-chairmen in early 1963, 60 percent of the 75 
leaders contacted favored liquor by the drink, as long as it had 
stringent enforcement provisions. One respondent was quoted as 
saying, “Don’t repudiate city Republicans or our party is dead.” 
Even the leader of the Republicans in the fall campaign—
Governor Norman Erbe—had a change of heart and threw his 
support to the effort. In a newspaper interview after the election, 
Erbe said that he “personally felt there should be some liquor-
by-the-drink system in Iowa” and, if he had to do it over again, 
he would have supported reform. He said he had refrained 
from doing so in the campaign because felt bound by the GOP 
platform, which only called for review of liquor laws.40 
 Newspapers around the state, taking the election of Hughes 
as an indication that Iowans wanted liquor by the drink legal-
ized, supported change—as well as Hughes’s pledge to enforce 
current law until it was changed. The Burlington Hawkeye wrote, 
“A principal reason Iowa has never become serious about chang-
ing its laws is that most areas already have liquor by the drink, so 
why stir it up? If most areas suddenly do not have liquor by the 
drink, the demand for a legislative change could well be so loud 
it will even penetrate the dense ears of the legislators.” Others 
noted that increased state revenue would accompany legaliza-
tion and that this was changing the minds of many “drys.” 
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According to the Davenport Morning Democrat, “Many who do 
not favor liquor itself under any circumstance have nevertheless 
been won over to the idea [that] since we actually have liquor 
by the drink in much of Iowa, the state should be collecting rev-
enue from it.”41 
 
THE MAN at the center of the effort immediately showed that 
he meant what he said in the campaign about enforcing current 
law. At a victory celebration in mid-November in Ida Grove, 
Hughes declared, “I hope illegal sale of liquor comes to a stop 
before I become governor. It will make things simpler for every-
body if that happens.” During a press conference in Des Moines 
in early December, Hughes called on sheriffs and county attor-
neys to start enforcing the law on liquor. If they did that, he said, 
it would not be necessary to use state officers for that purpose 
after his inauguration on January 17, 1963. In a meeting with leg-
islative Democrats the same day, he met some opposition to strict 
enforcement, but he made it clear that he was not changing his 
mind: “They might as well go home and make peace with their 
constituents.” The strategy—and the gamble that Hughes was 
taking—was to make legislators see that the current liquor law, 
when enforced, was unpopular, thus putting pressure on them 
to change it.42  
 Others in state government began altering their tone. For-
merly lukewarm about liquor law enforcement during his first 
term, Iowa Attorney General Evan Hultman, a recently re-
elected Republican, addressed county attorneys on November 
16 in Cedar Rapids and urged them to cooperate with Hughes if 
he sought to enforce the liquor laws. Hultman said that he was 
prepared to give his support and hoped the county attorneys 
would do so as well. Later in November Hultman announced 
that he was forming a 15-member state crime council, composed 
of state and local officials, to work out uniform enforcement of 
Iowa’s present liquor laws and other statewide crime problems. 
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The prime focus, he said, was enforcing the state’s liquor-by-
the-drink laws.43  
 On December 10, Iowa Safety Commissioner Carl Pesch, an-
ticipating an order from Hughes to crack down on illegal liquor 
traffic, announced that he was ordering 27 state agents into train-
ing. The agents included 17 from the State Bureau of Criminal 
Investigation and 10 from the auto dealer, license, and motor 
vehicle registration division who would be diverted from their 
primary duties to enforcing liquor laws. Creating what he called 
“liquor law schools,” Pesch said the agents in the State Depart-
ment of Public Safety would receive refresher courses in raiding 
techniques, search and seizure, preservation of evidence, and 
other subjects related to liquor law enforcement. He said he was 
“certainly aware that new and novel responsibilities soon may 
be thrust upon this department,” adding that this could force “a 
drastic and irreversible change in the philosophy and mechanics 
of all law enforcement in Iowa.” This was not his preference, he 
noted, but “my personal opinion is not pertinent.”44 
 Hughes made the effort official on January 3 when he ap-
peared at a Des Moines press conference with Pesch to an-
nounce a statewide crackdown on illegal liquor sales. The Des 
Moines Register headlined the story, “Hughes Set to ‘Dry Up’ 
Iowa.” The governor-elect said that he hoped he would not have 
to use state forces; he would prefer that local law enforcement 
bodies make sure that businesses complied with current law. “I 
believe that adequate warning has been given that I expected 
voluntary enforcement before taking office,” he said. “And we 
are not going to wait two months and see what the legislature 
will do with the liquor laws.”45  
 The effect was immediate around the state. According to an 
investigation by the Des Moines Register, many tavern and club 
operators, especially in the river cities, voluntarily stopped sell-
ing liquor by the drink, fearful of prosecution by either local or 
state officials. Linn County Attorney Jack Fulton reported, “I 
understand that it has been very difficult to buy a drink in Cedar 
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Rapids and Linn County.” Tamiel Bleyart, a Davenport tavern 
operator who said he spoke for others in his business, said that 
most operators had agreed to “call things to a halt” before 
Hughes took office. Requests for a mixed drink at Council Bluffs 
water places drew a “sorry, no more” from the bartender. Louis 
Meyer, president of the Dubuque Tavern Keepers Association, 
claimed that the loss of over-the-counter liquor sales would put 
about 200 people out of work in the county.46  
 For the most part, the “drying” of Iowa came through vol-
untary action or from warnings by local law enforcement. In 
Fort Madison, tavern owners were called to City Hall and ad-
vised that “if they had illegal liquor to get rid of it,” said Police 
Chief Richard Peak, who called the town “drier than a bone.” 
Muscatine Police Chief Clifford Bennett reported that “almost 
all of the liquor is gone from Muscatine and all of it will be gone 
when Hughes becomes governor”; he said he had made it 
known that the laws would be enforced and that plain-clothes 
police officers would make periodic liquor checks. In Clinton 
most taverns stopped serving liquor in early January, said 
Police Chief M. H. Etherton, who added that two liquor raids 
at that time “gave some impetus” to the dry-up. Davenport’s 
tavern owners reached a “gentlemen’s agreement,” informally 
binding them to serve the last shot of liquor the evening of 
Saturday, January 13; the agreement was preceded by a well-
publicized promise by the Scott County attorney and sheriff to 
fully cooperate with state authorities to shut down the illegal 
liquor trade there.47  
 One clear sign that the change was real came with a drop in 
sales at the state liquor stores in traditionally “wet” counties on 
Iowa’s eastern and western borders. Merchants selling illegal 
liquor by the drink had purchased some product from Iowa 
state stores—despite statistics from the Hughes campaign 
showing that some alcohol came from outside the state—and, 
when that stopped, sales fell. Purchases at state stores for Janu-
ary 5–11 in Davenport, Dubuque, Bettendorf, and Council Bluffs 
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were estimated at 50 percent below the same week a year earlier. 
In Sioux City, Fort Dodge, and Carroll, sales were down by 
several thousand dollars compared to a year earlier. Sales were 
about the same or off only slightly in major stores in Cedar Rap-
ids, Waterloo, and Des Moines. “There is little doubt that the 
sales falloff is a result of Governor-elect Harold Hughes’s warn-
ing that illegal liquor sales must stop,” said Homer Adcock, who 
chaired the Iowa Liquor Control Commission. A week later, 
the commission reported that statewide liquor sales had fallen 
$85,000 from the previous year and, the next week, had plunged 
$100,000.48 
 Most merchants voluntarily ended over-the-counter liquor 
sales, but they did not see this as a permanent condition. Most 
accepted the halt of liquor sales as temporary, seeing it as put-
ting pressure on the legislature to change the law. Some said 
that the pause would last only until state agents demonstrated 
their course of action or lack of action. Ben Thomas, president of 
the Tavern Owners Association in Clinton, commented, “How 
long it will last, I don’t know. The dry-up is to show Hughes we 
are willing to co-operate. We want liquor by the drink.” “I’m 
interested in seeing what’s going to happen if the legislature 
ditches liquor by the drink,” said Carroll County Attorney Rob-
ert Bruner. “I personally think this will last as long as the gov-
ernor maintains his stiff attitude.”49 
 One reason many saw this as temporary is that merchants 
could not sustain the serious income losses they were suffering. 
“Our loss will be tremendous,” reported Robert Rosenthal, 
manager of Cedar Rapids Elks Lodge 251, which had removed 
all liquor from its bar. The owner of a leading bar in Sioux City 
said restaurant business had fallen sharply there and was going 
to South Sioux City, Nebraska. He added, “They think they’ve 
got a gold mine now.” Some establishments in Sioux City closed 
because they simply could not do business. By early February 
in the western Iowa city, many bartenders and waitresses were 
laid off, and meat and food sales to restaurants were below 
normal. Sioux City Councilman Julian Torgerson said that 11 
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conventions had either cancelled in Sioux City or moved across 
the river to South Sioux City. In Dubuque, city officials estimated 
that enforcement was costing the city a $1 million drop in busi-
ness, a $200,000 loss in wages, and $40,000 less in taxes for the 
city. The economic impact of enforcing the liquor-by-the-drink 
prohibition was real, significant, and affecting the lives of Iowans. 
In Davenport, Scott County Attorney Martin Lear said that by 
late January he had received no complaints of liquor being sold 
in bars—“not even any anonymous letters.” According to one 
Davenport tavern owner, “Business is lousy. I couldn’t sell 
enough beer to even pay my help.” Some city tavern owners 
increased the price of draft beer from 15 to 20 cents simply to 
make ends meet. A number of Davenport taverns closed before 
midnight due to lack of business.50 
 After Hughes took office as governor on January 17, 1963, 
he formally launched his effort to clamp down on illegal liquor 
sales. After a week on the job, the governor met with Attorney 
General Hultman and, in a joint news conference, Hultman 
pledged his full support to Hughes in state enforcement of liq-
uor laws. The attorney general said his role would be to give 
county attorneys a firm policy statement on liquor enforcement 
and handle relations with them on execution.51  
 By the end of January, according to a report submitted to 
Governor Hughes, state undercover agents had investigated 63 
taverns and clubs throughout Iowa over seven days and found 
no liquor for sale by the drink. Nevertheless, some still had not 
gotten the word, and the governor’s office was working behind 
the scenes to stamp out violations. Hughes and his aides re-
ceived several communications from Iowans, alerting them to 
operators still selling illegal liquor. Dwight Jensen, executive 
assistant to Hughes, received an unsigned letter on February 4, 
stating, “A good time to check on Phillis Tavern on Locust 
Street in Carter Lake, Iowa would be next Tuesday.” Jensen 
passed the letter on to Carl Pesch. On the same day, Jensen sent 
another letter to Pesch, describing a phone call he had received 
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from Elma Deacon of Bernard, Iowa, on sales at the Laverne 
Klocker establishment: “Mrs. Deacon reports the following: 
They are still selling liquor there. It has not stopped one bit. 
They have minors behind the bar serving liquor. Sometimes 
they don’t close until 1:30 on Sunday mornings. And, they have 
poker games every Saturday night. They keep liquor in a tool 
shed right outside the door and I think it’s time something is 
done about it.” Jensen added, “Would you please have this in-
vestigated?”52  
 Hughes himself contributed to this surreptitious assistance 
to law enforcement. In mid-February the governor related to 
Pesch a conversation he had had with Cresco Mayor Frank 
Church discussing a “liquor control problem in this town that 
he cannot solve and asked assistance from State Agents.” The 
mayor told Hughes that “local authorities are thwarted by polit-
ical strife between county and city officials.” “He added that his 
visit to Des Moines was known by several people in the town. 
For these reasons, he advises waiting about three weeks before 
sending a man in.” Hughes also conveyed to Pesch correspond-
ence he had received from a source on the Midwest Tavern in 
Davenport: “My informant says that the best time to investigate 
this situation is around 3:00 p.m. on Friday afternoon.” Later, the 
governor wrote to Pesch, “We have received information that 
Davenport is far from dry. The source of our information says 
that Davenport is 90% open on liquor, that bartenders are mix-
ing drinks in Coke and 7-Up bottles and pouring liquor from 
pitchers kept under the bar, and that he would like to see some 
action.” Still other letters from Hughes mentioned violations in 
Remsen, Merrill, and Hilton.53  
 The administration turned its words to action on both sides 
of the state beginning the evening of February 28. In Davenport, 
three state agents, together with local police, raided the Tip-
topper Tavern, arresting owner Chester Bowes, confiscating 18 
bottles of liquor and charging Bowes with possessing liquor on 
premises with a beer permit. The state agents had checked 15 
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taverns and clubs in Davenport that day and raided the Tip-
topper Tavern after they were able to purchase liquor there. 
Early in the morning of March 1, 35 officers (six state agents, six 
local regular and six special deputies, as well as sheriffs and 
other deputies from other counties) armed with a dozen shot-
guns raided the Shangri La Club owned by Leo Kublik at Carter 
Lake on the Nebraska/Iowa border north of Council Bluffs. 
In all, 127 bottles were seized at the club and another 48 were 
found in a car in the driveway. Several days later, in an action 
that was the result of undercover work by state agents, police 
raided the Chateau Club in Clinton, arresting owner Peter Ran-
kins of Camanche and confiscating 19 bottles of liquor. Raids 
continued in other areas of the state.54 
 Davenport’s over-the-counter liquor merchants proved to 
be more resilient than others in the state and received continued 
close attention from state agents. Another series of raids was 
planned in Davenport for Saturday evening, March 30, after 
state agents had either bought illegal liquor or watched it being 
sold in six Davenport establishments. The raids were called off 
after an agent overheard a barmaid in one tavern telling a cus-
tomer every detail of the plan, including the places to be raided, 
the exact times, and where the agents were to gather before 
staging the raids. Davenport law enforcement officials were 
blamed for the leak, creating some tension between them and 
state agents. Several days later, Hughes himself mentioned the 
cancelled raids in a Des Moines news conference, referring only 
to “a border city” and indicating that state agents might operate 
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there in the future with minimal local involvement. That was the 
policy when six state agents simultaneously raided two down-
town Davenport taverns on the evening of Wednesday, May 1, 
without the knowledge or assistance of the Davenport police, 
seizing four bottles and a glass at one place and three bottles 
and a glass at the other.55  
 Hughes was well aware that the statewide crackdown was 
putting a strain on Iowa law enforcement. At the end of March, 
he acknowledged that other law enforcement efforts were suffer-
ing because state agents were assigned to liquor enforcement. 
“If these agents are devoting their time to liquor law enforce-
ment, they cannot take part in investigations of murders, rob-
beries, burglaries and other crimes. But until present liquor laws 
are changed, they must be enforced.” The message was clear 
to legislators meeting in Des Moines: pass liquor-by-the-drink 
reform or face the dire consequences of hampered law enforce-
ment—to say nothing of the negative economic impact suffered 
by many merchants.56  
 
A MINIMUM of 55 votes was needed for passage in the 108-
member Iowa House. One legislator who was a longtime advo-
cate of liquor by the drink said in mid-January that he could 
count only 41 House members likely to support such legislation. 
Assistant House Majority Leader John Camp (R-Brant) counted 
35 “drys,” 40 “wets,” and 33 undecideds. Camp believed that 
seven or eight among the undecided would vote for a “good bill 
if convinced there are enough votes to pass it”; another two or 
three would vote for a bill containing a provision for compulsory 
testing of persons arrested for driving while intoxicated, leaving 
50 to 52 votes for a possible liquor-by-the-drink bill, just shy of a 
majority. At the beginning of the 1963 legislature, supporters of 
liquor by the drink had work to do.57 
 The divide between “wets” and “drys” was not partisan; it 
was an urban/rural issue, with members of each camp in both 
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parties. Democrats, led by Hughes, were for the most part on the 
side of change, though there were a few opponents within the 
party. The great battle was among the Republicans. Party leaders, 
such as George Nagle and Norman Erbe (after his change of 
heart), were on the side of reform. Given that the Republican 
platform in 1962 called for a “re-evaluation” of liquor laws, the 
Republican leadership in the legislature felt obligated to fully 
debate liquor by the drink in both chambers and not hold it up 
in committee. Some in the GOP privately argued that they 
could not afford to give Hughes a political victory by supporting 
and passing his liquor pledge; others, like Nagle, countered by 
warning that, if they did not pass liquor by the drink, Hughes 
would again carry the issue to the public in 1964—with possibly 
disastrous results for Republicans.58  
 Rural Republicans were also uneasy about another 1963 po-
litical issue—the Shaff Plan for legislative reapportionment—
that could be linked to the liquor issue. The Shaff Plan, drawn 
up by the Iowa Farm Bureau Federation and named after Re-
publican State Senator David Shaff of Clinton, called for a 99-
member House with one representative from each county and a 
Senate based on population. This was a compromise put forth 
by rural interests to deflect comprehensive change to a legislature 
based entirely on population. The plan had passed as a consti-
tutional amendment in the 1961 session of the legislature and 
would pass again in 1963; the proposal would go before the 
people in December 1963. Some Shaff supporters feared that, if 
liquor by the drink failed in the 1963 session, urban interests 
would blame the rural bias in the current General Assembly 
and reject the Shaff Plan at the polls. This caused some rural 
politicians to reconsider their longtime opposition to liquor by 
the drink. Another impact of the Shaff Plan was that it could 
potentially set up a House controlled by 24 percent or less of the 
Iowa population, creating a strong rural block to a liquor bill in 
future legislative sessions; this prompted liquor-by-the-drink 
supporters to push aggressively for reform in 1963 or risk losing 
a chance for years.59  
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 The legislative strategy of Hughes and the Democrats was 
to avoid introducing liquor legislation that could be labeled a 
“Democratic bill,” destined for probable defeat in the Republican-
dominated General Assembly. Instead, they decided to partici-
pate in a bipartisan effort. Supporters believed that efforts should 
begin in the Senate, where it had the best chance of passage. 
Thus, in mid-January, legislation was taken up by the Senate 
Judiciary II Committee. (This was one of two Senate Judiciary 
Committees, and it was responsible for liquor legislation.) The 
committee was chaired by Senator Jack Schroeder, Republican 
from Davenport and an ardent backer of liquor by the drink. 
Schroeder, 38 years old and vice president/general counsel of 
General Life of Iowa, had extensive contacts in both chambers; 
he had served several terms in both the Iowa House and Senate 
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Governor Harold Hughes addresses the Iowa General Assembly. Photo from 
SHSI, Des Moines. 
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and was the former Republican majority leader. It was well 
known that his committee had a solid “wet” majority.60 
 Legislators began their committee work against the back-
drop of statewide and local enforcement of current liquor laws, 
resulting in the “drying of Iowa” and intense statewide lobby-
ing for and against liquor by the drink. At first, it appeared that 
opponents held the upper hand. On January 21 alone, five peti-
tions opposing liquor by the drink were filed in the House with 
only one in favor. Tom Riley, one of the two representatives from 
Linn County, the second most populous county in the state, said 
that he had received 100 letters against a liquor bill and only one 
in favor; John Ely, Linn County’s other representative, had re-
ceived 22 letters against a bill and only one phone call in favor.61 
 Much of the opposition was spearheaded by church leaders, 
particularly the powerful Methodist church, with about 290,000 
members throughout Iowa. Methodist Bishop R. Gerald Ensley 
of Des Moines had already issued a statement in December 1962 
opposing liquor by the drink, saying that it would increase alco-
holism in Iowa and that every dollar collected in taxes would be 
offset by three to five dollars in expenses to combat “crime, pov-
erty and marital misery.” On January 4, the board of directors of 
the Iowa Council of Churches, representing 15 Protestant denom-
inations with 2,600 local congregations and 700,000 members, 
declared its opposition to liquor by the drink. They were joined 
on January 20 by the executive committee of the Iowa Yearly 
Meeting of Friends, which issued a statement that liquor by the 
drink would increase consumption, resulting in loss of life on 
highways and more crime. In late February the Iowa Council of 
Churches conducted an all-day meeting at Wesley Methodist 
Church, a block north of the Iowa Capitol, to discuss its position, 
inviting legislators to dinner and urging local churches statewide 
to invite their legislators to attend.62  
 Religious opposition to liquor by the drink was not unani-
mous, however. Episcopal Bishop Gordon Smith, speaking for 
his church, which had 25,000 members in Iowa, said, “This is 
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not a moral issue with us at all but merely a question of the best 
way to control the use of alcohol. The present Iowa liquor laws 
have proven inadequate to properly control liquor and have 
produced attendant evils including the key club situation and a 
general disrespect for law and order. We should enact liquor-
by-the-drink legislation which can be enforced and accepted by 
the majority of our citizens as the proper way of handling the 
liquor problem.” Speaking for Iowa’s 435,000 Catholics, Bishop 
James J. Burnes observed that “nowhere in history has the 
Church condemned the moderate use of liquor.” Citing respect 
for law and its enforcement, he called the existing liquor laws 
“bad legislation and therefore not law.” Among religious leaders 
supporting change, the most direct was Rabbi Irving A. Wein-
gar of Tifereth Israel Synagogue, Des Moines. “We have no ob-
jection to liquor. We never have a celebration without the use of 
wine. . . . I personally believe that our present liquor laws are a 
farce. We are taking honest people and making them dishonest. 
If liquor is evil, then let’s make an issue of liquor, not of liquor 
by the bottle or by the glass. Certainly people will violate liquor-
by-the-drink laws. But this would be better than what we have 
now—plain drinking without any control.”63 
 Opposition to liquor by the drink also stemmed from a non-
religious body. In a half-page ad appearing in the statewide 
Sunday Des Moines Register in March, the Preferred Risk Mutual 
Insurance Company of Des Moines, calling itself “America’s 
Original Non-Drinkers Auto Insurance Company,” issued a 
message to Iowans, “Is Liquor-by-the-Drink Worth 44 Lives?” 
Citing statistics from surrounding states, the ad argued, “If 
Iowa’s highway death toll had been the same as liquor-by-the-
drink neighbors, it would mean 44 more Iowans killed last year.” 
It urged readers to call, telephone, or write legislators through 
card or letter to tell them to vote against liquor reform. The ad 
also offered readers a free report: “Will Legalizing Liquor-by-
the-Drink Increase the Death Toll on Iowa’s Highways?”64 
 During a press conference in mid-January, against the back-
drop of lobbying efforts by some religious groups and others, 
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Hughes urged “wets” to be more vocal in voicing their opinions 
to legislators. Legislators had told the governor that most of 
their mail was running against liquor by the drink and that 
much of it was organized by religious groups, primarily the 
Methodist church. One rural Democratic legislator told Hughes 
that he was personally in favor of reform but that he had re-
ceived 300 letters against liquor law change and only one in fa-
vor. Hughes insisted that “persons who want the law changed 
must organize in conveying their feelings to legislators.”65 
 The governor was also beginning to play hardball with 
Democratic legislators. In a meeting at the Hotel Savery in Des 
Moines in late January with his party’s legislative caucus, in-
cluding an estimated eight “dry” Democrats, Hughes warned 
that failure to support liquor by the drink “may determine the 
amount of consideration their recommendations for appoint-
ments in state jobs may get.” He added that he would “mobilize 
every man he can find to enforce the present law in the next two 
years, if the legislature does not act on the liquor issue.”66 
 One unexpected argument against liquor reform was that 
enforcement of current law was actually working, so no change 
was needed. A young Charles Grassley, then a state representa-
tive from New Hartford and a solid “dry,” said, “The Hughes 
campaign is proof the law can be enforced and there is little 
need for a change.” But the general feeling among most legisla-
tors was that enforcement was only temporary and could not 
continue, given the strains it placed on law enforcement and 
local economies; after the initial pressure, establishments would 
simply go back to selling liquor. As Representative Scott Swisher 
(D-Iowa City) said, “There are not enough law enforcement 
officers in the state to override the wishes of the people.”67 
 Hughes’s call for petitions and, no doubt, a response to state 
and local enforcement began to bear fruit by early February. An 
unofficial tally of petitions received in the Iowa House showed 
60,000 names in favor of liquor by the drink and 4,000 against.  
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By February 21, nearly 100,000 Iowans had petitioned legislators 
in favor, with only 6,031 against. Representative Riley Dietz (R-
Walcott), who was tracking the petition numbers, said, “In sev-
eral instances, legislators have received more signatures favor-
ing liquor by the drink than they did votes in last November’s 
election.” One representative, after receiving another packet of 
petitions favoring liquor by the drink, said, “I thought my county 
was dry.” In addition to petitions, legislators were being over-
whelmed by letters from voters. George Mills of the Des Moines 
Register called it the “biggest mail session of modern times.”68 
 By mid-February, Governor Hughes was regularly meeting 
with a bipartisan group of legislators from both houses, includ-
ing Schroeder of Davenport and the Senate and House majority 
leaders, to see how votes were lining up on the liquor issue and 
to discuss the shape of legislation. The numbers were looking 
good, though specific legislation had not yet been drawn up. 
The Des Moines Register reported on February 20 that a survey 
of House members showed 58 representatives—36 Republicans 
and 22 Democrats—backed general liquor-by-the-drink legisla-
tion, surpassing the 55 votes needed for passage.69  
 Senator Schroeder, leading the legislative writing of the bill 
and guiding it through the Senate, refused to accept any deals 
or “horse trading” to get liquor by the drink passed. “If legisla-
tors—after receiving the petitions they have received for legaliz-
ing liquor and after the polls indicating the vast majority of 
Iowans are in favor of changing the present laws—aren’t willing 
to vote for a measure on its merits then certainly I’m not going 
to be willing to trade or exert any undue pressure to get a liquor 
bill passed.” He saw passage of the liquor reform effort as noth-
ing less than the preservation of the Iowa Republican Party. 
“My own feeling is that the future of the Republican party in 
Iowa is at stake and that changing the liquor laws could be its 
redemption. If, as the majority party in Iowa, we Republicans 
don’t accede to the wishes of a majority of the people, then 
sooner or later we’ll become the minority party.”70 
                                                 
68. Des Moines Register, 2/11/1963; Cedar Rapids Gazette, 2/21/1963. 
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 In a further effort to counter pressure from church groups 
against liquor reform, Democratic and Republican legislative 
supporters met with business leaders at the Wakonda Country 
Club in Des Moines in late February—just ahead of a weeklong 
midterm recess when legislators would be talking with voters. 
At this strategy session, participants urged the business people 
to apply pressure to House members considered “marginal” on 
the liquor issue. Senate Majority Leader Robert Rigler (R-New 
Hampton), one of the leaders of the gathering, said, “It would be 
very helpful if business groups such as Chambers of Commerce 
and commercial clubs take a stand and let their legislators know 
how they feel about liquor by the drink” and “how the business 
men back home felt about it.” Robert Tyson, executive secretary 
of the Republican state central committee, announced on March 1 
that he and other Republicans would fan out across the state 
during the legislative recess to gain additional support for liquor 
by the drink.71  
 As the issue continued to drag on into late March without 
action, Hughes applied public pressure to legislators. In a speech 
at a six-county Democratic dinner in Perry that was publicized 
statewide in a press release, the governor said, “It would be 
disastrous if they wait much longer.” He called on legislative 
leaders to “start taking action—and soon—on a sensible liquor 
control bill.” Repeating his earlier arguments that “we will soon 
see this state drift into an atmosphere of cynicism where there 
will be little respect for any law,” he said that his enforcement 
efforts since January did not “mean we have made Iowa ‘dry’ or 
halted the intemperate use of alcohol. It only means we have 
driven bootlegging in this state further underground. Make no 
mistake about it. If the people of Iowa do not wish Iowa to be 
dry, a few state police agents cannot make it dry.” Tossing aside 
the arguments of some “drys” that enforcement could work in 
the long run, he said that it was temporary at best and liquor-
by-the-drink reform was the only alternative to lawlessness.72 
 
                                                 
71. Cedar Rapids Gazette, 3/1/1963. 
72. “Press release on address to six-county Democratic dinner in Perry, March 
27, 1963,” Press Releases 1963, box 25, HEH Papers. 
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PROPOSED LEGISLATION finally emerged from the Senate 
Judiciary II Committee on Wednesday, April 4, on a 7–0 com-
mittee vote. The only token opposition came from Senator Jacob 
Grimstead (R-Lake Mills), a committed “dry” who still spoke 
with a Norwegian accent. By voting “present,” according to the 
Cedar Rapids Gazette, he “yielded to the growing demand for le-
galized glass liquor sales.” (Schroeder told Grimstead at the vote, 
“Jake, you’ve come a long way.”) The committee bill called for a 
10 percent tax on gross receipts from the sale of alcoholic bever-
ages and set up licenses with different fee levels among four 
classes: clubs, hotels/motels, commercial establishments with 
tables and seats for at least 25 people, and airlines and railroads. 
The bill set hour limits on liquor sales. City and town councils 
and county boards of supervisors would have final approval on 
whether liquor licenses would be issued. There was no provi-
sion in the bill for a “local option” vote to prohibit sales within 
counties or towns. After reading the proposed bill, Governor 
Hughes objected to a clause limiting liquor sales to only within 
business districts, which would prevent neighborhood taverns 
from participating, and he said that he would prefer that en-
forcement powers be under the Liquor Commission rather than 
the Bureau of Criminal Investigation. But that was only the be-
ginning of the negotiating process.73  
 The bill’s supporters waited a week before bringing the leg-
islation to the Senate floor. Hoping to get a jump on opponents 
and avoid an avalanche of phone calls to wavering legislators, 
on Wednesday, April 10, at 9:37 a.m. they suddenly announced 
that they would begin debate. Senators Schroeder and David O. 
Shaff led the floor fight for the bill and thwarted most attempts 
to amend it. Opponents—led by Senators Eugene M. Hill (D-
Newton), a farmer, and John A. Walker (R-Williams), a banker 
and farmer—made several attempts to increase license fees, but 
these were rejected. “If we get the cost too prohibitive,” argued 
Schroeder, “it will give incentive to circumvention through 
bootlegging.”74 
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 One turning point in the debate came with the effort to in-
clude “implied consent” in the bill; this meant that, when a citi-
zen signed his or her driver’s license, it implied that the person 
had given consent for chemical tests of breath or body fluid for 
alcohol content if suspected of drunken driving. Presiding over 
the Senate, Lieutenant Governor William Moody ruled the pro-
vision out of order because it was contained in legislation cur-
rently being debated in the House. Without the “implied con-
sent” clause in the proposed legislation, some Senate supporters 
considered changing their vote to “no,” throwing the bill’s pas-
sage into doubt.75  
 As the debate lingered on that day, it was obvious that sup-
porters did not yet have the votes to pass the legislation, so they 
stalled with unplanned speeches and questions while applying 
pressure to undecided senators. The battle was for the votes of 
three individuals—Leigh Curran of Mason City, Donald Beneke 
of Laurens, and Irving Long of Manchester, all Republicans. “At 
midmorning, we had 26 or 27 votes [26 were needed for passage],” 
said one senator supporting liquor by the drink, “but as the 
radio announced over Iowa that the debate was on, the pressure 
started pouring into this chamber.” This included calls from 
ministers and other opponents throughout Iowa; they came in 
person, calling senators off the floor to lobby, and flooded the 
Senate’s telephone switchboard. At late afternoon, Mason City’s 
Curran was at the center of the pressure tactics, receiving calls, 
pro and con, from his home county and taking part in hushed 
discussions in the Senate cloakrooms, aisles, and hallways. Fi-
nally, at 4:41 p.m., talk suddenly stopped in the chamber for the 
first time that day and Senate Secretary Carroll Lane’s voice 
started reading the roll call in alphabetical order. When Leigh 
Curran voted “Aye,” an anonymous voice from the floor cried, 
“That does it!” When the roll call was finished, the Iowa Senate 
had passed its liquor-by-the-drink bill, 26–24.76 
 The final Senate vote divided both political parties. Seventeen 
Republicans and 9 Democrats voted yes; 21 Republicans and 3 
Democrats voted no. In addition to Curran, two other known 
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“drys” voted for the bill: Charles Van Eaton (R-Sioux City) and 
George O’Malley (D-Des Moines). “I’m against liquor in any 
form,” said Van Eaton after the vote. “I am also a practical indi-
vidual. I’ve seen attempts to enforce the present liquor law and 
it can’t be enforced. The whole question is this: Are you going to 
have liquor by the drink in Iowa legal or illegal?” Cedar Rapids 
Gazette reporter Frank Nye added up the county populations rep-
resented by the senators voting for and against the bill, coming 
up with a total of 1,829,362 to 928,175. “This vote pretty well bears 
out the polls which indicated that about two-thirds of Iowa’s 
residents are for legalizing liquor by the drink,” he wrote.77 
 All Iowa eyes then turned to the House. By late April 1963, 
the House had received petitions from 143,022 Iowans in favor 
of liquor by the drink and 29,208 opposed. But several compli-
cations emerged. A group of southwest Iowa House members 
threatened to vote against the liquor bill if the Senate raised the 
Iowa sales tax from 2 to 3 percent to pay for growing state ex-
penses; Representative Conrad Ossian (R-Red Oak), speaking for 
the group, said, “The number is enough to beat a liquor bill.” 
Some representatives proposed legislation forbidding sales of 
beer by any establishment other than a licensed liquor estab-
lishment, drawing fire from tavern operators and grocery stores 
that probably would not choose to get liquor licenses but still 
wanted to sell beer. Others were strongly opposed to the pro-
vision allowing city and town councils and county boards of 
supervisors to have final approval on granting liquor licenses, 
saying it would put enormous pressure on local officials and 
make liquor an issue at every council and supervisor election; 
instead, some favored a vote by the people. Still others insisted 
that the “implied consent” clause be added to the bill. As the 
date of debate neared, House supporters were unsure of the 
bill’s future. “I simply don’t know what’s going to happen,” 
said Representative John Mowry (R-Marshalltown), the bill’s 
floor leader. “I’m not even sure which day we’ll take it up.” 
Hughes predicted that the House would pass reform by one 
vote, saying, “It will be a bloody and close battle.”78 
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 On Wednesday, May 1, 1963, the House began debate by 
voting down a so-called “dry” amendment, 59–49, which 
would have defined beer as an intoxicating beverage, banning 
package sales of beer at grocery and drug stores. By defeating 
that amendment, the House made the Senate bill the liquor ve-
hicle. The likelihood of passage brightened when the block of 
anti–sales tax representatives indicated their support for the bill 
since it looked like the 3 percent tax would go down to defeat 
in the Senate. In turn, liquor-by-the-drink supporters selected 
the leader of the anti-tax group, Representative Bill Scherle (R-
Henderson), to direct the bill in the House. Later that day, the 
House passed the “implied consent” amendment, 79–29, incor-
porating into the bill a mandate that motorists under arrest for 
drinking must take a chemical test for intoxication or automati-
cally lose their license. By then, even “dry” House members 
conceded that a bill would pass. Charles Grassley, who, along 
with nine others, had proposed the implied consent amendment, 
said, “Many sincere drys want to be able to vote for liquor by 
the drink. They have conditioned their action on the acceptance 
of implied consent by the Senate.” While noting that “I would 
like to see liquor by the drink killed every place,” he admitted, 
“It appears that liquor by the drink will pass this session.”79  
 The final House bill was shaped by votes and compromises 
over the next few days. By 71–37, members voted down an effort 
to give counties the right to vote “wet” or “dry” every four years 
when petitioned by 10 percent of those voting for governor in 
the most recent election. The goal was to make it plain that 
counties could not have liquor by the drink unless they voted 
for it. Known as the “dry local option,” this meant that a county 
would be “dry” unless it voted itself “wet,” in contrast to the 
“wet local option,” which would allow counties to vote them-
selves “dry.” The House agreed to the latter, allowing people to 
vote their areas “dry” in special elections. By a vote of 53–51, 
House members also removed the ceiling on the number of li-
censes that could be issued for sale of liquor by the drink by a 
city or town council or a county board of supervisors; supporters 
argued that this would eliminate any under-the-table bidding 
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for licenses, permitting market demand and the public through 
elected officials to determine the number of establishments. The 
vote also removed the provision limiting licenses to within city 
business districts. The House version created an enforcement 
provision authorizing the Iowa Liquor Control Commission to 
police liquor operations throughout the state. Key clubs, which 
were at the center of so much debate over the years, were legis-
lated out of existence; rather than granting Iowans the right to 
bring their own bottles of liquor to store and pour at establish-
ments, legislators, hoping to improve enforcement, granted 
businesses the right to serve drinks to customers.80  
 On May 3, the Iowa House passed its liquor-by-the-drink bill, 
68–40, a more lopsided vote than anyone would have predicted 
months earlier. With all 108 members voting, 45 Republicans 
and 23 Democrats voted for it and 34 Republicans and 6 Demo-
crats opposed it. The Cedar Rapids Gazette’s Nye again added up 
the pro and con county totals based on county populations, 
showing that the 68 yes votes represented 2,073,898 residents and 
the 40 no votes represented 683,639, a 3 to 1 margin. In a state-
ment issued on the day of the House passage, Governor Hughes 
specifically cited for special commendation “the many members 
of the House from nonurban areas who voted for this bill, doing 
what they thought was right despite great pressure of a highly 
emotional nature from their home districts.” He added, “This bill 
will control liquor-by-the-drink, for the first time since Iowa 
became a state in 1846. We have had for the past 107 years hy-
pocrisy, double standards of law enforcement, dry laws and a 
wet state. We have never had adequate liquor control. Today’s 
action by the House is a step toward bringing this to an end.”81  
 The final legislative stage was for the Senate to concur with 
the House amendments. The Senate passed the bill, 27–23, on 
May 9, gaining the vote of an additional senator with passage of 
the “wet local option” feature. The bill then went to Hughes for 
his signature. Even after the agreement of both chambers, some 
looked upon the bill’s passage with gloom. Senator Franklin 
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Main (D-Lamoni) said, “We are approaching a brink of moral 
decay with the passage of this bill.” Others cited historical 
change. Representative John Murray (D-Fort Dodge) believed 
that the law would end “an age of hypocrisy and disrespect for 
the law.” Still others were even-handed. According to Senator 
Donald Beneke (R-Laurens), “This liquor bill won’t produce the 
dire results the drys predict or the rosy future for Iowa the wets 
predict.”82  
 For the man who was the force behind the change—
Governor Harold E. Hughes—the bill’s passage was “states-
manship of the highest order.” At the signing ceremony on 
Tuesday morning, May 14, 1963, Hughes said, “It is the peculiar 
genius of democracy that persons with diverse points of view 
can get together and work out solutions to complex problems 
that are in the public interest. In my opinion, this is exactly 
what happened with this liquor bill. . . . Those who followed the 
development of this legislation were amazed at the way wets 
and dries, Republicans and Democrats, worked together pa-
tiently, subordinating their individual interests to the interest of 
the state as a whole.”83 
 
THE LAW went into effect on July 4, 1963, and the Iowa Liquor 
Commission began to issue licenses the day after the holiday. 
Within days, the commission had approved 567 licenses for 
establishments scattered throughout 64 of Iowa’s 99 counties. 
By the end of the month, 91 counties had liquor by the drink. 
Over the next year, the commission issued 2,452 licenses. Iowa 
liquor sales to over-the-counter buyers in the first year of 
liquor-by-the-drink legalization was $11,778,048 out of the total 
of $49,778,394 in state liquor, wine, and ale sales, an increase of 
more than $5 million from the previous fiscal year. It was im-
possible to estimate sales of liquor drinks—and state income 
that was not collected—from prior years, but presumably most 
over-the-counter liquor sales in fiscal year 1964 were legal and 
taxed. The State of Iowa collected more than $3 million through 
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the 10 percent per drink tax, part of the overall $19 million from 
state liquor sales contributed to the state’s General Fund and 
local city, town, and county governments in fiscal year 1964. 
The state was well on its way to collecting taxes on liquor sales 
that it had missed in prior years.84 
 By 1970, the Liquor Commission was issuing 3,172 licenses 
annually, earning $1,175,675 for the state. By then, the liquor- 
per-drink tax had increased to 15 percent and was contributing 
$3,271,619 to state and local governments. In addition, a 3 per-
cent sales tax that went into effect in 1967 brought in $1,623,384 
to the state coffers from over-the-counter liquor sales. The amount 
of liquor sold to licensees through Iowa monopoly stores to-
taled $21,481,666, with the state earning profits from those sales. 
Liquor by the drink was contributing to the budgets of both 
state and local governments—and it was legal and regulated 
throughout the state.85  
 
WITH THE PASSAGE of liquor by the drink in 1963, legal 
alcohol availability among adults within Iowa became settled 
policy, ending a conflict that had raged in the state since its be-
ginning. To date, there have been no significant efforts by Iowa 
legislators or governors to pull back liquor sales from the gen-
eral adult population. This debate’s demise accompanied the 
transition of Iowa from a state with powerful rural interests that 
kept liquor limitations alive as a political issue to one of more 
urban sensibilities more tolerant of alcohol consumption. 
 Alcohol consumption and distribution were certainly politi-
cal issues in Iowa after 1963, but never in relation to limiting the 
general adult population’s access to liquor. Throughout the 1970s 
and 1980s, the minimum legal drinking age in Iowa fluctuated 
from 21 to 19 to 18 and finally back to 21. Efforts to curb drunken 
driving prompted legislators to establish minimum legal blood 
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alcohol levels and set strict fines, jail time, and driver’s license 
confiscation for violators. During the Farm Crisis of the 1980s, 
Iowa political leaders, who were looking for reductions in state 
expenses, eliminated state liquor monopoly stores and shifted 
to distribution through private businesses. 
 The fundamental reason for the end of this debate on over-
the-counter liquor access in Iowa is that Iowans wanted it to end. 
In the nineteenth century, clear majorities of Iowa voters wanted 
prohibition—as shown in the popular votes of 1847 and 1882—
though enforcement was a significant challenge. Politicians tried 
to chart courses between the desire to eliminate liquor and the 
reality that some Iowans wanted to continue to drink alcohol. 
Prohibition returned in the early twentieth century, but Iowans 
showed that their attitudes were changing by narrowly rejecting 
state constitutional prohibition in 1917 and voting for repeal of 
national prohibition in 1933. In 1934 Iowans turned to a state 
monopoly distribution system to manage and control liquor 
sales, but soon residents, wanting expanded availability, voted 
with their actions by defying the law in many quarters. When 
Harold Hughes gave Iowans a clear choice in 1962 to open the 
state to liquor by the drink, they voted him into office. That was 
not the only issue in the campaign, but it was a significant one, 
and his victory was seen as a mandate to change Iowa’s liquor 
laws. Given the tools of government, Hughes—with bipartisan 
support in the Iowa legislature—aggressively fought to accom-
modate the will of Iowans of the time. This reform of Iowa’s 
liquor laws closed a debate among Iowans that had been fought 
for over a century, making it Iowa’s last liquor battle. 
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The Origins of the  
Iowa Development Commission:  
Agricultural Transformation  
and Industrial Development  
in Mid–Twentieth-Century Iowa  
KEITH OREJEL 
ON JULY 1, 1945, the Fifty-first Iowa General Assembly passed 
an act creating the Iowa Development Commission (IDC). The 
commission, as a later report explained, was to serve as the “state’s 
official promotional agency,” tasked with overseeing postwar 
economic development. The state legislature assigned the IDC a 
“three-fold responsibility”: (1) research, specifically the “collec-
tion of facts and figures pertinent to Iowa’s economy”; (2) infor-
mation, centering on a “program of publicity and education 
about Iowa”; and (3) promotion, defined as “the procurement of 
new industrial enterprise, and the encouragement of existing 
business and industry.” The IDC’s membership was composed 
largely of “business and professional men,” along with a handful 
of state legislators, all of whom were appointed by the governor. 
A professional staff headed by a salaried director oversaw the 
group’s day-to-day operations.1  
 Although it received only modest attention at the time, the 
creation of the Iowa Development Commission was a ground- 
breaking event. The IDC was the first of its kind within the state— 
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a permanent government agency dedicated primarily to promot-
ing industrialization.2 With the formation of the IDC, the state of 
Iowa entered a modern era of government-sponsored economic 
development, as the public sector played an expansive role in the 
pursuit of manufacturing and other enterprises. A bold move 
into the cutthroat competition for new industry, the creation of 
the IDC represented a direct response to long-term agricultural 
transformations and new industrial opportunities that con-
verged during World War II.  
 Since the 1920s, farmers throughout rural America had con-
fronted a volatile global market, with declining crop prices re-
sulting in shrinking incomes and rising farm foreclosure rates. In 
an attempt to hold on to their property and maintain their stand-
ards of living, many farmers adopted new practices aimed at in-
creasing productivity. Farmers with available capital invested in 
machinery (primarily tractors) and other technological innova-
tions to maximize output. But these decisions not only failed to 
alleviate the plight of the farmer, they also initiated structural 
transformations that undermined the fabric of rural society. In-
creased output drove prices down further, necessitating ever 
greater production to survive. The social implications of these 
developments were staggering. As rural historian David 
Danbom has shown, “The minority of farmers whose ownership 
of tractors increased productivity intensified economic pressures 
on others.” Many farmers mortgaged their property to the hilt in 
order to keep up, while those unable to compete “withdrew from 
agriculture, usually by selling to expanding neighbors.” With 
“fewer farms and declining labor needs on those that remained,” 
the “pace of rural-to-urban migration” reached new heights. 
Outmigration led to the “deterioration of rural social networks,” 
since “depopulation” resulted in “fewer parishioners for 
churches and fewer pupils for schools.” Local businesses and 
other institutions also buckled under the weight of mass exodus.3 
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  Despite attempts by federal bureaucrats to limit overproduc-
tion during the 1930s, the New Deal did not significantly hinder 
the transformation of agriculture. In some ways, the New Deal 
propelled farm modernization. Federal agencies such as the Agri-
cultural Adjustment Administration and the Commodity Credit 
Corporation provided American farmers with infusions of capi-
tal through acreage reduction and price support programs. With 
fewer overall acres in use and more income generated by transfer 
payments and government-backed price levels, market-oriented 
farmers continued to improve their individual circumstances 
through greater productivity.4 
 Farm mechanization and rural outmigration were already 
issues by the early 1940s, but World War II accelerated those pro-
cesses. The global conflict catalyzed what some scholars have 
referred to as a “production revolution.” The number of tractors 
in use exploded during the war in response to labor shortages, 
resulting in the permanent replacement of manpower with ma-
chines. Simultaneously, rural and small-town inhabitants migrated 
en masse to nearby industrial centers to fill growing demand in 
wartime factories.5  
 Iowa was hit hard by agricultural restructuring. Farming in 
Iowa underwent the early stages of consolidation (a process that 
would continue for much of the century). Larger, more productive 
farms gobbled up smaller units, pushing many out of agriculture. 
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Between 1920 and 1950, Iowa’s farm population declined from 
984,799 to 790,424. Outmigration and depopulation caused the 
state as a whole to experience anemic population growth in the 
1920s, 1930s, and 1940s, with increases of only 2.8, 2.7, and 3.3 
percent. The U.S. population, in comparison, grew by 16.1, 7.2, 
and 14.5 percent during the same decades.6  
 During World War II, these decades-old rural ailments inter-
sected with new industrial opportunities. In response to the out-
break of war in Europe, the state legislature in 1940 created the 
Iowa Industrial and Defense Commission, which brought to-
gether a coalition of elected officials, agribusiness representatives, 
labor leaders, industrialists, and other notables. The commission 
melded state-level civilian defense with a campaign to acquire 
wartime industries. The acquisition of several major ordnance 
plants and smaller factories during the war created enthusiasm 
for industrial development. Proud of their accomplishments, but 
fearful of the potentially disastrous effects of peacetime recon-
version, state officials called for a permanent program of indus-
trialization after the conflict.  
 The Iowa Development Commission (IDC) was created in 
1945 out of the simultaneous confidence created by the war that 
new industry would come to Iowa and growing fears about the 
continual loss of farm jobs and rural inhabitants. In Iowa, indus-
trial development and agricultural transformations went hand in 
hand. But if changes in farming motivated many state officials to 
pursue industrialization, agricultural interests shaped the nature 
of Iowa’s postwar industrial campaign. Agribusiness represent-
atives, primarily the Iowa Farm Bureau Federation, insisted that 
new industries should not infringe on large landholders’ access 
to cheap labor. Also, agricultural interests pressed for industries 
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that would process farm products, thereby generating demand 
for their crops, eggs, milk, and meat.  
 The IDC addressed these various interests by laying out its 
vision for a “balanced economy.” In early promotional material, 
the IDC melded agricultural transformations and industrial de-
velopment into a blueprint that promised prosperity, harmony, 
and growth. In this synthesis, displaced agricultural producers 
and laborers, freed from farming by mechanization and scientific 
advancements, would staff newly acquired industries. Promising 
mutual benefit to both agriculture and industry, the IDC gave the 
most attention to recruiting enterprises that would utilize the 
state’s natural resources and farm products. Those business con-
cerns would then increase demand for Iowa’s abundant raw 
materials.  
 By analyzing the origins of the IDC, this article adds to the 
wealth of scholarship highlighting the interconnection between ag-
riculture and industry in the greater Midwest. In his classic work, 
Nature’s Metropolis, William Cronon emphasized the symbiotic 
relationship between city and countryside, showing how agri-
cultural production, resource extraction, and rural consumerism 
in the hinterland facilitated the rise of urban industrial Chicago.7 
More recent scholarship, most notably the valuable work of 
Wilson J. Warren, has emphasized the persistent importance of 
“agro-industrialization” in the economic development of Iowa 
and the Midwest. Farm-oriented industries, such as meatpacking 
and flour milling, have, since the nineteenth century, been at the 
center of the rural industrial economy.8 The early years of the 
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Iowa Development Commission represented one facet of these 
longstanding and well-documented development patterns.  
 At the same time, the IDC represented an important institu-
tional breakthrough in the history of rural industrialization, a 
development that has received little scholarly attention. The cre-
ation of the IDC signaled the state government’s modern stew-
ardship of economic development, elevating industrialization to 
official public policy. Much like James C. Cobb’s characterization 
of Mississippi’s Balance Agriculture with Industry program, the 
IDC embodied a “long-term commitment to state sanctioned and 
supervised economic development.”9 This article contributes to 
existing scholarship by showing how and why industrial de-
velopment became institutionalized in Iowa. Industrialization 
achieved a new level of government sponsorship during World 
War II because of concerns about rapid changes in agriculture. 
The precipitous decline in farm jobs led many state officials to 
conclude that only concerted government action could stem out-
migration. Faith in state intervention was reinforced by Iowa’s 
wartime experiment with industrial development. Iowa had ex-
perienced industrialization in the past, but it was the agrarian 
crisis of the mid–twentieth century that produced the modern 
form of government-directed development exemplified by the 
IDC.  
 It is important to note that this article, as the title indicates, is 
an origin story. The IDC would have a long career, operating 
under its original name until 1986, when it was replaced by the 
Department of Economic Development (which was later sup-
planted by the Iowa Economic Development Authority). Rather 
than tackling the organization’s entire history, this study exam-
ines the IDC’s founding and early promotional efforts, focusing 
especially on the interconnection between agriculture and indus-
trial development.  
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THE IOWA Industrial Resources and Defense Council held its 
first meeting in the offices of Governor George A. Wilson at two 
o’clock on Tuesday, September 10, 1940, almost a year after the 
invasion of Poland by German forces, and roughly four months 
since the fall of France.10 Present at the meeting were representa-
tives from the most important interest groups in the state, includ-
ing A. A. Couch, president of the Iowa Federation of Labor; Frank 
Wilson, president of the Iowa United Mine Workers of America; 
Allen Klein, vice-chairman of the Iowa Farm Bureau; R. R. O’Brien, 
publisher of the Council Bluffs Nonpareil; George S. Call, a mem-
ber of the executive committee of the Midwest Defense Confer-
ence; J. Tracy Garrett, editor of the Burlington Hawkeye-Gazette; 
Ralph Smith, president of the Iowa Grange; Edward Kimball, 
president of the Iowa Manufacturers Association (a state branch 
of the National Association of Manufacturers); L. A. Rowland, 
vice-president of John Deere and Company; and Dale L. Maffitt, 
general manager of the Des Moines Water Works. The group’s 
diversity reflected the need for economic cooperation among all 
sectors of the Iowa economy, as well as for communication be-
tween public representatives and private interest groups, for the 
purpose of wartime preparedness. In the words of one member, 
the “cross-section of representation on the Council” was an at-
tempt at “unselfishness and working toward the welfare of both 
the state and the nation.”11 
 Governor Wilson started the gathering by laying out the goals 
and responsibilities of the newly formed group. Given recent 
developments across the globe, the central focus was Iowa’s role 
“in the national defense program.” Wilson called for the collection 
of data on “Iowa’s manufacturing, processes, transportation, re-
sources and labor,” all of which was meant to ensure that the state 
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would be ready at a moment’s notice should the country start mo-
bilizing for war. Undergirding these grand ideals and national 
civic values, however, were more material and pragmatic con-
cerns. Wilson insisted that all “the information received by the 
Council” must be “made available to every community in Iowa” 
so that “the industries and citizens of the state may receive the full-
est benefit of this national expansion” of the defense sector. Wilson 
made clear that one of the commission’s central duties was “mak-
ing . . . applications for the location of new industries” in Iowa.12  
 Hovering over these initiatives were the menacing specters 
of outmigration and depopulation that had plagued Iowa since 
the 1920s. Commission member L. A. Rowland, vice-president of 
John Deere and Company, “expressed the opinion that labor 
supply was basic and that everything must be done to keep labor 
here in Iowa.” Noting that the “construction of munitions facto-
ries has a tendency to draw not alone men but supplies from 
Iowa for the industrial centers,” Rowland implicitly suggested 
that an agricultural state like Iowa could only hope to hold on to 
its domestic population and economic resources by achieving 
some degree of industrialization.13 Many in Iowa’s local com-
munities shared Rowland’s perspective. The Centerville Iowegian, 
the town of Centerville’s local newspaper, argued in 1940 that 
“southern Iowa has many ex-farmers and coal miners who are 
now jobless. They must either remain in the small towns on relief 
or go to the cities to get work.”14  
 Council members realized that the imperatives of modern 
warfare played to their advantage. Observers of the international 
scene forecasted that total war, especially the aerial bombard-
ments witnessed during the Spanish Civil War and the invasion 
of Poland, made the concentration of industrial facilities in large 
urban centers a defensive liability.15 As a result, Frank Wilson of 
                                                 
12. “Minutes of the Meeting of the IIRDC, September 10, 1940,” 2. 
13. Ibid., 3.  
14. “Iowa Industrial Institute Seeks War Industries,” Centerville Iowegian, 12/19/ 
1940.  
15. George C. Herring, From Colony to Superpower: U.S. Foreign Relations Since 
1776 (New York, 2008), 484. An excellent discussion of aerial warfare’s psycho-
logical effects and its political ramifications for the larger world can be found in 
Richard Evans, The Third Reich in Power (New York, 2005), and idem, The Third 
Reich at War (New York, 2009).  
Iowa Development Commission       55 
the Iowa United Mine Workers of America asserted, “We were 
undoubtedly headed toward the decentralization of industry,” 
which would “apparently be accomplished by the necessity of 
national defense.” Governor Wilson made similar claims in nu-
merous public statements, arguing on one occasion, “If there is 
any single lesson which has come out of Europe, it is that the de-
centralization of defense industry is equal in importance to the 
scattering of airports.”16 
 From the Defense Council’s first meeting it was apparent that 
Iowa’s industrial development program would have to accom-
modate itself to the demands of agribusiness. Allen Klein, vice-
chairman of the Farm Bureau, insisted that all “new plants will 
require” a “proper relation to agriculture.” Klein spoke for 
Iowa’s “agricultural interests” when he argued that “considera-
tion” in “locating industries” had to be given to ensure that there 
would be “no shortage or surplus of labor.” While Klein claimed 
to have the interests of rural and small-town communities at 
heart, he was obviously attempting to protect agribusiness’s ac-
cess to cheap labor when he concluded, “Larger industries must 
be located near larger communities.”17  
 The first meeting of the Iowa Industrial Resources and De-
fense Council, which would soon be renamed the Iowa Industrial 
and Defense Commission (IIDC), set the tone for the organiza-
tion’s wartime operations. The IIDC would play a dual role. On 
the one hand, it would ensure military preparedness and domestic 
defense by coordinating with representatives from agriculture, 
industry, and labor. Simultaneously, it would attempt to bring de-
fense, munitions, and ordnance plants to the state. Policymakers 
rationalized and justified these measures by arguing that Iowa 
would lose inhabitants to urban centers outside the state if it did 
not acquire manufacturing enterprises of its own. Implicit within 
this argument was a growing concern that Iowa was too depen-
dent on farm jobs, which not only paid less than their industrial 
counterparts but also were in shrinking supply as a result of 
mechanization. By war’s end, this implicit logic would become 
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an explicit argument as the need to replace agricultural employ-
ment with industrial jobs would be the central rationale for the 
creation of the Iowa Development Commission.  
 Between 1940 and 1945, the IIDC aggressively campaigned 
to attain defense contracts. In March 1941 the commission passed 
a motion calling for Governor Wilson to travel to Washington, 
D.C., to “confer with the Iowa senators and the Iowa congres-
sional delegation on the problem of obtaining industries for 
Iowa.” In July of that same year the commission decided to ac-
quire new office space and hire more employees to establish 
“a branch office of the Defense Contract Service Division of the 
Office Production Management,” an attempt to solicit federal 
contracts. These initiatives had significant success, as defense 
spending in Iowa skyrocketed, rising to $57 million by March 
1941 and then to $68 million the following month.18   
 What exactly did the IIDC do to bring new industry to Iowa? 
Primarily, members of the IIDC worked closely with communities 
that wanted to secure defense-related industries. The IIDC’s most 
important function was facilitating interaction among local towns, 
Iowa’s congressmen, and wartime government agencies. The at-
tempt to secure a corn alcohol plant for the small town of Eagle 
Grove provides a compelling example of how the IIDC navi-
gated various political channels in pursuit of wartime industries. 
On March 4, 1941, a “delegation of business men” from Eagle 
Grove met with the IIDC to “discuss the possibilities of corn al-
cohol [plant] construction in northern Iowa.” On March 13, IIDC 
Secretary Rodney Q. Selby met with the director of the Agricul-
tural Experiment Station at Iowa State College “to ask him to 
prepare material” on the manufacture of corn alcohol that “could 
be presented to defense production agencies in Washington.” 
About a week later, Selby visited Washington, D.C., to meet with 
Senator Guy M. Gillette (D-IA) to explain how these plants could 
produce corn alcohol necessary for the production of explosives. 
Gillette also proposed the possibility that corn alcohol could be 
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used as a motor fuel. After receiving the report produced by 
agricultural experts at Iowa State, Senator Gillette promised to 
discuss the finding with the secretary of war. Selby also dissemi-
nated the material to Iowa Democratic Senator Clyde Herring and 
“other members of Iowa’s delegation in Congress.”19  
 Although the War Department recognized the importance of 
ethyl alcohol for military purposes, notably in the production of 
smokeless powder, it informed Senator Gillette and the IIDC that 
the “present facilities will be adequate to supply . . . military 
needs.” Nonetheless, the IIDC pounced on its newfound access to 
federal wartime bureaucracies. In April 1941 IIDC Secretary Selby 
met with P. H. Groggins, a chemical consultant who worked with 
the Council of National Defense, to once again promote the con-
struction of corn alcohol plants in Iowa. Groggins reaffirmed the 
War Department’s initial assessment, informing the IIDC official 
that there was little demand for industrial corn-based alcohol.20 
  This did not deter Iowa’s public officials, however. On May 
20, 1941, Governor George Wilson, IIDC Chair Edward Kimball, 
and Secretary Selby met with Under Secretary of War Robert Pat-
terson and two officials from the Office of Production Manage-
ment to once again press for the “construction of corn alcohol 
plants in Iowa as a needed war production measure.” In January 
1942, the IIDC held a meeting in Ames, to discuss how corn al-
cohol could be used “as an adjunct to synthetic rubber manu-
facture.” Throughout February and March 1942, IIDC officials 
continued to travel to Washington to champion corn alcohol as a 
viable ingredient for the manufacture of synthetic rubber and ex-
plosive devices.21  
 In March 1942 the entire process came full circle when Otto 
Knudsen, a local businessman from Eagle Grove, joined Selby 
and several IIDC members on a trip to Washington, D.C. The 
group met with Senator Gillette, numerous Iowa representatives, 
and Vice-President Henry A. Wallace to once again push for the 
construction of corn alcohol factories in Iowa. At one point, Dean 
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Buchanan, director of Iowa State College’s Agricultural Exper-
iment Station, was called to testify before a U.S. Senate sub-
committee on the prospect of corn alcohol production within the 
state. The campaign remained active throughout the summer of 
1942, with IIDC member A. A. Couch lobbying in “Washington 
. . . to forward the promotion of corn alcohol plant construction.” 
In the latter months of 1942, Iowa’s spokespersons focused their 
sales pitch on the use of grain alcohol in the production of syn-
thetic rubber. Within Congress, Iowa’s elected officials, most no-
tably Senator Gillette, pushed hard to convince their colleagues 
that grain alcohol could replace the then dominant petroleum in 
the manufacture of synthetic rubber.22  
 Despite early setbacks, the IIDC’s campaign was an eventual 
success, as Iowa received numerous military contracts to manu-
facture alcohol from corn and other grain products. In early 1943 
the federal government initiated an ambitious program to spur 
the production of grain alcohol, which resulted in the construc-
tion of several industrial plants in Iowa. In February 1943 the 
Grain Processing Corporation of Muscatine, signed a contract 
with the federal Defense Plants Corporation to build a factory 
that would “produce 8,500,000 gallons of alcohol a year” for sale 
to “the defense supplies corporation” as part of the production 
of synthetic rubber. The following month, the cities of Dubuque 
and Keokuk were also picked as sites for federally sponsored 
grain alcohol plants. Perhaps most heartening for the IIDC was 
the announcement on March 10, 1943, that Otto Knudsen’s Iowa 
Farm Processing Cooperative was “allocated the contract to con-
struct and operate the Dubuque plant,” and that the town of 
Eagle Grove had also been selected as a site for one of five other 
future grain alcohol plants. Both measures were fitting since 
Knudsen and Eagle Grove had been deeply involved in lobbying 
for wartime grain alcohol production.23  
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 Grain alcohol plants represented just one part of Iowa’s war-
time industrial boom. Several large-scale munitions and ord-
nance facilities located in the state, along with a host of smaller 
defense-related enterprises. One of the earliest and most note-
worthy acquisitions was the Iowa Ordnance Plant, located near 
the city of Burlington. Construction of the massive factory began 
in January 1941, and the $60 million ordnance plant was officially 
dedicated on July 31, 1941. By the end of the war, the Iowa Ord-
nance Plant, according to historian Lisa Ossian, would turn out 
“25 million mortar shells, 200,000 medium-caliber shells, 5 mil-
lion major-caliber shells, and 2.5 million bombs.” The Iowa Ord-
nance Plant was soon followed by the Des Moines Ordnance 
Plant, an equally impressive munitions factory located in the 
suburban community of Ankeny. Along with these behemoth 
acquisitions, a slew of private businesses converted their plants 
for wartime production. In southern Iowa, the Hercules Manu-
facturing Plant, located in the town of Centerville, refitted its op-
erations and by 1943 was “wholly in the production of defense 
materials,” including the manufacturing of “steel casing and ma-
chining” as well as “stump pullers.”24  
 Along with its promotional duties, the IIDC also played a 
central role in helping local communities adjust to rapid indus-
trialization. In May 1941 IIDC Chair Edward Kimball made a per-
sonal visit to Burlington’s Iowa Ordnance Plant. After inspecting 
the facilities, he appointed Burlington residents to an advisory 
committee that would inform the IIDC on “problems” relating 
to industrialization. The IIDC addressed some of the primary 
issues related to wartime industrial development, such as press-
ing for legislation that would help meet the demand for housing 
in cities and towns that gained defense contracts.25  
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 World War II generated newfound interest in industrial de-
velopment as the state successfully acquired defense and muni-
tions plants. To a degree never before witnessed, Iowa’s elected 
officials, small-town business leaders, and various interest groups 
campaigned to bring industry to their state. Wartime mobilization 
offered these public and private citizens access to Congress, fed-
eral bureaucracies, and even the executive branch. World War II 
provided firsthand experience in industrial development. The 
global conflict offered local and state actors a model for industri-
alizing Iowa and a sense of excitement that the state’s agricul-
tural economy could be diversified with manufacturing.  
 
WHILE WARTIME INDUSTRY BOOMED in Iowa, the state’s 
farm sector was undergoing dramatic changes with long-term 
implications. These two processes were directly connected. An 
abundance of well-paying manufacturing jobs drew farmers and 
laborers off the land. Farm jobs tended to pay less than manufac-
turing employment, so thousands of field hands, tenant farmers, 
and even independent landholders left agriculture in search of 
industrial employment. Many rural and small-town inhabitants 
fled their communities for Iowa’s booming industrial areas or ur-
ban centers elsewhere in the region, such as Detroit or Chicago. 
As a result, farmers experienced a dire labor shortage. To make 
up for the lack of available manpower, farmers turned to machines. 
Farm mechanization greatly expanded during World War II. 
Sales of tractors and other equipment spiked throughout the con-
flict. These capital investments then created an autocatalytic effect, 
whereby a labor shortage resulted in mechanization, which then 
eliminated agricultural jobs for good. The number of farm laborers 
decreased significantly during the war. As the conflict continued, 
it became clear that farming would not produce postwar job 
growth.26  
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 But even as transformations in farming helped to fuel the 
growing desire for new industry, agribusiness continued to deter-
mine the contours of the state’s industrial development program. 
Public officials’ dogged promotion of grain alcohol factories ex-
emplified the obeisance paid to agricultural elites. Grain alcohol 
plants promised not only wartime industrial jobs for Iowans but 
also increased demand for the state’s agricultural products. Even 
the IIDC’s own internal documents made clear that the whole 
campaign was due to “the efforts of agricultural interests to in-
duce the government to build plants in Iowa for converting sur-
plus grain to alcohol.”27 
 As the tide shifted in 1943 and 1944 and it became clear that the 
Allies would defeat Nazi Germany and the Axis powers, policy-
makers prepared plans to carry Iowa’s industrial development 
program into the postwar era. After the conflict, agribusiness 
would once again shape industrialization in Iowa.  
 
PUBLIC OFFICIALS, buoyed by their positive experiences with 
wartime industrialization, began to argue for the continuation of 
state industrial development initiatives during peacetime. As 
early as August 1942 the IIDC was in conversation with Governor 
Wilson about creating a Post War Planning Committee. By De-
cember 1943, the IIDC was preparing to hold a joint meeting with 
the recently established State Post War Rehabilitation Commission 
(PWRC) “with a view to coordinating the activities of the two bod-
ies.” The IIDC not only offered to share its office space and staff 
with the PWRC, but the IIDC’s chairman, Edward Kimball, along 
with several other officials, also served as members of the PWRC.28   
 In April 1944 IIDC Secretary Selby disseminated material pro-
posing the “organization [of] a permanent Industrial Develop- 
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ment Commission.” At the same time, Governor Bourke Hicken-
looper (who succeeded George Wilson in 1943) called on the 
commission to “undertake a program of industrial promotion by 
compiling information relative to the State’s resources, opportu-
nities and potentialities as far as raw materials, transportation, 
labor and other features . . . for presentation to prospective in-
dustrial establishments.” In December 1944 the IIDC sent Chair-
man Kimball and Secretary Selby to Topeka to examine the Kan-
sas Industrial Development Commission. Apparently impressed 
with their findings, the IIDC appointed a committee composed 
of several members of the state legislature to “draft a bill for 
presentation to the Fifty-first General Assembly, which would 
provide for the creation of the Iowa Development Commission.”29 
It was clear by mid- to late 1944 that Iowa was gearing up for a 
major industrial development drive after the war ended.  
 In January 1945 IIDC members discussed the recently drafted 
bill that proposed the creation of the Iowa Development Com-
mission and decided to recommend its referral to the appropriate 
committees within the Iowa House and Senate. In March 1945 
the last recorded meeting of the Iowa Industrial and Defense 
Commission took place. Chairman Kimball informed the group 
that the law to create the Iowa Development Commission had 
passed. At the same meeting, copies of the Iowa Development 
Commission’s first promotional book, Iowa . . . Land of Industrial 
Opportunity, were passed out to each member of the soon-to-be 
defunct IIDC. The next time the organization released its meeting 
minutes, on July 13, 1945, the letterhead read “Iowa Develop-
ment Commission.”30  
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BY THE TIME the General Assembly approved the creation of 
the Iowa Development Commission in 1945, Robert D. Blue had 
replaced Bourke Hickenlooper as the governor of Iowa. Sworn 
into office in 1945, Blue oversaw the creation of the IDC and offi-
cially signed the legislation that brought the organization into 
existence. Archival records from Blue’s administration provide 
insight into the motivations behind the creation of the IDC. 
Governor Blue’s departmental files include a brief analysis of the 
importance of natural gas for new industry. This document offered 
a succinct explanation for the IDC’s formation, showing that Iowa’s 
campaign for industrial development was a direct response to the 
social effects of farm mechanization and rural outmigration.  
Through improved farming methods and equipment, the number 
of people engaged in agriculture in Iowa has been less each year. . . . 
This farm population has generally moved out of the State and into 
more congested areas. . . . For the good of the country as a whole, 
and for the good of Iowa in particular, it seems appropriate that 
every effort should be taken to develop the present industries in 
Iowa and secure additional ones, at least to an extent that will 
absorb the farm boys and girls that are not going to be needed in 
agriculture.  
 The State of Iowa, through its legislators, has created the Iowa 
Development Commission. Part of the duties and objects of this 
Commission are to aid in the industrial development of Iowa.31  
 The impending downward slide of agricultural employment 
and the population outmigration that this implied were clearly 
on the minds of Iowa’s public officials and policymakers when 
the IDC was first created. In November 1945 Governor Blue com-
missioned Professor Ray Wakeley of Iowa State College to pro-
duce a study on population trends and their implications for the 
state’s future. A letter from Professor William Murray, head of 
the Department of Agriculture and Mechanical Arts at Iowa 
State, to the college’s president, Dr. Charles E. Friley, laid out the 
report’s central findings: The “Iowa farm population is decreasing 
                                                 
31. Untitled document on natural gas for Iowa’s industrial development, folder: 
Development and Industrial Commission, 1944–1946, Departmental and Sub-
ject Files, Records of Governor Robert D. Blue, SHSI-DM. Although the docu-
ment does not have a title or date, its location in Governor Blue’s records and 
the content of the analysis suggest that it was produced in 1945 or 1946.  
64      THE ANNALS OF IOWA 
slowly,” and the state needed more “business and industrial de-
velopment.” The report itself noted the “increased migration out 
of Iowa,” detailing how the “farm population” had “declined . . . 
with increasing rapidity from 1920 to the present [1945].”32 The 
existence of such a dire report on the eve of the postwar period 
highlighted a growing awareness that overdependence on agri-
culture implied the perpetual loss of young, educated citizens 
and a shrinking population.  
 While declining agricultural employment motivated public 
officials to extend industrial development into the postwar era, 
the farm economy remained interwoven with visions of Iowa’s 
industrial future. Iowa . . . Land of Industrial Opportunity, the IDC’s 
first promotional book, captured the ongoing affiliation between 
agriculture and industry in the postwar period. Much like their 
wartime counterparts, members of the IDC argued that a mas-
sive “decentralization” of American industry was taking place. 
The movement of war-related industries had been motivated by 
defense imperatives; the relocation of private industry after the 
war, however, was compelled by political and economic factors. 
The defining feature of this industrial restructuring was manu-
facturing’s “movement away from congested industrial centers” 
to “new locations” outside of urban America. A myriad of reasons 
were offered for industry’s flight from urban areas: high taxes, 
unfriendly attitudes toward business, excessive costs, and over-
paid and impetuous laborers. Regardless of motivations, the trend 
was clear: manufacturers were looking for new homes outside of 
their traditional urban industrial locations.33  
 The central goal of Iowa’s industrial development campaign, 
according to Land of Industrial Opportunity, was to achieve a “bal- 
                                                 
32. William G. Murray to Dr. Charles E. Friley, 11/12/1946, folder: Changes in 
Iowa Population with Special Reference to Post-War Developments and State 
Institutions and Programs, by Ray Wakeley, box 62, Robert D. Blue Papers, 
Special Collections, University of Iowa Libraries, Iowa City; Ray Wakeley, 
“Changes in Iowa Population with Special Reference to Post-War Develop-
ments in State Institutions and Programs,” 3–4, 8, ibid. 
33. Iowa . . . Land of Industrial Opportunity (published by the Iowa Development 
Commission, Clyde Hendrix, chairman, and Rodney Selby, director), A1–A5. 
This book was originally published in 1945. The version cited here (found in 
Iowa State University’s Parks Library) does not list a publication date, but vari-
ous textual clues suggest that it was an updated edition published around 1949.  
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anced economy.” The concept of a “balanced economy” repre-
sented an attempt to align Iowa’s agricultural legacy with its in-
dustrial aspirations. According to promoters, “Iowa does not desire 
to become an industrial center” but rather to “increase gradually her 
industrial activity” so as to diversify the state’s economy. In al-
most every sense, Iowa’s campaign for industry was fashioned 
to avoid threatening agriculture’s status. While the state wel-
comed any and all manufacturers interested in Iowa, and the IDC 
paid attention to non–farm-related industries, state promoters 
gave special emphasis to those firms that oriented themselves to-
ward agriculture because, as the promotional booklet affirmed, 
“Obviously, the key to Iowa’s industrial importance is her agriculture!” 
Hemp, corn, wheat, oats, pigs, chicken, milk, eggs, and other “by 
products from agriculture present endless opportunities for 
industrial development.” Iowa’s abundance of farm outputs 
would entice manufacturing and processing firms to move to the 
state to be “close to raw materials.” In a clear nod to agribusiness 
interests, this model promised to increase demand for crops and 
other goods produced on the farm.34  
 While hailing the industrial potential of Iowa’s agricultural 
abundance, promotional material also acknowledged that in-
creases in farm productivity drove people off the land, necessi-
tating new manufacturing employment for displaced workers. 
“The source of Iowa labor,” the IDC explained, “is the farm.” The 
“old fashioned” labor-intensive form of farming was “out of 
vogue in Iowa.” Farming had become “a mechanized business” 
operating with scientific instruments and methods. Thus, the 
state had witnessed “a steady outward flow of young men and 
women from the farms of Iowa over the borders of the state,” 
producing a “decrease in [farm] population of over 200,000” 
since 1900. But the IDC argued that workers released from agri-
culture would create an available pool of labor for industry. With 
mechanical know-how from their years working with tractors 
and a healthy respect for the principles of business efficiency, 
Iowa’s farm population would serve as a stable, hard-working, 
and inexpensive source of labor for manufacturers.35  
                                                 
34. Ibid., A-4, B-1, A-9, B-13 (all italics in original). 
35. Ibid., C-7, C-8, C-7–11.  
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 Iowa . . . the Land of Industrial Opportunity fully captured the 
interconnection between agriculture and industrial development. 
This linkage existed on multiple levels. First, increases in agricul-
tural productivity, as a result of mechanization and government 
policies, created a cornucopia of farm goods that might entice 
food processing and manufacturing plants to the state. Seeking 
closer access to agricultural inputs, these firms would help to en-
hance Iowa’s economic position by transforming farm products 
and raw materials into value-added consumer goods. Second, 
industrial development boosters clearly crafted their program to 
appease agribusiness interests. By focusing on farm-oriented 
enterprises, industrial development would not supplant agri-
culture but rather would benefit the farm sector by increasing 
demand for crops, eggs, meat, milk, and other products. Finally, 
and most important, the shift from labor-intensive to capital-
dependent farming reduced the number of available jobs, leading 
Iowa’s public officials to pursue new industry to keep residents 
from leaving the state. Without new manufacturing employment, 
industrial development promoters argued, the state would suffer 
from low incomes, population outmigration, and a shrinking tax 
base.  
 With all of these dynamics in play, Iowa . . . the Land of Indus-
trial Opportunity offered a comprehensive roadmap for Iowa’s 
immediate postwar economic development. Agriculture and in-
dustry would flourish side by side. Mechanization and scientific 
advancements would not be hindered, but championed, since 
greater productivity would put more money into the hands of 
farmers and create a surplus of agricultural goods that would at-
tract processing firms to Iowa. There would be fewer family farms 
(which would not be able to compete with large landholders) and 
less need for farm laborers, but that would not be a problem since 
those displaced workers would serve as a surplus labor force for 
new industry. In a disturbing twist of logic, boosters viewed 
agrarian displacement and unemployment as a selling point for 
luring industrialists in search of cheap labor. IDC promotional 
material argued that “there is a constant surplus of the finest 
labor in the world in Iowa!” “The [labor] supply comes from the 
farms, and there is no more adaptable group in the country than 
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Iowa farm boys and girls.”36 The terms “surplus” and “adapt-
able” implied the existence of a cheap, pliable workforce. In a 
harmonious and fluid process, promoters suggested, redundant 
farm labor would drift smoothly into newly created manufacturing 
jobs. Young and educated citizens, who previously had migrated 
to urban centers outside the state for greater opportunities, 
would stay in Iowa to fill these industrial positions.  
 During its early years of operation, the IDC promoted en-
terprises in harmony with farming. In 1946 the IDC published 
Why Iowa Is Great, a promotional book that lauded the “direct re-
lationship between Iowa’s industry and agriculture.” Noting that 
“more than one-half of Iowa’s industrial income directly de-
pends upon agriculture,” the book celebrated the state’s notable 
“food processing and meat packing industries,” naming specifi-
cally the Quaker Oats Company and Rath Packing Company.37 
The Development Bulletin, the IDC’s monthly news bulletin, was 
littered with articles focusing on farm-oriented industries, bearing 
headlines such as “Food Processing Top Iowa Industry” and “In-
dustry Finds Gold in Iowa Oat Fields.”38  
 In March 1951 the Development Bulletin published an article 
profiling the Independence Canning Corporation. Located in the 
small town of Independence, the firm was portrayed as an arche-
type of postwar industrial development. The company was jointly 
owned by Don Forsman of the nearby town of Fredericksburg, 
John Van Zetten and Archie Shannon of Oskaloosa, and two Chi-
cago businessmen. The plant was originally purchased in 1946. 
At that time, general manager and treasurer Darrel Forsman later 
recalled, “We thought we had a really good day if we turned out 
1200 cans of whole chicken.” By 1951 the plant was producing 
9,000 cans of chicken and turkey every day. Initially, the factory 
had canned both poultry and corn, but it eventually gave up on 
                                                 
36. Ibid, A-9.  
37. An excerpt from this book is published in the Iowa Development Commis-
sion’s Development Bulletin, vol. 1, no. 28, November 30, 1946, 4, in folder: Devel-
opment and Industrial Commission, 1944–1946, Departmental and Subject Files, 
Records of Governor Robert D. Blue. 
38. “Food Processing Top Iowa Industry,” Development Bulletin, vol. 3, no. 15, Au-
gust 15, 1948, 1, in folder: Development Commission, 1947–1948, Departmental 
and Subject Files, Records of Governor Robert D. Blue; “Industry Finds Gold in 
Iowa Oat Fields,” Development Bulletin, vol. 2, no. 14, August 15, 1947, 1, ibid. 
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corn when the owners “realized the peak demand for poultry 
conflicted with the sweet corn harvest.” “Under the trade name 
of Corn Blossom,” the Development Bulletin explained, “the Inde-
pendence Company puts out four sizes of whole chicken-in-the-
can” that included “disjointed halves of chicken, boneless turkey 
and chicken, and fricassee in butter gravy.” General Manager 
Forsman admitted that the company was forced to search as far 
as Tennessee, Texas, New York, and even Canada for chickens 
during slack periods, but he insisted that locally raised animals 
were their priority: “During the season, we buy all our poultry 
within 100 miles of Independence.” A relatively small plant, with 
just 85 employees in 1951, the firm had nonetheless experienced 
substantial growth since 1947, when it had employed only 25 
people.39 
 The Independence Canning Corporation embodied the IDC’s 
early vision for postwar industrialization. The firm bought most 
of its raw materials (chickens) from poultry houses within the state, 
generating greater demand for local chicken farmers. Simultane-
ously, the firm created new jobs for residents in the local com-
munity, many of whom were no doubt being turned out of agri-
culture. Rather than challenging agribusiness’s preeminence, the 
Independence Canning Corporation helped sustain large commer-
cial farmers’ quest for greater productivity, soaking up surplus 
raw materials while simultaneously capturing superfluous agri-
cultural workers.  
 
IN THE DECADES after World War II, the Iowa Development 
Commission could point to steady economic progress, as the 
number of manufacturing establishments in Iowa increased from 
2,965 to 3,388 between 1947 and 1972, while the average number 
of production workers grew from 112,490 to 157,000. Starting in 
the mid- to late 1950s, agro-industrial firms would lose their priv-
ileged place in the economic development of the rural Midwest. 
Food products would remain one of the largest industrial sectors 
                                                 
39. “A Switch from Corn to Chicken Pays Off at Independence,” Iowa Develop-
ment Bulletin, vol. 6, no. 5, 3–4, March 15, 1951, folder 2, box 36, Departmental 
and Subject Files, Development Commission, Records of William S. Beardsley, 
SHSI-DM. There appears to have been a slight name change at some point from 
the original Development Bulletin to the Iowa Development Bulletin. 
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throughout the twentieth century, but other manufacturing cat-
egories, such as non-electrical machinery, electrical machinery, 
fabricated metal, and transportation equipment, would experi-
ence substantial growth. The diversification of manufacturing 
throughout the rural Midwest would undermine the centrality 
of farm-oriented enterprises. This trend was apparent in Iowa, 
where, according to Wilson J. Warren, many small towns hosted 
“traditional agro-industrial companies as well as companies 
making television components, construction equipment, win-
dows and doors, pharmaceuticals, plastics, and batteries.”40 
  Yet this later shift in development patterns does not negate 
the importance of agriculture in the IDC’s early activities. As-
sessing Iowa’s industrial progress up until 1956, the research 
specialist George May concluded that “the most important in-
dustries in Iowa are those which are closely linked with the 
farm—food processing plants and the farm equipment indus-
try.”41 The fact remains that the emergence of state-sponsored 
industrial development in Iowa was inextricably linked to agri-
culture. The transformation of American farming inspired, justi-
fied, and legitimated the creation of a permanent development 
agency in Iowa. If Iowa had not been experiencing rural depopu-
lation, outmigration, and farm modernization, it is inconceivable 
that the state would have invested such a significant amount of 
time, energy, and resources pursuing new industry.  
 
THE CREATION of the Iowa Development Commission in 1945 
marked the beginning of modern industrial development in Iowa. 
For the first time, the state could claim a professional, institution- 
                                                 
40. Warren, “Beyond the Rust Belt,” 77–86 (manufacturing statistics on p. 79, 
quote on p. 85). Other scholars have also examined the changing composition 
of rural manufacturing in Iowa during the postwar period. See Rory Edward 
Moehnke, “The Changing Industrial Employment Structure of Iowa Commu-
nities between 1960 and 1970” (Ph.D. diss., Iowa State University, 1974); Clifford 
M. Baumback and Clark C. Bloom, “The Economy of Southern Iowa,” Iowa Busi-
ness Digest, June 1959, 22–30. I have argued elsewhere that industrial promoters 
and local boosters consciously shifted their focus from farm-oriented enter-
prises to other manufacturing sectors over the course of the postwar period. See 
Keith Orejel, “Factories in the Fallow: The Political Economy of America’s Rural 
Heartland, 1945–1980” (Ph.D. diss., Columbia University, 2015). 
41. May, “Recent Industrial Development” and “Iowa Industries.” 
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alized, and permanent industrialization program. The proximate 
origins of the IDC lay in the state’s wartime experience. Officials 
and residents had worried for over 20 years that low wages and 
mechanization in the farm economy would drive people out of 
the state, but it was not until World War II that industrial devel-
opment presented itself as a viable solution to those problems. The 
pursuit of munitions, ordnance, and grain alcohol plants gave 
Iowans experience in, and models for, industrial development. 
The Iowa Industrial and Defense Commission linked local com-
munities and state officials with Congress, federal bureaucracies, 
and high-ranking politicians. Wartime industrialization provided 
Iowans with a sense of hope that the state could acquire manu-
facturing concerns. At the same time, labor shortages pushed 
farmers to utilize new machinery and scientific improvements, 
resulting in fewer available agricultural jobs after the war. In 
1945 Governor Blue and the state legislature decided to meet 
agricultural transformations head on by creating the Iowa Devel-
opment Commission. The IDC presented a plan for postwar eco-
nomic development that offered industrial jobs for displaced 
farm workers, increased demand for agricultural products, and 
created a “balanced economy” for all of Iowa. The IDC’s original 
program exemplified the inseparability of agricultural transfor-
mations and industrial development during the immediate post-
war years. 
  
THE ANNALS OF IOWA 76 (Winter 2017). © State Historical Society of Iowa, 
2017. 
 
71 
Local 1’s Unionism  
and the Transformation  
of Iowa’s Politics, 1939–1970 
WILSON J. WARREN 
The following article is reprinted with permission from Struggling 
with “Iowa’s Pride”: Labor Relations, Unionism, and Politics in 
the Rural Midwest since 1877, by Wilson J. Warren (University of 
Iowa Press, 2000). It is reprinted here because it aptly complements the 
other two articles in this issue, expanding and providing context for 
their narratives.  
 Previous chapters in the book recounted the emergence and erosion 
of a militant unionism in Local 1 of the United Packinghouse Workers 
of America, which represented workers at the John Morrell and Com-
pany meatpacking plant in Ottumwa.—Editor 
 
LOCAL 1’S MILITANT UNIONISM keyed Iowa’s political 
transformation in the post–World War II years. Morrell workers’ 
CIO movement quickly moved beyond plant organizing and 
bargaining with the company into a larger political struggle for 
greater power in city and state politics. Ottumwa’s meatpacking 
workers, together with other blue-collar workers and middle-
class residents of the city, became Democratic supporters who 
precipitated a remarkable transition in partisan politics in Ottum-
wa, Wapello County, and Iowa as a whole. Indeed, Ottumwa’s 
CIO movement, combined with meatpacking, auto-worker, and 
farm equipment worker unionism across the state, helped to 
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transform Iowa’s political landscape from solid Republicanism 
to competitive two-party status.1 
 This Democratic transition started in the 1930s but did not cul-
minate until the 1960s. As historian James L. Sundquist describes 
in Dynamics of the Party System, the Democratic ascendancy in 
Iowa and ﬁfteen other northern states was part of a two-stage re-
alignment that spanned the 1930s to the 1950s. Developments 
among packing workers in Ottumwa illustrate these ﬁndings 
quite well. The packing community’s enthusiasm for unionism 
in the 1930s did not immediately carry over into support for the 
Democratic party. From the 1860 presidential election until 1928, 
Ottumwa and Wapello County were usually dependable Repub-
lican strongholds in local, state, and national politics, not unlike 
most of Iowa’s cities and counties. Only during the late nine- 
teenth century and then during World War I had Democrats en-
joyed success in Ottumwa and Wapello County. Unlike the situ-
ation in other industrial cities elsewhere, the 1928 presidential 
election results did not presage later Democratic landslides; Hoo-
ver drubbed Smith in the packing district’s Ward One by a 60 to 
40 percent margin. Beginning with the 1932 presidential election, 
however, Iowa Democrats in both urban and rural areas won by 
landslide margins in the 1932, 1934, and 1936 national and state 
elections. As in so many midwestern states, though, Democratic 
gains largely reﬂected farmers’ protest voting. By 1938, with the 
New Deal agricultural programs addressing farm problems, 
Democratic gains declined throughout most of Iowa, even in the 
industrial cities. Although the Democrats received majorities in 
                                                 
1. The standard argument, expressed especially by Harlan Hahn, is that Iowa’s 
Democratic transition rested with both its farmers and urban residents (defined 
as cities with over 10,000 population). Hahn attributes the support for Demo-
cratic candidates among urban residents owing mainly to issues of taxation, 
liquor control, and legislative reapportionment. Neither he nor James Larew, 
though the latter is more generous in crediting labor’s assistance, focus centrally 
on the contribution of Iowa’s growing labor union movement to the Democratic 
tradition. Shelton Stromquist’s synthesis of oral histories on Iowa’s labor move-
ment suggests this connection, but it is not systematically examined. See Harlan 
Hahn, Urban-Rural Conflict: The Politics of Change (Beverly Hills, CA, 1971); 
James C. Larew, A Party Reborn: The Democrats of Iowa, 1950–1974 (Iowa City, 
1980); Shelton Stromquist, Solidarity and Survival: An Oral History of Labor in the 
Twentieth Century (Iowa City, 1993), 282–94; and Dorothy Schwieder, Iowa: The 
Middle Land (Ames, IA, 1996), 290–91. 
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Ottumwa and Wapello County during the early 1930s, the pack-
ing community did not turn out for Roosevelt to a much greater 
degree than the rest of the city’s voters.2 
 With the 1936 election, though, Ottumwa’s industrial work-
ers’ selections foretold the signiﬁcant swing to the Democratic 
ticket by voters in industrial communities in the state after World 
War II. Between 1944 and 1972, the original packing district and 
the south side precincts (where even larger numbers of Morrell 
workers lived after World War II, and who were joined by work-
ers at the UAW-afﬁliated Deere plant) averaged 65 and 60 per-
cent majorities, respectively, for Democratic presidential candi-
dates. Even more signiﬁcant, the residents of Ottumwa and 
Wapello County as a whole voted solidly Democratic for not 
only presidential candidates but congressional and state-level 
politicians as well. From 1932 to 1948, Democrats won 52 percent 
of Wapello County and Ottumwa’s gubernatorial vote. Between 
1950 and 1972, Democrats garnered 58 percent of the total vote 
in Wapello County, and 59 percent of the vote in Ottumwa dur-
ing the same period. From the Civil War to 1954, only two Dem-
ocrats had occupied the governor’s ofﬁce in Iowa, Horace Boies 
in 1889 and 1891 and Clyde Herring in 1932 and 1934. With vot-
ers in Ottumwa and Wapello County leading the way and con-
tributing to concerted urban support across the state, Democrats 
Herschel Loveless, an Ottumwa native with working-class roots, 
and former trucker Harold Hughes won the governor’s seat ﬁve 
times between 1956 and 1966.3 
 Accompanying the transformation of voting behavior was 
the direct political participation of workers from Morrell and 
                                                 
2. James L. Sundquist, Dynamics of the Party System: Alignment and Realignment 
of Political Parties in the United States, rev. ed. (Washington, DC, 1983), 256–57; 
Larew, A Party Reborn, 7; State of Iowa, Official Register, 1933–1934 (Des Moines, 
1933); and State of Iowa, Official Register, 1941–1942 (Des Moines, 1942). Regard-
ing the designation of Ottumwa’s Ward One, beginning in the 1932 election, 
Ward One was reconstituted as Precincts One and Two. I have generally retained 
use of the designation First Ward (or Ward One) for the sake of continuity with 
earlier chapters. Although part of the two-stage realignment, Iowa obviously still 
lagged behind the political revolution wrought by the Democrats in much of the 
rest of the urban Midwest and Northeast as early as the 1920s. See Richard Oes-
treicher, “Urban Working-Class Political Behavior and Theories of American 
Electoral Politics, 1870–1940,” Journal of American History 74 (March 1988), 1257–86. 
3. State of Iowa, Official Registers, 1933–34 through 1973–74. 
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other industries in Ottumwa in city and state politics. From the 
1940s to mid-1950s several union members ran for various city, 
county, and state ofﬁces, and assumed leading roles in the union-
organizing campaigns of other plants around the region. Union 
representatives from Ottumwa were especially instrumental in 
the union drive at the Rath Packing Company plant in Waterloo, 
a somewhat larger manufacturing city in northeast Iowa. Home 
to Iowa’s two largest factories, Rath and John Deere, both CIO 
organized, Waterloo would emerge in the late 1940s and early 
1950s as the other leading CIO locale in the state. Constituting 
the largest bloc of union members in the state’s CIO council, 
Waterloo and Ottumwa representatives, working together with 
other representatives from the state’s packinghouse and auto 
worker unions, would promote the political action programs that 
would transform Iowa’s Republican-dominated political estab-
lishment into a much more balanced two-party system by the 
1960s. 
 The transformation of voting behavior and workers’ direct 
political participation were mutually reinforcing in Ottumwa 
through the 1950s. Union leaders, motivated by the same desire 
for power and control that had sparked most of their union ob-
jectives in the plant in the 1930s and 1940s, also ran for political 
ofﬁces to gain a more direct role in community affairs. For union 
leaders, achieving greater inﬂuence in the community was just 
as important as it was in plant affairs. Their concerns were also 
increasingly expressed in the voting behavior of rank-and-ﬁle 
unionists as well as signiﬁcant segments of Ottumwa’s popula-
tion as a whole. As local union achievements became increas-
ingly linked to those of other unions in the industry and around 
the Midwest by the mid-1940s, Morrell-Ottumwa workers’ polit-
ical horizons became likewise broader. From the mid-1940s to the 
early 1950s, as workers battled with Morrell’s management for 
control in key production decisions, they also struggled for 
power in local and state political arenas. 
 Local 1 was at the forefront of Iowa’s Democratic transition 
long before the post–World War II years. Beginning in 1940, union 
members registered large numbers of new voters in Wapello 
County. Then in fall elections of that year, Ottumwa gave Roose-
velt his largest percentage victory among all Iowa’s industrial 
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cities.4 With the organization of the CIO’s political action commit-
tee (PAC) in 1944, workers participated signiﬁcantly in local Dem-
ocratic party campaigns. From 1946 through the 1960s, Ottumwa 
workers’ central role in shaping the Iowa-Nebraska States, later 
Iowa State, Industrial Union Council’s CIO-PAC efforts and then 
the merged AFL-CIO Iowa State Federation of Labor’s state-level 
political efforts resulted not only in consistent Democratic victo-
ries in local and county politics, but also helped to secure Demo-
cratic successes at the state and national level by the 1960s. 
 
Building a “Union Politic” in Ottumwa 
In 1885, Republican orator, later U.S. senator, Jonathan P. Dol-
liver claimed that “Iowa will go Democratic when Hell goes 
Methodist.” In fact, Republicans did not dominate Iowa’s politics 
until after the turn of the twentieth century. For much of the late 
nineteenth century, struggles among the various groups that had 
settled the state, including Yankees, upland southerners, and for-
eigners, particularly Germans, over racial equality and Prohibi-
tion made Democrats and Republicans fairly evenly matched. 
Ottumwa generally reﬂected the state’s diverse ethnocultural mix 
and political heritage from the mid–nineteenth century through 
the 1920s. Although populated by some Irish and German Cath-
olic immigrants, Ottumwa’s Democratic supporters in the late 
nineteenth century were often American-born with roots in the 
South, unlike Dubuque, where Irish and German Catholics 
turned that city into a major center of Democratic party support. 
Situated in the southern half of Iowa where upland southerners 
were among the earliest settlers, from its earliest years Ottum-
wa’s working class demonstrated a noticeable tendency to vote 
more Democratic than the city as a whole. In the 1856 presiden-
tial election, Wapello County, like several of the counties in the 
two southernmost tiers of the state, returned majorities for the 
Democratic candidate, James Buchanan.5 
                                                 
4. Among Iowa’s industrial cities in 1940, Roosevelt won 58 percent of the vote 
in Ottumwa, followed by Fort Dodge with 56 percent, Davenport, Mason City, 
and Sioux City each with 54 percent, Waterloo with 52 percent, Dubuque and 
Des Moines with 49 percent. See State of Iowa, Official Register, 1941–42. 
5. Dolliver quoted in Hahn, Urban-Rural Conflict, 17. On the cultural streams of 
Iowa settlers, see Hahn, Urban-Rural Conflict, 35–36; Nicole Etcheson, The Emerging 
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 Yet beginning with the 1860 presidential election through 
1928, the majority of Ottumwa and Wapello County voters, like 
Iowa’s voters in general, normally turned out for the Grand Old 
Party. Although Ottumwa’s working-class voters, particularly 
those in the Ward One packing district, did vote more strongly 
for Democrats between 1888 and 1936, the difference between 
their turnouts compared to those for the rest of the city’s voters 
was generally only a few percentage points. Ottumwa and Wa-
pello County voters also demonstrated a somewhat higher pro-
clivity to vote for third-party candidates, especially Socialists and 
Progressives though not Populists, resulting in somewhat lower 
percentage returns for Republicans than the state as a whole, but 
otherwise there was little signiﬁcant difference between Ottum-
wa, Wapello County, and Iowa in Democratic voting tendencies 
during this period. The Republican party’s dominance in Wa-
pello County before the 1930s is also evident when looking at 
county elected ofﬁcials. Between 1898 and 1932, only during the 
period from 1906 to 1912 were there more Democratic ofﬁcials 
than Republicans in Wapello County.6 
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 The real watershed in the packing district’s voting behavior 
occurred with the 1936 presidential election. Although the pack-
ing district gave 56 percent to Roosevelt in 1932, Wapello County 
as a whole actually supported Roosevelt at an even higher rate 
of 57 percent. Indeed, the 1932 and 1934 gubernatorial and 1932 
U.S. Senate races demonstrated the same pattern. These results 
lend credence to Harlan Hahn’s argument that Roosevelt’s suc-
cess in Iowa’s 1932 presidential election was largely owing to ru-
ral protest votes. Across Iowa in 1932, farmers gave Roosevelt 70 
percent of their vote compared to just over 50 percent from resi-
dents of towns over 10,000. The returns from the packing district 
from 1936 on, however, were consistently higher for Democrats 
and markedly greater than that of the entire city or county, though 
the returns from these larger areas also showed consistently 
higher returns for Democrats.7 
 The underpinning of this Democratic transition in Ottumwa 
was the extension of workers’ struggles for greater power and 
control in the Morrell plant to the city as a whole. The 1939 strike 
and the shop-ﬂoor struggles that were endemic in the plant in the 
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late 1930s and early 1940s made the larger political context for 
workers’ local workplace efforts more important. During the 
1940s and 1950s, workers’ forays into local politics mirrored the 
struggles within the plant. Workers running for local and state 
political ofﬁces often contested management representatives from 
the Morrell plant. As a consequence, while Local 1 struggled to 
gain union shop and dues check-off agreements in the late 1930s 
and early 1940s, the local also aggressively expanded its presence 
in Ottumwa’s politics and within Iowa’s CIO movement. 
 Over the course of the 1950s, however, as the militants 
among Local 1’s leadership lost favor among the new workers 
entering the plant, they also failed to capture support in commu-
nity political contests. The 1953 city elections saw the last attempt 
by Local 1 militants to contest for city council positions. During 
the same period, however, several members of the new genera- 
tion of Local 1 ofﬁcials, including Jack McCoy and David Hart, 
along with politically active members of the UAW local organized 
at the city’s growing John Deere plant, especially Jacob “Jake” 
Mincks, as well as a former Morrell worker, Herschel Loveless, 
would successfully contest for positions in city, state, and state 
labor politics. Instead of viewing local and state politics as an- 
other means of punishing management and gaining greater con-
trol in rapid fashion, as the militants tended to view politics, the 
new generation of labor leaders were in the fray for the long haul. 
They were willing to work within the political system to gain 
beneﬁts for their fellow workers in a way that appeared less com-
bative than the militants’ efforts and behavior. In particular, work-
ers who began their tenure at Morrell after World War II saw the 
new Local 1 leaders as less self-interested and vindictive. This 
perception translated into a wider appeal among other Ottumwa 
and Iowa voters when the new generation entered politics. 
 The central agency of Morrell workers’ political involvement 
was the Ottumwa Industrial Union Council (OIUC) created in 1939 
by Local 1. It quickly overshadowed the city’s AFL central labor 
body, the Trades and Labor Assembly (TLA). During the war 
years, animosity between the PWOC and Amalgamated in the 
Morrell plant mirrored the competition between the OIUC and 
TLA in part because Henry Hoover, leader of the small group of 
Amalgamated members in the Morrell plant and infamous 
Unionism and Iowa’s Politics      79 
among Local 1 members for his attempted back-to-work move-
ment during the 1939 strike, served as TLA president. In Septem-
ber 1941, for example, competition between the two groups ﬂared 
into a ﬁerce struggle over union afﬁliation of the city’s truck driv-
ers. Local 1 had urged the members of the AFL-afﬁliated Interna-
tional Brotherhood of Teamsters (IBT) truckers to join the CIO’s 
Motor Transport Drivers and Allied Workers, led by former IBT 
(and IUAW) leaders Farrell Dobbs, Carl Nilson, and the Dunne 
brothers, Trotskyites out of Minneapolis and Duluth, Minnesota, 
and Frank Cronin, a Waterloo-area organizer who later became a 
CIO regional director in Nebraska. Local 1 provided picketers at 
grocers still working with IBT truckers. When Local 1’s represent-
atives on the OIUC failed to give unanimous support to the chal-
lenge to the IBT, Local 1’s membership promptly asked for their 
representatives’ resignations. OIUC president Jack Woodrow, 
secretary Orvel Champ, Donald Jones, and Harold Whitney, all 
Local 1 members, then threw their support behind Nilson’s CIO 
efforts, but were nevertheless forced to step down because of 
pressure from Local 1’s membership. Because of developments in 
Ottumwa, Iowa-Nebraska CIO director Ben Henry pledged to 
throw the weight of the state union apparatus behind a move of 
the truckers into the CIO. Despite this support from Local 1 and 
the state CIO, the AFL won out over the CIO and signed a city-
wide contract to handle both motor and rail freight. Although un-
successful, the struggle over the truckers’ union afﬁliation dem-
onstrated the widespread militancy within Local 1 and the local’s 
commitment to larger union and political ﬁghts.8 
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 Both Local 1 and the OIUC supported candidates for local and 
state ofﬁces beginning in 1940. The experience of the 1939 Morrell-
Ottumwa strike convinced union leaders that they needed a more 
supportive city and county government. In 1940, Charles Sears, 
president of Local 1 in 1939, ran for a seat on the Ottumwa school 
board. Sears’s candidacy posed a test of union power against one 
of the incumbents running for reelection, recently retired Morrell 
superintendent and longtime worker enemy Ernest Manns. In the 
race to select members for three seats, Manns ﬁnished second and 
Sears came in fourth out of thirteen candidates. Interest in the elec-
tions, however, generated the highest turnout in a school board 
race in twenty years. In the next two months, Local 1 and the OIUC 
expanded on this interest by helping to boost voter registration 
in Wapello County before the May 1940 primaries. Their efforts 
added 1,625 new voters to the county rolls, an increase of more 
than 10 percent. That fall’s elections resulted in the Democrats’ 
sweep of local and state representative slots in Wapello County, a 
county safely Republican since the late nineteenth century.9 
 The impact of this 1940 voter registration campaign is also 
clearly evident when the total votes from the 1940 general elec-
tions are compared to earlier results. Whereas Ottumwa’s popu-
lation increased by 12 percent between 1930 and 1940, the total 
vote cast for the president went up 15 percent between 1936 and 
1940, and was up nearly 20 percent from 1932. The total number 
of votes cast for Roosevelt in the same periods was up 16 and 25 
percent in Ottumwa. At the county level, although the popu-
lation had increased by 9 percent between 1930 and 1940, total 
votes cast for the president in 1940 were up 13 percent over 1936 
and 20 percent since 1932. Correspondingly, Roosevelt received 
11 percent more votes in 1940 from Wapello County voters than 
in 1936 and 20 percent more than in 1932.10 
 In addition to entering local political contests and registering 
voters, Morrell-Ottumwa workers involved themselves early on 
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in a campaign to retain the structure of city government. Local 1 
activists saw the city’s commission form of government as poten-
tially responsive to working people if labor union members or 
other union allies could be placed in ofﬁce. Ottumwa’s mayor as 
well as its streets and public improvements and public safety 
commissioners each received a salary that allowed them to hold 
ofﬁce without needing an additional source of income. This fact 
also potentially held promise for attracting a working person to 
run for ofﬁce. Yet almost as soon as Morrell workers launched 
themselves into city politics, middle-class groups mobilized to 
oppose their efforts. Beginning in early 1941, a middle class–
dominated Citizens Committee for the Council-Manager Plan 
proposed that Ottumwa adopt a city-manager plan of local gov-
ernment whereby a salaried city manager would be hired to “ad-
minister the city’s business.” The city council would then consist 
of unpaid elected ofﬁcials. Members of the Citizens Committee 
baldly stated that under the present conditions, namely greater 
labor union inﬂuence, “we cannot ELECT and KEEP men of ABILITY 
in ofﬁce.” The OIUC led the opposition to the plan, and argued 
that it was a blatant attempt to remove working people from par-
ticipating in local political affairs. Using language that echoed 
workers’ desire for power in workplace affairs, the opposition 
argued that the city-manager plan would mean “ONE-MAN 
AUTHORITY” and would deprive citizens of “political and personal 
liberty.” The opposition said that Ottumwa residents were being 
asked to “adopt the dictator plan and have a stranger rule us!” 
In the union’s ﬁrst true political success in city affairs, the city-
manager plan failed in March 1941 by a more than two-to-one 
vote in the city as a whole and by much wider margins in the 
working-class precincts. In 1944, however, after racketeering 
charges resulted in the dismissal of the city’s safety commissioner 
and nearly ended the mayor’s tenure, middle-class residents once 
again attempted to secure passage of the city-manager plan. The 
Fosters [owners of the Morrell plant] were open proponents of 
the plan this time around. Once again because of Local 1’s and the 
OIUC’s efforts, it fell to defeat by an almost two-to-one margin.11 
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 Engaging themselves in local politics during the early 1940s, 
several leading militants from Local 1 also helped to establish 
and lead the state’s CIO council. The Iowa-Nebraska States In-
dustrial Union Council, CIO, established in Des Moines in April 
1938, held its fourth annual constitutional convention in Ottum-
wa in August 1941. Robert K. Gustafason from Local 1 served as 
one of the vice presidents. The following year, two members of 
Local 1 served on the council. Thomas B. Hadden, president of 
Local 1 in 1941, served as the secretary-treasurer alongside Pres-
ident Ben Henry, and Orvel Champ was one of the vice presidents. 
In addition, in 1942 Joseph Clark, a member of SWOC’s local at 
the Ottumwa Iron Works, was another vice president. In 1943, 
Orvel Champ, Local 1’s recording secretary that year, then be-
came the secretary-treasurer of the state council with James Pro-
venzano, a member of USWA Local 2134 of the Ottumwa Iron 
Works, a member of the executive board. Morrell-Ottumwa’s local 
constituted a strong presence in the founding and World War II 
years of the state CIO council since it was the second-largest CIO 
local in the state, behind only the UAW-organized John Deere 
plant in Waterloo. In 1943, after the Rath plant’s workforce in 
Waterloo joined the PWOC-CIO, Ottumwa’s Local 1 then consti-
tuted the third-largest union in the state council. Indeed, Local 1 
was instrumental in providing leaders for the Rath-Waterloo or-
ganizing campaign. Lester Bishop, Wilson (Moose) Rogers, and 
Edward Fitzpatrick all played signiﬁcant roles leading up to the 
union’s victory there in a November 1942 certiﬁcation election. A 
year earlier, Local 1 activists helped Ottumwa’s Dain, later John 
Deere, employees gain their ﬁrst union contract, and also helped 
establish the Cedar Rapids Industrial Union Council.12 
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 During the World War II years, Morrell-Ottumwa workers 
continued to run for local political ofﬁces. In March 1944, another 
president of Local 1, Edward A. Filliman, failed in the city’s school 
board elections. The following year, Filliman also lost by a huge 
margin to Frank Pedrick, a south side hardware merchant, in a 
race for city riverfront commissioner. In 1944, however, two union 
members won Wapello County’s two seats in the state legisla-
ture. Dean Aubrey, a UAW member and John Deere employee, 
and Wade McReynolds, a bus driver and AFL member, captured 
those seats in a heavy general election turnout. Voters seemed 
already to have perceived Filliman’s militant credentials as a po-
litical liability compared to Aubrey and McReynolds, who did 
not have the same reputation. As the fall election campaign 
approached, Ottumwa’s packing workers became involved in 
the newly formed CIO-PAC. Given the organizational and voter 
registration efforts of the OIUC, Ottumwa-Morrell workers were 
well prepared to lead local PAC efforts. Local 1 had already 
formed its own PAC in November 1943, consisting of nine mem-
bers including Donald Jones, Louis C. May, Virgil and Gene 
Bankson, and Dean Aubrey. Although the Iowa-Nebraska States 
Industrial Union Council did not make PAC a permanent part of 
its committee structure until 1946, the organization did place ten 
leading union members from across Iowa on its payroll to help 
with efforts to increase voter registration and distribute national 
PAC literature. Much of the CIO political action effort across Iowa 
in 1944 was focused on recruiting farmers into the Democratic 
party. Lyle Cooper, the UPWA international’s research director, 
speciﬁcally commended Ottumwa’s Local 1 in this regard as two 
farmers were elected as Democrats to formerly Republican-
dominated county ofﬁces. State CIO ofﬁcials noted that the Iowa 
legislature also passed a few laws beneﬁting labor for the ﬁrst 
time in twelve years, such as increased workmen’s compensation 
beneﬁts. Nevertheless, though the packing community’s Ward 
One gave Roosevelt 69 percent of its vote, up from 61 percent in 
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1940, across Ottumwa and Wapello County as a whole votes for 
the Democrats remained at the same levels as in 1940. Roosevelt 
received 58 percent from Ottumwa voters and 57 percent from 
voters in Wapello County.13 
 Nevertheless, at the local political level Democrats already 
dominated Wapello County’s politics by World War II. Except for 
the period between 1906 and 1912, when the majority of elected 
county ofﬁcials were Democrats, Wapello County’s elected of-
ﬁces had long been held by Republicans. Beginning in 1932, how-
ever, Democrats would prevail in Wapello County elected ofﬁces 
through the end of the 1960s. The only year in which Republicans 
came close to a majority in the county was in 1942, when there 
were six Democrats and ﬁve Republicans. This dominance would 
continue long after World War II. From 1956 to 1968, in fact, there 
were only a total of ﬁve Republicans elected for ninety positions 
in the county.14 
 Through all of its political and welfare efforts by the end of 
World War II, Local 1 had made signiﬁcant strides in creating 
loyalties to union and CIO political goals among a large segment 
of Ottumwa’s working-class residents. As the largest single or-
ganization in Ottumwa during the war years, Local 1 became 
enmeshed in the city’s welfare and wartime institutional support 
network. In 1943, Orvel Champ led the OIUC’s War Manpower 
Commission and Local 1 was the second-largest donor, behind 
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Morrell, to the National War Fund and Red Cross ﬁnancial cam-
paigns. Local 1 raised $12,000 in 1943, over 15 percent of Ottum-
wa’s entire goal. In 1944, Dean Aubrey served on the board of 
directors of Wapello County’s Red Cross. Local 1 and Morrell 
together accounted for more than 20 percent of the Red Cross’s 
quota for the county.15 
 At both the state and local level, however, the involvement of 
Local 1’s militants in political efforts often created more contro-
versy and turbulence than success. At the state level immediately 
following World War II, Local 1 militants were entrenched in po-
sitions of power on the Iowa-Nebraska States Industrial Union 
Council. In 1946, Orvel Champ was the group’s secretary, Donald 
Jones was the chair of the Legislative Committee, and Edward 
Filliman was secretary of the Resolutions Committee. With 
twenty-ﬁve votes in the council, the third largest bloc—behind 
Waterloo’s UPWA Local 46 from Rath and UAW Local 838 from 
John Deere—Local 1’s delegates supported the council’s establish-
ment of a permanent PAC. Yet Edward Filliman in particular was 
adamantly opposed to increasing the per-capita tax from four to 
ﬁve cents to help support PAC activities. Filliman had emerged as 
Local 1’s leading militant during World War II, and as the local’s 
chief steward from 1945 to 1948, had masterminded many of the 
local’s worker control efforts against Morrell’s speedup cam-
paigns. He attempted to assert the same sort of control over the 
state’s CIO council. Instrumental in leading the separation of the 
Iowa-Nebraska States Council into two separate councils in 1947, 
he accepted Orvel Champ’s nomination to be the ﬁrst president of 
the independent Iowa CIO council and won the election.16 
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 Filliman’s tenure as the state’s CIO council president was short 
and combative. His tenure also coincided with a period of intense 
factionalism within Iowa’s (and the national) CIO over various 
issues, particularly the Progressive party’s presidential campaign. 
Iowa’s CIO left-wingers, supportive of the Progressives, were led 
by Charles Hobbie, head of the United Farm Equipment and 
Metal Workers Union (FE). At the 1948 state CIO constitutional 
convention, Filliman promoted the majority report against third-
party candidates in the fall elections. Even though Hobbie had 
advocated support for third-party candidates, he nevertheless 
nominated Filliman for another term as state council president, 
noting that “I have worked with him over a period of time and 
found him to be efﬁcient, capable and [an] honest trade union 
leader.” But because of charges of opportunism leveled on him by 
state CIO president Ben Henry and his frustration with the pres-
ent council’s constitution that did not allow him to “take and for-
mulate and carry out policy,” Filliman declined the nomination.17 
 From 1946 through 1948, however, when Local 1’s militants 
were signiﬁcant leaders of the state CIO council, they strongly 
inﬂuenced the political efforts the group undertook in conjunc-
tion with the national CIO-PAC as well as the various regional 
representatives of CIO unions, such as UPWA, UAW, and FE. At 
the same time that the UPWA and FE were especially active po-
litically in Iowa following the disastrous 1946 elections and pas-
sage in June 1947 of the Taft-Hartley Act, the state CIO council 
urged greater PAC activities and greater effort in terms of farmer-
laborer cooperation. The state CIO council as well as UPWA, FE, 
and several other unions brought their members out in droves to 
protest a proposed “right-to-work” law for Iowa. On April 21, 
1947, 25,000 unionists picketed at the state capitol in Des Moines 
to no avail; the law passed Iowa’s rural-dominated legislature 
and Republican governor Robert Blue signed it into law.18 
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 Passage of a state “right-to-work” law galvanized both the 
UPWA and FE into pursuing farmer-labor organizing. Union 
leaders felt farmers needed to be more sympathetic to the needs 
of labor and see their common interests. Both unions established 
full-time farm relations directors in 1946, and began to pursue 
cooperative efforts with the Iowa Farmers Union (IFU) by the end 
of that year. The IFU’s president beginning in 1945 was Fred W. 
Stover, a social democrat and devotee of Henry A. Wallace. As 
was true of many left-liberals and their organizations during the 
1940s, Stover and the IFU pushed issues such as full employment, 
economic planning, expanded social welfare and civil rights pro-
grams, higher farm commodity subsidies, and international co-
operation with the Soviet Union. Stover’s ﬁrst editorial for the 
Iowa Union Farmer called for closer relations with labor since “[a] 
sympathetic understanding by farmers of labor and labor organ-
izations is of prime importance if we are to progress as citizens 
in a democracy.” The fact that the IFU was as committed to social 
democratic programs as either the UPWA or FE greatly helped 
labor’s coalition-building efforts with farmers.19 
 To be sure, the social democracy of the UPWA, FE, and IFU 
in this period was episodic and, as David Plotke carefully points 
out about this theme in American liberalism in the 1930s and 
1940s, should not be seen as “an autonomous political force” and 
“had no chance of success” in replacing the Democratic party. 
Moreover, Ottumwa’s workers, as they demonstrated in the 1948 
national elections, were not budding social democrats, even if 
they wanted greater shop ﬂoor power. Nevertheless, the social 
democratic themes and programs of the three organizations cap-
tured the imaginations and support, however ﬂeeting, perhaps, 
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of many workers in Ottumwa and industrial cities in Iowa and 
the Midwest in the period. The UPWA’s social democratic pro-
grams rested on a vision of labor, capital, and the state cooperat-
ing to restructure America’s economy and society so that class 
conﬂict would be reduced and all Americans would prosper. The 
UPWA advocated national economic planning or “planned pro-
duction for abundance,” practiced already in Austin, Minnesota, 
where union members at the Hormel packing plant had won a 
guaranteed annual wage. The UPWA also supported pay raises, 
especially those advanced in the union’s national strikes of 1946 
and 1948, social welfare, farmer-labor cooperation, civil rights 
and antidiscrimination programs, and local union participation 
in Democratic community politics.20 
 Ottumwa’s Local 1 quickly became one of Iowa’s most active 
UPWA social democratic advocates, especially in regard to 
farmer-labor organizing. In April 1947, Lee Simon, the UPWA’s 
farm relations director, served as a conciliator along with Local 1 
representatives for a four-day Ottumwa milk strike, in which 190 
dairy farmers refused to accept the price cut imposed by four 
area milk distributors. Building on the success of Simon’s efforts, 
Stover, Simon, and the Reverend John Harley Telfer, pastor of 
the First Congregationalist Church in Ottumwa, elaborated in 
May on the IFU district conference theme, “Building for Peace and 
Abundance,” by speaking to Ottumwans on “Farmer-Labor Team- 
work for Peace and Abundance.” Telfer, an Ottumwa resident 
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since July 1945, had already made a name for himself as an out-
spoken advocate for black civil rights. Educated at the University 
of Chicago, he had been director of the Milwaukee Federation 
Forum and Milwaukee Town Hall before moving to Ottumwa. 
He chaired Ottumwa’s Interracial Committee and the People’s 
Flood Prevention Committee, an organization of local farmers 
and laborers. Beginning in 1947, he became the UPWA District 3’s 
radio show host. The show aired three times weekly and was de-
scribed by the UPWA as one of the most widely aired labor radio 
shows in the country.21 
 Soon after the IFU conference, Local 1 formed one of the ﬁrst 
UPWA local union farmer-labor committees. Later in the fall, Ot-
tumwa was the site of the UPWA-IFU jointly sponsored Farmer–
Labor Day picnic. More than 3,000 people attended the two-day 
celebration at Wildwood Park on Ottumwa’s south side and 
heard liberal and left-wing farm and labor leaders urge a “po-
litical revolt against [R]epublican legislators and congressmen.” 
The picnic was organized by Ed Filliman and Dwight Anderson, 
a farmer from Agency and local IFU leader, along with a plan-
ning committee including ﬁve meatpacking workers, ﬁve em-
ployees of the Deere-owned Dain Company farm implement 
plant, two employees of the Ottumwa Iron Works, and one ma-
chine operator at the Hardscog Pneumatic Tool Works in Ottum-
wa. Local 1 militants later complained about how AFL groups 
were notably absent from this and other farm-labor efforts in 
Ottumwa during the period, but it is difﬁcult to know just how 
eager they actually were to work with them, given earlier squab-
bles between the two groups. The FE also held joint meetings 
with the IFU during summer and fall 1947 at Charles City, home 
to a large Oliver farm implement plant, and other nearby north-
central Iowa locations.22 
                                                 
21. Ottumwa Daily Courier, 4/5/1947; Iowa Union Farmer, 4/19/1947, 5/17/1947; 
Packinghouse Worker, 4/18/1947; The Unionist and Public Forum, 8/28/1947; and 
First Congregationalist Church file, Ottumwa Public Library, Ottumwa. 
22. Iowa Union Farmer, 9/20/1947; Ottumwa Daily Courier, 8/28/1947, 9/1–2 1947; 
The Unionist and Public Forum, 7/31/1947; McCoy’s Ottumwa City Directory, 1947; 
and Proceedings, Ninth Annual Constitutional Convention, Iowa-Nebraska In-
dustrial Union Council, CIO, 1947, pp. 262–63, IFL, SHSI. On the FE’s efforts, see 
Wilson J. Warren, “The ‘People’s Century’ in Iowa: Coalition-Building among 
Farm and Labor Organizations, 1945–1950,” Annals of Iowa 49 (1988), 380–82. 
90      THE ANNALS OF IOWA 
 Although the state CIO council was strongly supportive of 
farm-labor cooperation and political efforts, inviting Fred Stover, 
Homer Ayres, and Lee Simon to speak on the issue at its 1946 
and 1947 constitutional conventions, the state CIO, like the na-
tional CIO, was not supportive of third-party candidacies in the 
1948 election. Thus, a more decidedly left-wing political impact 
from the joint efforts of the UPWA, FE, and IFU was limited. This 
is especially evident in the failure of Henry A. Wallace’s presi-
dential bid in 1948. Wallace’s emphasis on programs for full em-
ployment, economic abundance, and international cooperation 
with the Soviet Union were attractive for many left-wingers with 
social democratic concerns. In late 1947 and early 1948, the FE 
international and Iowa’s FE District 5’s leadership endorsed Wal-
lace. Some local leaders within the UPWA also lobbied on his 
behalf. Fred Stover bucked the National Farmers Union to en-
dorse Wallace in the January 1948 issue of the Iowa Union Farmer. 
Yet in 1948, most Americans associated these planks with com-
munism. Accordingly, such efforts were unacceptable to most 
farmers and laborers. Also crucial in swaying CIO members was 
the removal of several FE District 5 left-wingers by the state CIO 
council in August. CIO regional director Ben Henry castigated 
Hobbie and Stover for their support of Wallace. Despite the sup-
port and organizing efforts of the IFU, FE, and some UPWA locals 
on behalf of Wallace’s presidential candidacy, he did not gain 
many votes in the November election. He only garnered 1 per-
cent more of the total votes in north-central Iowa counties where 
the IFU had its largest support than his overall nationwide vote 
total of 2 percent. He did even worse in Ottumwa, where he re-
ceived less than 2 percent of the votes cast, primarily because 
Local 1 leaders, such as Edward Filliman, did not encourage their 
membership to support him.23 
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 After 1948 left-liberal farm-labor educational efforts declined 
noticeably. This was owing in part to conﬂicts within the IFU, to 
conﬂicts between them and the state CIO, and to the virtual ab-
sence of support for the popular front in Iowa as a whole. An-
other signiﬁcant factor was the loosening of ties between the IFU 
and the UPWA. Even though UPWA District 3 leadership con-
tinued to pass resolutions supporting farm-labor work, they no 
longer organized farm-labor meetings and conferences. Some of 
this might be attributed to Lee Simon’s death in September 1948. 
From 1948 to 1950, the UPWA devoted most of its efforts to pro-
moting farm-labor cooperation by distributing leaﬂets at its booths 
at county fairs in the Midwest. These efforts were substantial in 
their own way. In the fall of 1948, for example, UPWA District 3 
staffed booths at twelve county fairs in Iowa and at least two 4-H 
shows, and during the summer of 1949 it increased its allocations 
for exhibits and literature and even sponsored a group of ballad 
singers at over thirty local union meetings and county fairs in 
Iowa and Nebraska. In all, the UPWA visited more than forty fairs 
in 1949 and expanded its monthly literature mailings to farmers 
from 14,000 to 100,000 pieces between 1948 and 1949. Yet in 1949 
the UPWA no longer was as active in sponsoring farm-labor meet-
ings and conferences, unlike the FE, which merged reluctantly 
with another outcast CIO international, the United Electrical, 
Radio and Machine Workers of America (UE). Local 1’s farm-
labor committee also evaporated during these years. Conse-
quently, after 1948 the FE was the only labor union willing to 
work in this way with the IFU.24 
 Criticism within the state CIO council during the early 1950s 
singled out several problems with mainstream CIO farmer-labor 
cooperative and political efforts. In 1951, Jacob “Jake” Mincks, a 
member of UAW Local 74 representing Ottumwa’s John Deere 
plant, voiced several concerns as chair of the state CIO council’s 
farm-labor committee about the episodic nature of labor’s political 
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efforts. Mincks, though never employed at Morrell-Ottumwa or 
a participant in the factionalism within Local 1, emerged as the 
most important unionist from Deere in Ottumwa after starting 
work there in 1947. He immediately became involved in local 
union, community, and statewide political causes. Raised on a 
farm south of Ottumwa, he came to live in the city in 1931 after 
his father’s death. After working at odd jobs and for the Civilian 
Conservation Corps, he ﬁrst joined a labor union in 1938 as a 
Teamster, and then worked at the Ottumwa Iron Works from 
1941 to 1947 and joined the local CIO steelworkers union there. 
Though like the militants who formed Local 1 Mincks was an 
early CIO supporter, unlike them he apparently never supported 
militant job actions. He revealed in a later interview that he took 
pride that Deere had only one signiﬁcant strike (in 1950) during 
the long period that he worked there. Although clearly ambitious 
in his own way, he did not view politics as a forum for punishing 
employers. Within a year of joining the Deere ranks, Mincks was 
a clear leader within the UAW local there. He was also one of the 
UAW’s local representatives on the OIUC. In October 1948, he 
gave a report to the local’s membership on PAC efforts, and one 
month later initiated a motion within the local to have them go 
on record supporting Ben Henry’s purge of the left-wingers 
within the state’s FE. His political involvement at the local level 
soon carried him into prominence within the state CIO council. 
He became a consistent voice for more concerted political efforts 
on the part of the state CIO council. Indeed, Jack McCoy, part of 
the new generation of Local 1 leaders to move into state-level 
politics, later described Mincks as “the pusher behind the political 
activities of all of us [in Ottumwa].”25 
 Mincks thoroughly backed the new leadership of the state CIO 
council, led since the controversial 1948 elections by president 
Vernon Dale and secretary-treasurer Kenneth Everhart. Dale, a 
member of Amalgamated Clothing Workers of America (ACWA) 
Local 261 in Muscatine, and Everhart, part of UAW Local 838 in 
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Waterloo, were committed especially, like Mincks, to increasing 
the level of funding for the state CIO council’s PAC efforts. This 
commitment never wavered from the late 1940s through the state 
council’s merger with the state AFL council in 1956 largely because 
both Dale and Everhart were reelected to their ofﬁces each year 
by acclamation. In 1950 this fact led to an attempt initiated by 
Filliman to oust them by demanding a secret ballot for the election 
of ofﬁcers. Three years earlier, Filliman, along with many other 
delegates from the UPWA especially, had demanded roll call votes 
for the election of ofﬁcers so that local union constituencies could 
be assured that delegates voted for the candidates they had 
agreed on before the convention. That motion was narrowly de-
feated, and so was Filliman’s attempt to enforce the secret ballot 
provision in 1950. Nevertheless, the defeat of this motion caused 
several local unions, including Local 1, to withdraw from the 
state CIO council for the next two years. Although Filliman’s overt 
argument all along was the need for democratic process and 
responsiveness, his efforts also strongly suggested a personal 
desire for power and control. After the return of most local union 
delegations to the state’s fold by 1953, state CIO delegates no 
longer were swayed by Filliman or other CIO militants. The two-
year absence of the most militant voices effectively muted their 
voice in the state CIO council.26 
 As articulated by Dale, Everhart, and Mincks, the PAC chair 
beginning in 1952, effective political efforts demanded more sys-
tematic voter registration, more lobbying efforts, especially at the 
grassroots level, and, more than anything, a greater commitment 
by local union members to ﬁnancially support PAC. By 1950, for 
instance, the national CIO-PAC was working more closely with 
the state CIO council’s PAC, and had committed substantial 
funding for selected campaigns, especially Albert Loveland’s 
candidacy for the U.S. Senate. Morrell-Ottumwa’s Local 1 spent 
$3,000 of its own funds and expended considerable manpower 
in canvassing unsuccessfully for Loveland on behalf of PAC. The 
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CIO hoped Loveland would also appeal to family farmers because 
of his support for the Brannan Plan, a proposal to hike farm sup-
ports to higher, ﬁxed levels. Despite winning 67 percent of the 
First Ward’s vote as well as 54 percent of Ottumwa’s and 53 per-
cent of Wapello County’s votes, Loveland only mustered 45 per-
cent of the state’s total tally. Some blamed his poor showing on 
scathing attacks on the Brannan Plan by the American Farm 
Bureau Federation, a larger organization representing more pros-
perous individual farmers and agribusiness interests. More im-
portant, because of a lack of more consistent political efforts and 
money overall, Democratic candidates did not do well through-
out the state. This sentiment was voiced by Mincks when he 
noted in his farmer-labor committee report regarding U.S. House 
efforts, “We down in Ottumwa can carry Wapello County, but 
we have four counties in the district down there. How are you 
going to carry the others?” Another CIO delegate noted that too 
few county-level PAC committees had been established. In his 
1952 president’s report, Dale noted that “in the early days . . . too 
few people tried to do too much. The end result [was] a lot of 
noise with little accomplished.” On a related issue of farmer-
labor political strategies, Everhart noted in 1952 that “setting up 
booths at State Fairs [was not] particularly conducive to good 
farmer-labor relations in the state of Iowa.” Though thoroughly 
supportive of farmer-labor political efforts, he questioned the 
tactic of “trying to cram a farm program down the farmer’s [sic] 
of Iowa without knowing what we are talking about.” In another 
debate on political tactics, Everhart and Mincks stressed the need 
for more direct visits with local legislators.27 
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 Again, the underlying need, according to these leaders, was 
greater funding for the PAC. Before the 1951 state CIO council con-
vention, the militants, led by Filliman, had effectively blocked 
increases in the per-capita tax. However, without the militants’ 
attendance at either the 1951 or 1952 conventions, Dale and Ever-
hart were able to make the issue a key point of debate. At the 
1951 convention, President Dale noted that he was sympathetic 
to the packinghouse workers’ delegates’ position against a per-
capita tax increase, but he stressed that the need for a two-cent 
increase (from ﬁve to seven cents) was pressing. The two-cent in-
crease would be earmarked for PAC’s use only. This issue was 
ﬁnally resolved the following year. The 1952 convention passed 
the two-cent per capita increase after a lengthy debate regarding 
the reafﬁliation of the locals that owed back dues or had walked 
out over the per-capita issue in 1950. Initially, the Resolutions 
Committee passed a resolution demanding full repayment be-
fore locals were allowed back onto the state CIO council. But Fort 
Dodge UPWA Local 31 member and UPWA Region 3 director 
Russell Bull, who had helped to move Local 1 militants out of 
power during the 1950–1952 period, condemned the resolution 
for trying to “ring [sic] every last cent of blood” out of locals be-
fore letting them back in. Both Dale and Everhart reminded dele-
gates that there was no sense in punishing delinquent locals since 
the PAC program needed all locals to be present and current in 
dues for it to function effectively. Everhart clinched support for a 
more moderate resolution that would give the executive board 
discretionary power over conditional readmittance by exclaiming 
that “you make councils out of people, not out of money.” Ben 
Henry made an indirect reference to Local 1 in regard to the local 
union readmittance and the PAC issue by noting that “one par-
ticular local union is in an important spot in this political action 
program that we are going to try to promote.”28 
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 From 1948 to 1952, Local 1’s militants also made several efforts 
to assert their power in community politics. But just as occurred 
within the state CIO council, these efforts all faltered. In their wake, 
moderate and more conciliatory Local 1 leaders emerged and ex-
perienced greater political success. Particularly in the aftermath 
of the tumultuous 1948 UPWA meatpacking strike, Local 1 mili-
tants focused even more attention on controlling city politics. 
They viewed the 1949 city council elections as crucial to the lo-
cal’s political power in Ottumwa in several respects. On the most 
basic level, Local 1 hoped to retake the offensive against the city’s 
middle-class community that had largely been unsupportive of 
its strike efforts. True to their tactics at the shop ﬂoor level, Local 
1’s militants wanted to mobilize union members and other blue-
collar Ottumwans to defeat and punish public ofﬁcials who had 
hindered the workers’ strike efforts. As a consequence, militants 
even attempted to dissuade workers from supporting friends of 
labor, in this particular election, Herschel Loveless, because he 
and others were seen as not sufﬁciently militant. Loveless’s vic-
tory would be another sign of the weakening hold the militants 
had in Local 1. 
 Early in 1949, Local 1, the OIUC, and the TLA formed the 
Ottumwa Policy Committee to focus working-class votes in the up-
coming city elections. During the mid-March primaries, the 
Ottumwa Policy Committee supported David Nevin, Lester Par-
cell, and Patrick Harden. Each man won enough votes to be en-
tered in the general election. Mayoral candidate Nevin and safety 
commissioner candidate Parcell both ﬁnished a close second. 
Mayor Herman Schaefer was thoroughly defeated, having won 
the scorn of not only working-class voters for his role in the 1948 
strike, but also having alienated middle-class voters for not hav-
ing controlled the situation more effectively. Streets commission 
candidate Patrick Harden won the primary election for this po- 
sition. Local 1 then embarked on an intensive propaganda cam-
paign during the two weeks preceding the general election.29 
 Local 1 supported Nevin over the other mayoral candidate, 
Herschel Loveless, because union leaders claimed that Loveless 
had not joined a union until he needed labor’s political support. 
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Born on a farm near Fremont, Iowa, in 1911, Loveless had moved 
to Ottumwa as a youngster and graduated from Ottumwa High 
School in 1927. He then worked for the Chicago, Milwaukee, St. 
Paul and Paciﬁc Railroad through most of the Great Depression. 
In 1939, he joined Morrell’s workforce as a turbine operator in 
the power plant before returning to work for the Milwaukee Rail-
road in 1944. On a leave of absence from the railroad, Loveless 
organized the street and sanitation departments and then served 
as the city council’s emergency chief organizer during the disas-
trous 1947 ﬂood in Ottumwa. It was in this capacity that he 
earned widespread support among Ottumwans. Nevertheless, 
Local 1 accused Loveless of not joining the Railway Clerk’s Union 
until the mid-1940s when he pursued political ambitions.30 
 Local 1 also tried to sway working-class Ottumwans to look 
unfavorably on Edna Lawrence, Lester Parcell’s opponent for 
safety commissioner in the city election. Lawrence, like Loveless, 
had considerable support among workers in the city. In 1948, 
with Local 1 support, she had won a seat in the state legislature 
but then resigned her ofﬁce in early 1949 in hopes of winning city 
ofﬁce. Local 1 noted that Lawrence had run unsuccessfully for 
local ofﬁce many times before and now seemed more concerned 
about settling old scores than serving Ottumwans on the state 
level, as she had been entrusted to do. John Meagher, Harden’s 
opponent for streets commissioner, had served in that position 
during the 1948 strike and had suffered consequently in the pri-
mary election. Although his role in the strike had been minor, 
Local 1 did not spare him, attesting that “his management of 
ofﬁce and regard for the public [since 1947] has been very poor.” 
Indeed, the local reminded workers of Meagher’s positions as well, 
labeling him a “scab” for having crossed the picket line during 
Ottumwa’s 1922 railroad strike.31 
 Before the general election, Local 1 reminded the packing 
community and other blue-collar residents to “recall just what 
position certain members of the City Council took in regards to 
the strike action at Morrells last year.” Yet, just before the election, 
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the Ottumwa Policy Committee alliance of AFL and CIO unions 
broke down. It is not clear which side initiated the split, but Local 
1 was left alone in support of its candidates. It seems fair to spec-
ulate, however, that many Ottumwa voters, even among the 
city’s working class, saw Local 1’s decision to stick with its can-
didates as evidence of its combativeness. Most of the other AFL 
and CIO unions in town supported Loveless over Nevin because 
of Loveless’s help for working-class neighborhoods damaged by 
the 1947 ﬂood. Lawrence, according to other unions in town, 
boasted signiﬁcant prolabor credentials. The other unions sup-
ported Loveless, Lawrence, and Meagher. When the votes were 
counted, only Harden among the Local 1 endorsed candidates 
emerged victorious. Demonstrating the growing divisions 
within Local 1, the voting results in different parts of the city sug-
gest that many of Morrell’s rank and ﬁle ignored their leaders’ 
endorsements. The east end original packinghouse community 
supported Nevin for mayor while south side residents, where 
most of the ﬂood damage occurred, solidly cast their votes for 
Loveless. Thus, despite a tremendous effort on the part of the 
militant leadership of Local 1 to reafﬁrm its power, the largest 
city election turnout in Ottumwa’s history underscored the un-
raveling of this control and of unity within the local’s ranks.32 
 After 1949, Local 1’s militant leaders had little ability to con-
vince blue-collar residents to support their candidates in local 
elections. Allegations of sloppy handling of local union funds 
also bothered voters. Ed Filliman, a UPWA international ﬁeld 
representative after 1949, exacerbated tensions within the local 
by noting that the ﬁnancial stability of Local 1 in 1950–1951 had 
been seriously compromised by its ofﬁcers’ predilection for ever-
increasing salaries and misappropriations of local union funds. 
Too many ofﬁcers, Filliman noted, were “Do-Nothing, Money-
Grabbing individuals.” Although it is difﬁcult to know how 
much Filliman’s charges were motivated by his sense of declin-
ing power, having lost a position in not only Local 1 but also on 
the state CIO council, he named the local’s president in these 
years, Walter Van Tassel, as a particular culprit. In February 1951, 
Local 1’s trustees, including Donald Jones, seconded Filliman’s 
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accusations by ﬁling charges against Van Tassel for drawing pay 
for lost time at the same time that Morrell paid him for vacation 
time. To a large degree the ﬁght within Local 1 during these years 
reﬂected a power struggle between the older militants and the 
newer generation of less combative union leaders.33 
 This power struggle created generally poor results for Local 
1 in city elections during the early 1950s. In 1951, Van Tassel and 
Thomas Cohagan, Local 1’s recording secretary in 1951 and a 
prominent member of the new generation of union leaders at 
Morrell-Ottumwa, ran for city ofﬁces and lost. Each candidate 
not only failed to win but could not gain the support of voters in 
the packinghouse workers’ precincts. Herschel Loveless, how-
ever, again won the city’s mayoral election soundly with the 
OIUC’s solid support. Two years later, Herschel Loveless was the 
only one of ﬁve OIUC-endorsed candidates in the 1953 election 
who won versus those endorsed by the middle-class and profes-
sional voter–backed “Good Government Association.” Van Tas-
sel and Dean Aubrey both lost.34 
 By 1953, internal factionalism within Local 1 had seriously 
compromised its ability to effectively run its own members or 
even gain working-class support for its endorsed candidates in 
city elections. The deleterious impact of this factionalism was 
starkly illustrated in that year when the “Good Government As-
sociation” revived its campaign to implement a council-manager 
plan of city government. Unlike the case in 1941 and 1944 when 
Local 1 had stood at the center of opposition to similar plans, in 
1953 the local ignored the campaign until after enough petitions 
were collected by July to put it on the general election ballot. At 
Local 1’s July 21 membership meeting, the rank and ﬁle decided 
to spend between $300 and $500 to ﬁght its passage in a last-ditch 
effort. On July 26, the council-manager plan passed with 58 per-
cent of voters supporting it. Although voters in the old First 
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Ward immediate packinghouse neighborhood rejected it by a 68 
percent majority, packing workers who lived in the city’s south 
side precincts contributed to its victory.35 
 Although factionalism within Local 1 contributed to the 
losses in community politics in 1953, Ottumwa mayor Herschel 
Loveless demonstrated his strong commitment to labor in the 
battle over the council-manager plan in that year. Jack McCoy, 
an employee of Morrell since 1949 and recording secretary for 
Local 1 in 1953, noted explicitly how Local 1 and the OIUC counted 
on Loveless’s support:  
When the ﬁght over going to a city manager form of government 
developed, Herschel Loveless came down and visited with Dave 
Hart and I [sic]. He didn’t want to turn over the city government to 
the Chamber of Commerce crowd. We said we’d do our job at the 
plant. The damn election was held on a Saturday, and we assigned 
our stewards to different precincts. They worked hard to try to stop 
it. The newspaper had been building that up for a long while, and 
they beat us on it, in spite of the stewards doing a good job. We 
must have ﬁelded between sixty and eighty stewards that Saturday 
in the precincts in Ottumwa.36 
 
Transforming Iowa’s Politics 
Although factional conﬂict within Local 1 diluted the union’s po-
litical strength in Ottumwa during the late 1940s and early 1950s, 
the union mobilized sufﬁcient power to transform state politics. 
By 1953, a new generation of Local 1 leaders, like Jack McCoy 
and Dave Hart, working closely with Jake Mincks, emerged and 
began to contribute to the next and more successful stage in this 
political transformation. In 1952, Mincks became Wapello County 
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Democratic chair and, in 1954, McCoy was selected as one of Lo- 
cal 1’s representatives on the OIUC. That fall, along with Ottumwa 
AFL unionist Wade McReynolds and after borrowing over $1,000 
from the OIUC’s building fund to ﬁnance his campaign, McCoy 
was then elected to the Iowa House of Representatives, a position 
he won again in 1956. Beginning in the mid-1950s, with the suc-
cessful merger of the AFL and CIO at both the local level in Ot-
tumwa and, more important, at the state level, Ottumwa’s union 
leaders contributed centrally to the Democratic party’s successes.37 
 The state CIO council’s 1953 constitutional convention, ﬁt-
tingly held in Ottumwa, opened after an address by Mayor Her-
schel Loveless with Iowa CIO president Vernon Dale recognizing 
Ottumwa’s key role in the state’s labor movement. Dale noted 
that “much of the leadership and a great number of the member-
ship of the early days of our organization [came from the city]. 
Ottumwa and its labor movement contributed much to the 
growth of the CIO in our state.” Dale immediately went on to 
highlight how he viewed the state CIO council’s political action 
efforts, activities in which Ottumwans Mincks, McCoy, and Hart 
would all play important roles. Mincks, as he had been since the 
year before, was chair of the PAC, McCoy was secretary of the cre-
dentials committee, and Hart, another prominent member of the 
new generation of leaders at Local 1, was secretary of the Rules 
Committee. Born in 1907 in the coal camp town of Hocking, 
Iowa, just west of Ottumwa, Hart had attended UMWA meet-
ings with his father during the World War I era. He worked at 
odd jobs in Iowa and Chicago before the 1930s, when he moved 
to New York City. There, interrupted by military service during 
World War II, he held a variety of laboring positions. When his 
father died in 1947, Hart returned to Ottumwa and got a job at 
Morrell just after the 1948 strike. Quickly selected as a depart-
ment steward, he became chief steward in 1952 in the wake of 
Local 1’s receivership and most intense period of factionalism.38 
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 In his comments on the legislative committee’s reports at the 
1953 convention, President Dale identiﬁed labor’s most crucial 
political objectives. Labor unionists elected to the Iowa legislature, 
such as Kenneth Everhart and Jack McCoy, hammered away at 
fellow politicians about the need for passing new unemployment 
and workmen’s compensation legislation and repealing the 
state’s right-to-work law, the so-called Senate File 109. However, 
everything, according to Dale, hinged on counterbalancing the 
control that the Republican party, and its key lobbying group, the 
Iowa Manufacturers Association (IMA), had in the legislature. 
The way to neutralize this Republican dominance was through 
reapportionment. Although Iowa’s constitution required reap- 
portionment after each census, no legislative reapportionment 
had occurred since 1886. According to political scientist Charles 
Wiggins, two state constitutional amendments passed in 1904 
and 1928 made reapportionment “virtually impossible.” The 
result, especially in the state house since each county received 
equal representation, was that urban counties were vastly under- 
represented. Dale proclaimed that reapportionment “is the only 
way that the people in Des Moines, Waterloo, Cedar Rapids, 
Davenport, Dubuque, Sioux City, and the various other cities of 
the state can have themselves represented.” In his 1952 opening 
convention remarks Dale had also stressed the problem of dis-
proportionate representation in the state legislature. There were 
too many “men from smaller community areas, farmers and peo-
ple dependent upon the farm for their living [as well as] those 
directly representative of the antilabor groups, the big business 
boys and their lawyers” who constituted the legislators’ mem-
bership. PAC chair Mincks emphasized how all the convention’s 
resolutions tied into the need to get “our people into the politi- 
cal parties in this state of ours” and to raise funds for PAC. On 
the funds, Dale noted that the passage of the two-cent increase in 
the per capita tax, the so-called citizenship fund, had resulted in 
much “improved ﬁnancial condition and ability to carry out 
needed projects in political action and legislation.”39 
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 Reporting on the CIO’s political efforts over the next two 
years, Dale noted incremental gains. Although the structure of 
the PAC program was revamped in 1954 with new full-time rep-
resentatives appointed and training classes started, Dale ex-
claimed that “you should be getting damn well fed-up with the 
spectacle of a labor committee [in the state legislature] headed by 
a business man [sic] and overloaded by farmers who admittedly 
do not understand the labor problem.” Although Democrats 
picked up eighteen seats in the House, and Republican governor 
Leo Hoegh agreed to some favorable appointments to various 
commissioner positions and made good on promises to provide 
increases in unemployment and workmen’s compensation, labor 
otherwise “received little or nothing” from the state legislature. 
Moreover, by 1955 much of the state CIO council’s discussion 
pertained to the more immediate issue of the imminent merger 
of the AFL and CIO.40 
 To be sure, many veteran Iowa CIO unionists looked skepti-
cally at the merger of the two unions. Many agreed with Ralph 
Helstein, UPWA president, that the merger was defensive; it was 
a strategy of effectively combating the strength of growing cor-
porations during a period of national political conservatism 
while also conserving early gains. At the last state CIO council 
convention, held in Des Moines on June 26, 1956, much of the 
convention’s debate was devoted to the upcoming merger con-
vention, held the following two days in Des Moines. Mincks was 
one of the outspoken voices urging acceptance and the necessity 
of the merger. Indeed, Mincks was the guiding force between Ot-
tumwa’s CIO and AFL councils’ merger, delayed at the request 
of the AFL council until after the state’s merger. To allay the fears 
of the smaller AFL central body that its unions would have no 
voice in the new city labor council, Mincks negotiated a nearly 
equally partitioned representative council. Ottumwa was in the 
nearly unique position of having CIO unions outnumber AFL 
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unions. The only other Iowa city where this was true was Water-
loo, where a volunteer coordinating council had been active since 
1950. When founded in August 1956, Ottumwa’s AFL-CIO labor 
council had four AFL representatives and ﬁve CIO representatives, 
even though Local 1 and UAW Local 74 together accounted for 
75 percent of the city’s total labor union membership.41 
 In large part, the merger between the AFL and CIO in Iowa 
occurred as smoothly as it did because the top CIO council 
ofﬁcials, like Dale, Everhart, and Mincks, were not militants but 
were moderates interested in practical political gains for laboring 
people. They saw the necessity of the merger primarily for polit-
ical action purposes. Important, too, was the decision of the 
state’s top AFL ofﬁcials, most notably Ray Mills, the new AFL-
CIO president, to throw their support to the Democratic party. 
Mills, a lifelong Republican, publicly announced his switch to the 
Democratic party in 1955 after tiring of the IMA-dominated Re-
publican positions on labor laws in the state. Republican gover-
nor Leo Hoegh had promised in his 1954 campaign to support 
the union shop, for instance, but was unable to sway the con-
servative forces in the legislature to overturn the state’s right-to-
work law. By combining forces, AFL and CIO activists could cer-
tainly accomplish much more working together in the Iowa legis-
lature than they could separately. Iowa’s AFL-CIO merger in 1956 
created a more politically uniﬁed labor movement at both the 
state and local levels. At the founding convention, the CIO was 
now outnumbered by AFL unions in the Iowa Federation of Labor 
(IFL), AFL-CIO, by 390 to 587 votes. Yet in several respects, the 
CIO still wielded considerable weight. For instance, both the 
UPWA and UAW received their own vice presidents because each 
had more than 10,000 members. UPWA Locals 46 and 1 as well 
as UAW Local 838 were the largest locals in the new IFL. By the 
1957 IFL convention, Mincks, Hart, and McCoy all held promi-
nent positions in the state labor federation. Mincks was the Cre-
dentials Committee chair, Hart was Resolutions Committee chair, 
and McCoy was the new Committee on Political Education 
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(COPE) director. After the death of Russell Bull in 1959, Hart be-
came director of UPWA District 3.42 
 In terms of approaches to political action, the IFL’s basic strat-
egy, as well as leading personnel, remained true to the CIO’s 
original plan of attack. Farmer-labor cooperation, for instance, re-
mained a key component of the IFL’s approach to political mobi-
lization. IFL leaders worked closely with a new farm group, the 
National Farmers Organization (NFO), for joint political beneﬁt. 
Although its organizing strategies differed, for many farmers the 
NFO ﬁlled a void left by the decline of the Iowa Farmers Union, 
embroiled in communist accusations throughout the 1950s. 
Formed in 1955 and led by Oren Lee Stanley beginning in De-
cember 1956, the NFO focused its strategy for raising farm prices 
on aggressive organizing and collective bargaining. The NFO 
gained members who were disillusioned with the strategies of 
farm cooperatives and who felt leery about the future of the fed-
eral farm program. Adopted at its convention of 1958, the NFO’s 
collective bargaining aimed at obtaining master contracts with 
livestock processors and farm commodity buyers on a “cost- 
plus” basis. Speciﬁcally, according to NFO historian Jon Lauck, 
the “NFO’s plan involved Marketing Area Bargaining Commit-
tees, elected by NFO members, presenting offers to meatpackers 
and promising a steady ﬂow of livestock, all in exchange for con-
tracts for better prices.” After signing up over 100,000 members, 
the NFO began to stage holding actions in 1959 as a ﬁrst step 
toward gaining master contracts. One of the ﬁrst holding actions 
took place at St. Joseph, Missouri, for an entire week. Packers 
there were able to break the effort, however, by trucking in live-
stock from outside the organized area. More successful holding 
actions took place in April 1961 in the Omaha, Kansas City, and 
St. Joseph areas, followed by further efforts in these and other 
areas in 1962–1964.43 
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 At the local level, this new form of farm-labor cooperation 
was most successful in Waterloo after the formation of the Black 
Hawk Labor Council (BHLC), AFL-CIO, in 1956. Besides Ottum-
wa, Waterloo was the state’s other strong CIO center where the 
merger with the AFL went smoothly because of several previous 
years of cooperation between the two unions. Unlike earlier 
efforts by the UPWA and the FE in the late 1940s, however, the 
BHLC’s farmer-labor efforts resulted in greater political gains in 
this period because they were not tainted with left-wing activities. 
The NFO initially approached the BHLC because the farm group’s 
organizers, though enthusiastic, had little actual experience with 
collective bargaining. As a consequence, the BHLC and NFO came 
to see each other as natural allies.44 
 The BHLC and NFO’s collaboration resulted in the formation 
of a Farm-Labor Association in 1956. John Cooney, president of 
the BHLC from 1956 to 1965, described how farmer-labor organ-
izing in Black Hawk County and surrounding areas of northeast 
Iowa worked: 
Well, what happened, you know, the farmers would have one of 
their meetings and invite somebody from labor to come there and 
talk. Maybe they would have a hog roast, and they’d invite so many 
of us to come there. So ﬁnally we sat down and, well, if we can sit 
and talk here why can’t we sit down at the table and talk business. 
We found out there was very little that we couldn’t support that 
they were passing, and vice versa. 
Paul Larsen, executive secretary of the BHLC from 1956 to 1965, 
elaborated on the origins of the Farm-Labor Association: 
[The NFO] came to various elements of the labor movement want-
ing to know how to organize, wanting to work with and use the 
expertise of the labor movement. There were a number of people 
that were very active in the labor movement at that time that had 
had prior experience working with organizing farm groups too. [As 
a result of this collaboration], that was the ﬁrst time that they came 
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up with the slogan, “Collective bargaining in the marketplace.” 
That was the ﬁrst time that any farm organization had done really 
anything toward the idea of bargaining for their prices rather than 
going in and taking [what] was being offered.45 
 In places other than Black Hawk County, Iowa’s farmers and 
urban laborers were drawn closer together politically during the 
middle and late 1950s by several speciﬁc concerns that ultimately 
bore fruit for the Democrats in several state races, most notably 
the governor’s race in 1956. After several years of rising sur-
pluses and declining prices, farmers balked at U.S. Secretary of 
Agriculture Ezra Taft Benson’s proposal to combat the problem 
with ﬂexible price supports. Even Iowa’s Republican governor 
Leo Hoegh castigated Benson’s proposal, which cost Hoegh the 
support of the Iowa Farm Bureau Federation. The Democratic 
candidate for governor, Herschel Loveless, beneﬁted not only 
from this issue, but also two others, namely Hoegh’s passage of 
a half-percent increase in the state sales tax and his strong sup-
port for blocking the serving of liquor by the drink. The IMA 
joined Loveless in criticizing the higher sales tax. Moreover, vot-
ers in Iowa’s urban areas, where slightly more than one-half of 
the state’s population now lived in 1956, endorsed liberalizing 
the state’s alcohol laws.46 
 With a considerable war chest now available from the state 
AFL-CIO, combined with Democratic party resources and the 
support of farmers and anti-tax backers, Loveless carried the 
election, becoming only the fourth Democrat elected governor in 
Iowa since the Civil War. Election results conﬁrm that Loveless 
won his greatest support in cities of 25,000 to 50,000 population 
and farm townships. The state’s medium and large industrial cit-
ies were now Democratic strongholds, largely accounting for the 
second-stage gain that James Sundquist describes for the Demo-
cratic realignment in Iowa that peaked between 1954 and 1958. 
Two years later in 1958, similar issues and the same constituencies 
propelled Loveless to another term as governor and Democrats 
even took four of the state’s eight U.S. congressional seats. In the 
state legislature, the Democrats increased their representation in 
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both the house and senate. For Wapello County, Mincks won a 
seat in the senate, which he would retain through 1966, while 
Dean Aubrey and Robert Conner, another UAW Local 74 mem-
ber, won places in the house. Ottumwa Democrat Gene Glenn 
took over Mincks’s seat from 1966 to 1974. In fact, from 1944 to 
1972, Wapello County Democrats won twenty-one of the thirty 
total seats contested for the state house.47 
 Loveless made good on his campaign to repeal the half-cent 
sales tax increase, and along with increasing state social services 
and appointing professionals to various state commissions, he 
then made reapportionment the main focus of his term. In his 
address to the IFL convention in 1957, Loveless emphasized how 
urban groups, especially organized labor, must be better repre- 
sented in state politics. Loveless spoke before the IFL convention 
every year he was in ofﬁce, and consistently stressed a similar 
message underpinned by statistics on the shift in Iowa’s popula-
tion from rural to urban locations. In his 1957 address, for in-
stance, he noted how the twenty-six less heavily populated sen-
atorial districts contained about one-third of Iowa’s population 
while the other twenty-four districts comprised about two-thirds 
of the population. Unless reapportionment occurred, establish-
ment of union shop contracts and improvements in unemploy-
ment and workmen’s compensation could not occur. Although 
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not speciﬁcally named in this speech, the Farm Bureau, espe-
cially, together with the IMA, hoped to blunt the urban shift in 
reapportionment as much as possible through a proposal re-
ferred to as the Shaff Plan, after Senator David O. Shaff of Clin-
ton, that called for a state senate based on population and a house 
based on area. An attempt by the IFL, the League of Women Vot- 
ers, the urban press, and the Democratic party to gain reappor-
tionment by making the issue a constitutional convention refer-
endum in 1960 narrowly failed after the IMA and Farm Bureau 
combined to spend nearly $2 million to campaign against it while 
the IFL and League of Women Voters spent just $100,000.48 
 Although 1960 was a disappointing year for Democrats in 
Iowa, especially for Loveless who lost his race for the U.S. Senate 
after spending more time campaigning for John F. Kennedy than 
himself, the election results indicated that cities of over 10,000 
population were now solidly in the Democratic camp. Historian 
Harlan Hahn’s ﬁndings indicate that the traditional role of farm 
townships in casting deciding albeit protest votes for Democrats 
from the 1930s to mid-1950s was still present after 1958 but less 
important than the strong support for Democrats in the larger 
cities. Jack McCoy, as the IFL’s COPE director, also laid the 
groundwork for Democratic gains in the 1960s by establishing 
local-level COPE programs that were then integrated with the 
state’s programs.49 
 The fruits of the IFL’s political efforts can be seen in the suc-
cess of Democratic governor, then U.S. senator, Harold Hughes 
throughout the 1960s as well as in Democratic gains in both the 
state and national legislature following the IFL’s successful lead-
ership in the reapportionment battle. Hughes initially attracted 
Herschel Loveless’s attention through his work with the Iowa 
Better Trucking Bureau. After changing parties at Loveless’s 
prompting, Hughes successfully ran for one of the state commerce 
commission seats in 1958. A direct, outspoken, and charismatic 
trucker turned politician, Hughes won the 1962 gubernatorial 
election by calling for action on the issues of reapportionment 
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and liquor by the drink. In addition to weak stands on liquor 
reform, Republican governor Norman Erbe had irritated urban 
Democratic voters by standing by while his lieutenant governor, 
William Mooty, cast the deciding vote in allowing the passage of 
the Shaff Plan in 1961. During Hughes’s ﬁrst term, Iowa’s liquor 
laws were repealed and the IFL ﬁled suit in federal court in Des 
Moines in 1963, challenging the constitutionality of the Shaff 
Plan’s reapportionment scheme. The court refused to act on the 
plan’s constitutionality until after a statewide referendum was 
held on December 3, 1963. Following a statewide campaign 
against it by Hughes, organized labor and urban voters in gen-
eral won an enormous victory when the Shaff Plan was defeated 
by a margin of 59 to 41 percent. The most overwhelming opposi-
tion to the plan came in the seventeen counties containing cities 
of more than 10,000 population. Wapello, Polk, Woodbury, Linn, 
and Black Hawk County voters, all home to signiﬁcant numbers 
of union members, rejected it by over 80 percent majorities. Farm 
townships in nineteen predominantly rural counties, in contrast, 
supported the plan by a 70 percent margin. In a special session 
of the 1964 state legislature, a new temporary apportionment 
plan was passed that gave signiﬁcant increases to urban areas in 
both the house and senate. A ﬁnal, more equitable reapportion-
ment plan, mandated by the federal district court in Des Moines, 
was ﬁnally implemented by the state legislature in 1969 and re-
vised by the state supreme court in 1972.50 
 Having deemed reapportionment “the most important proj-
ect that the Iowa labor movement had ever undertaken,” IFL ex-
ecutive vice president Jake Mincks, McCoy’s successor as IFL 
COPE chair, claimed without hyperbole that the Shaff Plan had 
been defeated because of trade union inﬂuence. Certainly labor 
unionist funding had been vital. Following McCoy’s campaign 
to make COPE more effective on the local level, the 1962 IFL con-
vention had passed an increase in the per-capita tax, bringing it 
up to ten cents per member per month. Mincks noted in his 1965 
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report to the IFL convention that in terms of state and national 
legislation much had been accomplished. Because of Democratic 
majorities in the state house and senate—101 of the 124 seats in 
the house and 35 of the 53 seats in the senate—“we were able to 
make gains that we hadn’t been able to make in recent years.” 
Among many improvements, Mincks listed a 25 percent increase 
in the disability beneﬁts of workmen’s compensation, positive 
changes in the unemployment compensation formula and wait-
ing period, and passage of a Fair Employment Practices Act. A 
bill to legalize the union shop made it through the house but was 
defeated by four votes in the senate.51 
 In addition to these victories and helped by Democratic con-
trol of the state legislature from 1964 to 1968, the IFL and its Dem-
ocratic allies pushed for and won annual salaries for legislators, 
encouraged more blue-collar citizens to run for ofﬁce, and gained 
a strong workmen’s compensation act, unemployment compen-
sation, Iowa’s OSHA law, and postcard registration during the late 
1960s and early 1970s. Although some members among the IFL 
blamed Hughes for not pushing harder for the union shop bill, a 
criticism Hughes strongly rejected in his speech to the IFL con-
vention the next year, in 1965 he helped to settle a UPWA strike 
at the new Iowa Beef Processors plant in Fort Dodge. At the 1968 
IFL convention, Hughes cited some of the gains made for work-
ing people during his six years as Iowa’s governor, including im-
provements in workmen’s and unemployment compensation, 
industrial development, greater school aid, property tax relief, 
abolishment of the death penalty, improvements in state govern-
ment organization and planning, increased highway patrol and 
trafﬁc safety programs, and more state facilities for the mentally 
ill and physically handicapped. Moreover, even when the 1968 
                                                 
51. In 1948, only 25 of Iowa’s 108 representatives in the House were Democrats. 
This fell to 12 in 1950 and just 3 in 1952. In 1954, however, there were 17, followed 
by 30 in 1956, 409 in 1958, 29 in 1960, and 17 in 1962. After a majority following 
the 1964 elections in the Iowa Senate, Democrats held a majority again in 1966 
before tailing off but remaining competitive between 1968 and 1972. State of 
Iowa, Official Registers, 1945–46 to 1973–74; Proceedings, Seventh Annual Con-
vention, IFL, AFL-CIO, 1962, pp. 4–5, 9, IFL, SHSI; Proceedings, Eighth Annual 
Convention, IFL, AFL-CIO, 1963, pp. 17–20, IFL, SHSI; Proceedings, Ninth An-
nual Convention, IFL, AFL-CIO, 1964, p. 1; IFL, SHSI; and Proceedings, Tenth 
Annual Convention, IFL, AFL-CIO, 1965, pp. 6–7, IFL, SHSI. 
112      THE ANNALS OF IOWA 
elections swept many Iowa Democrats out of state and national 
legislative ofﬁces, the consolidation of the state’s Democratic 
party organization in the late 1960s and early 1970s helped it to 
bounce back during the 1970s. After Hughes’s election to the U.S. 
Senate in 1968, and establishment of a progressive record there, 
another progressive Democratic, John Culver, a ten-year veteran 
of the U.S. House, was elected in his place. Culver’s former aide, 
Dick Clark, was elected to the other Senate seat in 1972. By the 
mid-1970s, Democrats were also back in control of both houses of 
the Iowa legislature. Although the Democrats’ power has eroded 
since the 1970s, Iowa remains a competitive two-party state.52 
 By the mid-1960s, labor’s political efforts had refashioned 
local Democratic parties in Iowa’s industrial cities. Paul Larsen 
recalled how “[the BHLC] was very effective politically in en-
dorsing and ﬁnancially supporting  candidates for the . . . state 
legislative ofﬁces. And as a result of that, we were able to gain a 
great deal of inﬂuence that we had not had with members of the 
State Legislature from rural areas.” The impact of the BHLC’s 
political activities “started to show up in the elections of 1958 
[when] we started to elect some people locally to the State Legis-
lature for the ﬁrst time. This improved in 1960 and 1962.” When 
Black Hawk County went Democratic in 1964 for the ﬁrst time 
since before the Civil War “folks down there thought it was the 
end of the world.” John Cooney was even more blunt about the 
impact of organized labor on local Democratic politics: 
Well, as far as I’m concerned, the Black Hawk Labor Council was 
the local Democratic party. We put a lot of money into it. We had 
good representation in this area. We encouraged a lot of people to 
get mixed into politics that had never thought of doing it, simply 
because, you know, they were knowledgeable people.53 
 Cooney also stressed that the BHLC built its Democratic 
coalition in Waterloo by involving itself in civil rights. Indeed, 
Waterloo established one of the ﬁrst Fair Employment Practice 
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Commissions in the United States during this period. The BHLC 
actually built on the antidiscrimination and civil rights efforts of 
UPWA Local 46 at Waterloo’s large Rath packing plant. Local 46 
established its antidiscrimination program in 1950 and especially 
combated the segregation of African American women in the 
plant. The local also fought segregation in Waterloo beginning in 
1953, and when the BHLC was formed, worked with the county-
wide labor council to do the same. Besides the establishment of 
the Fair Employment Practices Commission, the BHLC started 
the Martin Luther King Jr. Center for educating blacks of all ages. 
These anti-discrimination and civil rights initiatives solidiﬁed a 
cross-racial Democratic base in Waterloo.54 
 Without organized labor’s involvement, Iowa would not have 
become a true two-party state by the 1960s. Beginning with ag-
gressive local union efforts during the 1940s in Ottumwa and 
prompted by the Iowa State Industrial Council’s political efforts 
in the late 1940s and early 1950s, voters in Iowa’s manufacturing 
centers steadily turned toward the Democrats. Helped by coop-
erative efforts with sympathetic farmers, Democrats made steady 
gains in state and national representation after the mid-1950s. 
Despite its national reputation as a conservative farm state, Ottum-
wa’s union leaders along with the state’s CIO movement prompted 
Iowa’s belated participation in the New Deal political transition 
and established the state’s modern Democratic foundations. 
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American Serengeti: The Last Big Animals of the Great Plains, by Dan Flores. 
Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 2016. 213 pp. Illustrations, maps, 
bibliography, index. $24.95 hardcover. 
Reviewer Brad D. Lookingbill is professor of history at Columbia College of 
Missouri. Among his research and writing interests are the history of the Great 
Plains, environmental history, and military history. 
My family and I drove across the Great Plains this summer. We paused 
at a popular restaurant called Simon’s Catch near Elk City, Oklahoma. 
Its walls were decorated with animal trophies, including the heads of a 
pronghorn, a bear, and a buffalo. Although seldom seen in the region 
today, these creatures and many others dominated the North American 
interior a long time ago. 
 Dan Flores insists that the wildlife of the Great Plains once rivaled 
the Serengeti of Africa. Offering personal observations mixed with “big 
history,” he studies the species native to the grasslands from West Texas 
to the Upper Missouri River. He recalls Walter Prescott Webb’s classic 
The Great Plains (1931), which contained only a brief section on animals. 
However, Flores meditates on something other than a Darwinian strug-
gle on the western frontier. Critical of American attitudes toward the 
great beasts, he posits that “our slaughterhouse on the Great Plains was 
profoundly immoral” (8). 
 Flores begins by discussing the prehistoric megafauna of the Great 
Plains, such as lions, mammoths, cougars, saber-toothed cats, giant sloths, 
dire wolves, and wild horses. He devotes most of his attention to the 
pronghorn, coyote, wolf, grizzly, and bison, who survived what paleo-
biologist Paul Martin called “Blitzkrieg Overkill” between 8,000 and 
13,000 years ago. A fine chapter on the nineteenth-century horse trade 
features reports from military expeditions as well as the correspon-
dence of President Thomas Jefferson. Throughout the book, Flores’s 
approach to source material is selective yet compelling. 
 Flores is at the top of his game when analyzing the bison ecology. 
He contemplates competing narratives about the demise of the bison, 
giving special recognition to traditional Native American stories of cul-
ture heroes. Under optimum conditions, he estimates, the bison num-
bered in the range of 25 million during the first half of the 1800s. Unfor-
tunately, a study conducted in 1886 indicated that only 1,073 still lived. 
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While debunking the famous legend that the U.S. military conspired 
with the federal government to eradicate the herds, Flores highlights the 
oft-cited words attributed to General Philip Sheridan about “destroying 
the Indian’s commissary” and traces them to a fabrication by a Texas 
hide hunter named John Cook. In fact, the army officer actually declared, 
“I consider it important that this wholesale slaughter of the Buffalo 
should be stopped” (131). Beset with environmental changes, exotic dis-
eases, and unregulated hunting, the bison barely escaped extinction. 
 With a lyrical flourish, Flores concludes the book with a sentimental 
call to “re-wild” the Great Plains. Like many naturalists, he acknowl-
edges that the prairie is as sublime as canyons, mountains, and forests. 
He touts the ongoing efforts to create parks and preserves, although 
most have fallen short of artist George Catlin’s vision of 1832. Anyone 
who has driven across this vast country sees its emptiness, encounter-
ing many places in the grasslands that remind the author of “a dustier 
Iowa, with more than a hint of ammonia, feedlots, and hog farms” (162). 
Flores hopes that future visitors will encounter a more romantic land-
scape, where large animals and human beings might play. 
 My only disappointment in Flores’s book stems from the absence 
of endnotes, footnotes, or other forms of citation. His bibliography lists 
12 pages of published materials but gives no record of archives and col-
lections for further research on the last big animals. Such additions to 
the book would have made his passionate plea on behalf of this lost 
world even more noteworthy. 
 
 
Frontier Democracy: Constitutional Conventions in the Old Northwest, by 
Silvana R. Siddali. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2016. xv, 
392 pp. Illustrations, tables, maps, notes, index. $120 hardcover.  
Reviewer John Dinan is professor of politics and international affairs at Wake 
Forest University. He is the author of The American State Constitutional Tradition 
(2006) and Keeping the People’s Liberties: Legislators, Citizens, and Judges as Guard-
ians of Rights (1998). 
Scholars have recently begun paying long overdue attention to the more 
than 230 state constitutional conventions held since 1776. Although no 
conventions have been called during the past 30 years, the longest such 
gap in American history, they were once held regularly to frame inau-
gural state constitutions or revise existing constitutions, albeit more 
often in some states than others. In fact, 14 state constitutions currently 
require that referenda on whether to call a convention be held at peri-
odic intervals, as in Iowa where a referendum is considered every ten 
years, most recently in 2010. 
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 In Frontier Democracy: Constitutional Conventions in the Old Northwest, 
Silvana R. Siddali analyzes conventions held from the 1830s to the 1850s 
in the six states created from the Northwest Territory as well as Iowa. 
These include conventions in Illinois (1847), Indiana (1850–51), Iowa 
(1844, 1846, 1857), Michigan (1835, 1850), Minnesota (1857), Ohio (1850–
51), and Wisconsin (1846, 1848). Several of these conventions tried to 
draft inaugural constitutions but were unsuccessful, as when Iowa’s 
1844 convention drafted a constitution that was defeated by voters 
when it became ensnared in debates about the boundary with Missouri. 
Other conventions were successful in framing inaugural constitutions; 
for instance, Iowa’s 1846 convention crafted a constitution that was rat-
ified by voters and served as the state’s foundational document for just 
over a dozen years. In still other cases, conventions made changes of 
varying significance to existing constitutions, as when Iowa’s 1857 con-
vention framed the state’s current constitution.  
 Delegates at these conventions addressed a range of topics, includ-
ing “black people’s rights, banks and paper money, married women’s 
property rights, the power of the legislature, and the authority of the 
judiciary” (4). A number of these conventions were reacting to the Panic 
of 1837 and subsequent failure of internal improvement projects and 
default on debt payments in a number of states. These developments 
prompted widespread approval of constitutional provisions barring 
legislatures from investing in roads, canals, and railroads and limiting 
legislators’ ability to charter banks and borrow money. Throughout this 
period, convention delegates also responded to popular pressures to 
democratize governing institutions by providing for popular election of 
judges and a wide range of executive officials. In other cases—and this is 
a particular focus of Siddali’s book—convention delegates were respond-
ing to petitions from African Americans and women, “who would cer-
tainly never have been permitted to serve as delegates” but neverthe-
less participated in “parallel reform conferences that met while several 
of the constitutional conventions were in session” and placed issues of 
African American suffrage and women’s rights on the conventions’ 
agenda and occasionally resulted in proposals being submitted for a 
popular vote, even if they generally did not lead to enactment of consti-
tutional provisions (19).  
 In analyzing convention debates on these topics—the book is orga-
nized thematically, with chapter titles such as “judges,” “land rights,” 
“places,” “citizens,” “wives,” and “banks”—Siddali explains that Frontier 
Democracy “is primarily a book about conversations rather than about 
foundational documents” (2). As she notes, “The outcomes of the con-
vention debates represented the difference between a decent, worth- 
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while, prosperous life and a corrupt, degraded, impoverished exist-
ence,” given that “new state constitutions would frame governments, 
delineate rights, clarify the state’s physical boundaries, and empower all 
the branches of government” (4–5). But she is less concerned with ana-
lyzing what she views as “largely predictable outcomes” than with ex-
ploring the “public and private conversations” that took place in and out 
of the conventions and delving into the “philosophical, spiritual, and po-
litical roots” of “northwestern opinions on constitutional matters” (10).  
 In exploring “the full panoply of the private, public, and political 
conversations” (18), Siddali draws on transcripts of convention debates, 
which are available for conventions in these states from the 1850s on-
ward. But conventions called in these states in the 1830s and 1840s chose 
not to keep transcripts, opting instead to keep a journal of motions, res-
olutions, and votes, while relying on newspapers to publish the speeches 
in accounts that attracted a wide readership (60–61). Siddali also goes 
well beyond these official sources by compiling extensive information 
on the political experience, education, and wealth of convention dele-
gates. She also examines delegates’ papers and correspondence to gain 
insight into the convention proceedings, which featured impressive dis-
plays of erudition but also “devolved into noisy, chaotic, disorganized 
messes” and occasionally led to “fisticuffs” (56, 57).  
 Frontier Democracy is an exhaustively researched account that pro-
vides fresh perspectives on several aspects of antebellum northwestern 
state conventions, most importantly in the attention given to the role of 
African Americans and women’s groups outside the convention halls 
in trying to gain a hearing for various issues. As Siddali shows, groups 
influenced the convention proceedings in part by holding conferences 
alongside convention proceedings—and with some success, as when 
members of the Ohio Colored Citizens League held a convention at the 
same time as Ohio’s 1850–51 convention and “insisted on (and won) a 
meeting with the convention delegates, a concession that suggests that 
they were able to participate in the conversation about reforming their 
state government” (1). Conventions also “received petitions from free 
black people and from their white supporters” calling for “black rights” 
and occasionally “proposing suffrage for black citizens” (281). In some 
states, as in Illinois and Indiana, the principal question at the conven-
tions was whether to permit “black persons to migrate into the state”; 
but in other conventions delegates took up the question of African 
American “voting rights” (267), most notably when Iowa’s 1857 con-
vention agreed to submit the question to a popular vote, where it was 
defeated overwhelmingly. In detailing the various ways that groups 
secured a hearing and occasional votes on citizenship issues in ante- 
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bellum Northwest state constitutional conventions and analyzing the re-
sulting debates in and out of these conventions, Siddali has broadened 
the scholarly focus and made a fine contribution to standard accounts. 
  
  
Ioway Life: Reservation and Reform, 1837–1860, by Greg Olson. Civilization 
of the American Indian Series 275. Norman: University of Oklahoma 
Press, 2016. xx, 163 pp. Illustrations, maps, notes, bibliography, index. 
$29.95 hardcover. 
Reviewer John P. Bowes is professor of history at Eastern Kentucky University. 
He is the author of Land Too Good for Indians: Northern Indian Removal (2016) and 
Exiles and Pioneers: Eastern Indians in the Trans-Mississippi West (2007). 
In Ioway Life, Greg Olson focuses on a brief period of critical transitions 
and transformations in the history of the Ioways. A treaty signed with 
the federal government in 1836 formalized a cession of their lands in 
Missouri and arranged for their removal to a reserve in what is now 
Nebraska and Kansas. Over the next 20-plus years the federal govern-
ment and its agents sought to alter the Ioway way of life. In short, the 
federal government wanted the Ioways to become Christian farmers. 
Despite successful Ioway resistance to such measures, Olson argues, 
these years before the Civil War laid the foundation for the cultural 
changes that would occur in the late nineteenth and early twentieth cen-
turies. Colonialism is a powerful force. Olson asserts that, although “the 
accomplishments of the agents and missionaries were decidedly mixed,” 
the seeds for the success of their overall policies were planted during the 
years they operated under the auspices of the Great Nemaha Agency. 
 This book is brief, with only about 135 pages of text, and the chap-
ters are organized more along thematic than strictly chronological lines. 
Following a short chapter to explain events leading to the Ioway relo-
cation to the reservation on the south bank of the Great Nemaha River, 
Olson examines the impact of Christian missionaries and their unsuc-
cessful efforts to convert Indians in their first decade on the reserve. As 
the next chapter demonstrates, the school established by Presbyterian 
missionaries in the mid-1840s experienced similar failures as a result 
of weak government support, missionary miscalculation, and Ioway 
resistance. In the fourth and fifth chapters Olson focuses on politics, first 
illustrating the transformation in Ioway leadership and then explaining 
how bureaucratic incompetence and corruption undermined the fed-
eral government’s Indian policy on the reservation. This narrative 
draws to a conclusion with an examination of events that compromised 
the Ioway reservation, specifically the Kansas-Nebraska Act and federal 
efforts to institute allotment. The Ioways signed their last treaty with 
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the federal government in 1861. Since then, they have maintained a 
smaller reservation that still exists. Yet, as of 1883, a separate Ioway res-
ervation was established farther south in Indian Territory for those who 
left the Great Nemaha River after the Civil War.  
 Ioway Life contributes to the literature on Ioway history but ulti-
mately misses an opportunity to describe an Ioway perspective on the 
transformative events of the mid–nineteenth century. In most chapters 
the narrative focuses on the work, ideas, and failures of government 
agents and does not provide substantial explanations of Ioway efforts 
during the same time. To the extent that Ioway resistance shaped events 
on the reservation, readers will not find a full picture of that resistance 
over time. The narrative also suffers somewhat from organizational 
issues. Because the book is structured along thematic lines, events such 
as the Platte Purchase and the Kansas-Nebraska Act are discussed in 
some depth twice over. A different narrative framework could have 
prevented this repetition. In discussing the mid–nineteenth century 
experience of the Ioways and how that historical period laid a distinct 
foundation for the following decades, Olson has explored an important 
topic. The book as written, however, does not always do enough to sup-
port the argument the author wants to make. 
 
  
Women, Work, and Worship in Lincoln’s Country: The Dumville Family Letters, 
edited by Anne M. Heinz and John P. Heinz. Urbana and Chicago: Uni-
versity of Illinois Press, 2016. xviii, 219 pp. Family tree, maps, illustra-
tions, notes, references, index. $40.00 hardcover. 
Reviewer Bryon C. Andreasen is a historian at the LDS Church History Mu-
seum, Salt Lake City, Utah; he was formerly research historian at the Abraham 
Lincoln Presidential Library, Springfield, Illinois. 
In 1840 the Dumville family emigrated from England to the United States. 
They purchased land in west central Illinois in a small new settlement in 
Macoupin County. In 1842 Thomas Dumville died, leaving his wife, Ann 
(age 46), and daughters Elizabeth (13), Jemima (11), and Hephzibah (9) 
in financial straits. They lost their land and moved to the small county 
seat, Carlinville. Ann’s meager income proved insufficient, prompting 
the girls to seek employment away from home. Elizabeth married a 
farmer, John Williams, and eventually moved to Poweshiek County, 
Iowa. Jemima and Hephzibah went north 50 miles to the more substan-
tial city of Jacksonville, Illinois. There, Jemima taught primary school 
(later moving to nearby Lynnville), and Hephzibah worked as a domes-
tic for the family with whom she boarded. Both girls attended the local 
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Methodist female college off and on as circumstances permitted. The sep-
aration of mother and daughters instigated over a decade’s worth of 
correspondence, the surviving portion of which today is archived at the 
Abraham Lincoln Presidential Library in Springfield, Illinois. 
 The Dumville Collection consists of 117 letters, 100 of which are in-
cluded in this volume. They are presented chronologically, beginning 
in June 1851 and ending in December 1863. The excluded letters were 
deemed “less informative” by the editors (xii). Moreover, in several 
letters they deleted passages they considered “extraneous, repetitious, 
fragmentary, or otherwise of little use in telling the story” (xii). They 
also added punctuation and paragraphing for ease of reading. This 
methodology may raise eyebrows among some documentary editing 
purists. Original spellings are retained, however. As the editors them-
selves suggest, “Scholars who want to use the letters as primary sources 
should of course consult the originals” (xii). But certainly the volume 
provides convenient, time-saving access to the collection for the pur-
pose of learning what is there. 
 In the opening chapter, the editors quickly review the Dumville 
family story up to the point where the surviving correspondence begins, 
and they provide brief character profiles of Ann and her three daughters. 
Then they identify, discuss, and provide context for six topics they be-
lieve are particularly illuminated in the letters: religion (particularly the 
attitudes of Methodists), education, social mobility, politics, the Civil 
War, and gender roles. The rest of the book consists of five chapters 
presenting the letters in roughly two- or three-year increments, with 
helpful chapter introductions that update family happenings and pro-
vide context on such things as cholera epidemics, technological innova-
tions, growing tensions over abolition, and the Lincoln-Douglas rivalry. 
 These letters are valuable in that they provide the voices of nine-
teenth-century immigrant women working their way toward middle-
class respectability in a society transitioning from frontier settlements 
into small-town agrarian communities that seek stronger connections 
to the market economy. The letters reveal a surprising degree of politi-
cal awareness among working women of the time. 
 Students of Iowa history will be particularly interested in the 13 
letters sent from Elizabeth’s isolated farm in Poweshiek County, dated 
from January 1855 through July 1863. Elizabeth was “barely literate, if 
at all” (4). Her husband, John Williams, wrote all of the letters but one, 
the last being written by their very literate 12-year-old daughter Mar-
garet. Their six wartime letters are replete with anguished references to 
rife Copperhead sentiment in the area. 
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 A brief concluding chapter nicely recaps the correspondents’ stories 
beyond 1863 and summarizes the importance of the letters in docu-
menting how one set of women “transformed themselves from immi- 
grants to Americans” and how “they progressed from rural poverty to 
ownership of homes and farms” (167)—a perspective that can some-
times be hard to document. 
 
 
Bonds of Union: Religion, Race, and Politics in a Civil War Borderland, by 
Bridget Ford. Civil War America Series. Chapel Hill: University of 
North Carolina Press, 2016. xxiii, 398 pp. Map, notes, bibliography, in-
dex. $45.00 hardcover. 
The Rivers Ran Backward: The Civil War and the Remaking of the American 
Middle Border, by Christopher Phillips. New York: Oxford University 
Press, 2016. xviii, 460 pp. Notes, bibliography, index. $34.95 hardcover. 
Reviewer Nicole Etcheson is the Alexander M. Bracken Professor of History at 
Ball State University. She is the author of A Generation at War: The Civil War Era 
in a Northern Community (2011); Bleeding Kansas: Contested Liberty in the Civil War 
Era (2004); and The Emerging Midwest: Upland Southerners and the Political Culture 
of the Old Northwest, 1787–1861 (1996). 
Does a river divide or unite? In the postrevolutionary period, Congress 
created territories northwest and southwest of the Ohio River. The 
Northwest Ordinance forbade slavery, but the peculiar institution flour-
ished south of the river. So it would seem that the river was a border 
dividing the middle of the country. But migrants from south of the Ohio 
traveled down the river and settled on its northern banks. Residents on 
both sides of the river shared many values, including racism. And there 
was no clear division during the Civil War between Union and Confed-
erate. In the free states, proslavery Copperheads protested the federal 
government’s prosecution of the war while, south of the river, many 
slaveowners opposed secession, and men from Union slave states fought 
to suppress the rebellion. 
  Bridget Ford and Christopher Phillips grapple with these complex-
ities in their respective books. Ford examines Cincinnati and Louisville 
to understand the Ohio-Kentucky border. Phillips’s “Middle Border” 
includes not just the Ohio River states of Ohio, Indiana, Illinois, and 
Kentucky but also Kansas and Missouri. Both authors complicate our 
understanding of the sectional, cultural, and political bonds and divi-
sions in the region. 
 Ford uses Abraham Lincoln’s reference to the “bonds of Union,” a 
phrase with religious as well as political overtones in the mid-1800s, as 
a springboard to understand the communities north and south of the 
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Ohio River. Lincoln saw slavery as promoting discord, but Ford em-
phasizes that residents in the region worked to preserve ties between 
free and slave states and thus hold the Union together.  
 In Ford’s borderland, religion is as much a divisive issue as slavery. 
She opens with the “collision” between “supercharged Protestantism” 
and “Catholic fervor” (3). Among those Protestants were black congre-
gants who formed their own Methodist and Baptist churches. All of these 
religious groups battled, sometimes literally, for the soul of the west. 
Anti-Catholic riots took place in both cities. Such conflict is well known, 
but Ford also details how Protestants and Catholics drew closer. Cath-
olics adopted evangelical oratorical techniques while Protestants, white 
and black, sought to build architecturally and aesthetically impressive 
church buildings akin to those that housed Catholic worship. Both 
Protestants and Catholics valued “novel forms of pious expression” (64) 
that emphasized personal connections to the divine. 
 The Ohio River was an imperfect division between slavery and 
freedom in the antebellum period. Blacks found employment on the 
river but faced the danger of kidnapping into slavery. Race riots as well 
as nativist violence convulsed Cincinnati while blacks in Louisville 
experienced the everyday brutality of slavery along with a spectacular 
lynching of slaves accused of murder. Despite these realities, African 
Americans in the region built community, resisted the push for coloni-
zation, and protested Ohio’s black laws and the federal fugitive slave 
law. Ohio African Americans even got public funding for schools for 
black children while Louisville made its public schools tuition free. 
Blacks used their ties to whites to advance a black agenda. Many blacks 
worked in personal service as dressmakers, barbers, and hairdressers to 
white clients who then might attest to black respectability and worthi-
ness to remain in the United States. Outbreaks of violence, such as the 
1857 lynching, might encourage emigration, but most free blacks con-
demned efforts to send them to Liberia and fought the colonization 
movement that was popular among whites north and south of the river. 
 Despite Ford’s efforts to find links across the river, she concedes 
that “alienation” surfaced in the Methodist and Baptist schisms of the 
1840s (203). These divisions also involved breaks between black and 
white churches. Ohio became wedded to free soil politics at the same 
time that Kentucky strengthened its protections for slavery. The Civil 
War, however, which should represent the highpoint of division, caused 
Unionists in Cincinnati and Louisville to forge bonds. Protestants and 
Catholics, blacks and whites, all worked to support the troops. Louis-
ville Unionists even came to accept that emancipation was necessary to 
preserve the government. 
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 Ford reaches the Civil War only in the final chapters of her book; 
Christopher Phillips reverses the emphasis, spending only the first few 
chapters on the antebellum period and the bulk of his book on the Civil 
War itself. Phillips also acknowledges the many commonalities between 
the two regions, arguing that they formed a more cohesive whole than 
postwar memory allowed, but he focuses much more on the internal 
conflicts within the region. 
 Phillips shows that the North-South “binary” (9) is a creation of the 
postwar period. In the antebellum period, midwesterners demonstrated 
differing varieties of antislavery and proslavery sentiment. To be anti-
slavery was not necessarily to be nonracist or an abolitionist and to be 
proslavery did not necessarily mean support for secession. The post-
war period erased such distinctions in favor of a narrative in which the 
Loyal North included all the free states, obscuring antiwar and anti-
emancipationist sentiment in the Lower North, and the Lost Cause myth 
of an idyllic plantation society and support for secession took hold even 
in Unionist slave states such as Kentucky.  
 Before the war, midwesterners, even those in free states, accommo-
dated slavery through their shared racism, but the crisis decade of the 
1850s increased sectionalism. For the war years, Phillips describes the 
futile efforts at neutrality by the border slave states, the wartime con-
tests for civilian loyalty, the crucial role of emancipation in destroying 
the prewar accommodation on slavery and race, the guerrilla war and 
homefront dissent, and the postwar struggle to secure or overturn the 
results of the war. Throughout this narrative, Phillips pays due attention 
to the experiences of African Americans and women. 
 Phillips demonstrates an often masterful combination of synthesis 
of existing scholarship and extensive primary research. Each chapter 
begins with a microhistorical piece that examines the experience of a per-
son or place and establishes themes to be pursued in the larger chapter 
that follows. Some of these smaller set pieces are quite gripping, includ-
ing the accounts of slaves making salt in Illinois and Kentucky Shakers 
struggling to deal with first Confederate and then Union occupations. 
 In covering such a vast amount of material, mistakes are inevitable. 
Phillips says that the Indiana and Illinois legislatures provided in their 
state constitutions for allowing unfree labor in those states in violation 
of the Northwest Ordinance. Both constitutions were written by con-
ventions. Illinois’s 1818 constitution provided for future indentures; 
Indiana’s 1816 constitution did not. Phillips then says that Indiana’s 
Supreme Court did not address “involuntary servitude” in its rulings 
through the 1820s (30, 32). In fact, the Indiana Supreme Court ruled 
against indentured servitude in the case of Mary Bateman Clark in 1821. 
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(This review is based on an uncorrected advance copy provided by the 
publisher which also contained a number of infelicitous phrasings that 
one hopes will be corrected in the final book.) 
 Phillips overstates when he says that “most historians hold that the 
Ohio River was a clearly defined and static demographic and political 
boundary between North and South and, by its distinctive cultures, an 
extension of the Mason-Dixon Line” (7). There has been too much recent 
work challenging the Ohio River as a boundary by scholars such as Kim 
Gruenwald, Stanley Harrold, and others to present that as the consen-
sus of current historians. Their theses require both Ford and Phillips to 
downplay antebellum conflict. In her introduction, Ford acknowledges 
Elizabeth R. Varon’s Disunion: The Coming of the American Civil War, 
1789–1859 (2008). Varon analyzed the rhetoric of disunion and its even-
tually destructive effect. In addition, Stanley Harrold’s recent Border War: 
Fighting over Slavery before the Civil War (2010) illuminates the violent 
struggle over slavery that often occurred in the same region Ford and 
Phillips cover. Ford—and Phillips in his early chapters—are more in-
terested in how the Union held together in a border region where free-
dom and slavery were in constant contact, but Ford’s in-depth analysis 
nonetheless reveals formidable conflict within each city and between 
the states on the opposite sides of the river. Both are valuable works. 
Phillips’s book will clearly be a seminal study of the Midwest during 
the Civil War and a work that scholars will be turning to—either for 
enlightenment or to challenge—for a long time. 
 
 
Following Father Chiniquy: Immigration, Religious Schism, and Social Change 
in Nineteenth-Century Illinois, by Caroline Brettell. Carbondale: Southern 
Illinois University Press, 2015. xvi, 312 pp. Illustrations, tables, notes, 
bibliography, index. $40.00 paperback and e-book. 
Reviewer Franklin Yoder recently retired as an academic adviser at the Univer-
sity of Iowa. His Ph.D. dissertation (University of Chicago, 1999) was “A Rural 
Kaleidoscope: Property, Mobility, and Ethnic Diversity in the Middle West.” 
In a research field dominated by studies of German, Irish, and other 
northern European immigrant groups, Caroline Brettell’s examination 
of a French Canadian settlement in northern Illinois offers a new per-
spective on nineteenth-century ethnicity and immigration in the Mid-
west. By bringing the analytical tools of an anthropologist to this work, 
Brettell adds a layer of complexity that provides a rich and detailed look 
at this small French immigrant settlement. 
 Studies of immigration and ethnicity generally focus on groups and 
pay little attention to specific individuals within those societies. This 
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book has the added elements of a strong charismatic leader, religious 
division, and a clash between an established religious hierarchy and 
a renegade church leader—the Roman Catholic church and Charles 
Chiniquy. As Brettell states, her study examines “the significance of 
charismatic leadership in processes of social and religious change” (2). 
 The French settlements in northeastern Illinois faced many of the 
same challenges that confronted most midwestern immigrant communi-
ties. Occupational choices, marriage patterns, and educational systems 
reflected the tensions between immigrants and established settlers as 
immigrants sought to maintain their culture and way of life. However, 
in St. Anne and other local French Canadian settlements, immigrants 
dealt with an internal choice that created tensions and strife—the deci-
sion to be Catholic or to be Protestant.  
 Religion is a dominant theme in this study. However, unlike many 
ethnic communities where religion served as a common rallying point 
that helped maintain an ethnic identity, religion in the French Canadian 
settlements also drove a wedge within the group. As a result, these set-
tlements offer a fascinating opportunity to compare two groups with 
the same French roots who came to embrace two different religions. 
Brettell provides excellent data and analysis to illuminate how different 
religious choices led to marked differences in political preferences, oc-
cupational choices, birth rates, and land transfer patterns. 
 The central figure in this analysis—Charles Chiniquy—presents a 
complex and convoluted picture. To some, he was a saint, a visionary, 
a caring leader who stood against an institution riddled with corruption 
and greed. To others, he was a charlatan, a demagogue, and a trouble-
maker who preyed on the weak and vulnerable. As becomes clear when 
current residents in St. Anne were questioned about Chiniquy, he re-
mains a controversial figure even today.  
 When Chiniquy led several families of French Canadians out of the 
Catholic church and out of Canada, he committed two major sins—
leaving Canada and leaving the Catholic church. The ensuing conflicts 
were amplified by the close familial and ethnic connections among the 
various factions within this small, closely connected ethnic community. 
Those conflicts give credence to Freud’s “narcissism of small differences,” 
when seemingly insignificant disagreements are never so intense as when 
they are present within a largely homogenous group. 
 In addition to issues of assimilation and ethnic identity, this book 
raises the question of where historians should focus attention—on the 
broad middle or on the fringes? What do we learn by examining a small 
settlement that by all accounts is an anomaly? Do the extremes help us 
understand the middle by offering sharp contrasts and keeping us aware 
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that the middle is never the complete picture? At the very least, this 
examination of French Canadians in northern Illinois reminds us to be 
wary of painting with too broad of a brush. 
 
 
We Are What We Drink: The Temperance Battle in Minnesota, by Sabine N. 
Meyer. Urbana and Chicago: University of Illinois Press, 2015. xiv, 269 pp. 
Illustrations, notes, bibliography, index. $55.00 hardcover. 
Reviewer James E. Klein is associate professor of history at Del Mar College in 
Corpus Christi, Texas. He is the author of Grappling with Demon Rum: The Cul-
tural Struggle over Liquor in Early Oklahoma (2008). 
In We Are What We Drink, Sabine N. Meyer provides a nuanced exami-
nation of the campaign to ban alcohol in early Minnesota. The stance 
individuals took on the liquor question was determined by religion, 
economic class, ethnicity, gender, and civic identity. The latter, she ar-
gues, is a product of the former factors, but also of place, citing St. Paul 
as an example—that city’s civic identity influenced residents’ stance 
on liquor. She also studies the staunchly dry position of Bishop John 
Ireland and the split that created between Irish and German Catholics. 
While the temperance issue shaped Irish and German ethnic identities 
in Minnesota, it also created a public identity for Minnesota women, 
who previously had been relegated to the home. 
 Meyer begins with the early European settlement of Minnesota by 
fur traders and the raucous reputation earned by early St. Paul, origi-
nally named Pig’s Eye after a local liquor dealer. The 1850s temperance 
movement saw middle-class reformers, relocated from New England, 
attempting to civilize the Minnesota wilderness. They failed to curb St. 
Paul’s liquor industry because it was a part of residents’ civic and mas-
culine identity.  
 By the late nineteenth century, Irish Americans, aspiring to middle-
class status, remade their ethnic identity by adopting abstinence as a 
badge of respectability. German immigrants, from the distinct regions 
of Prussia, Saxony, Westphalia, Bavaria, and others, instead used oppo-
sition to temperance (based on a devotion to the concept of personal 
liberty) as a shared trait to create a unified German American culture. 
As their initial social standing was higher than that of Irish Americans, 
they saw no need to emulate the middle-class expression of respectability 
—opposition to alcohol. Rather, they viewed the temperance movement 
as an attack on German American culture. 
 St. Paul, influenced by the prominent position of German American 
brewers and by residents’ devotion to the notion of joie de vivre, op-
posed and resisted liquor regulations, pitting the city against the state 
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government and contrasting that city with its twin settlement, the more 
refined Minneapolis. Residents of the Twin Cities internalized these dif-
ferent identities, thwarting effective liquor regulation in St. Paul and 
further differentiating the two municipalities.  
 The temperance campaign provided women with a rare oppor-
tunity to enter the previously male public sphere of society. Minnesota’s 
Woman’s Christian Temperance Union, the vehicle for this entrance 
into public affairs, redefined gender roles and emboldened women for 
the subsequent woman suffrage campaign. Irish American men, notably 
Bishop Ireland, accepted women into the temperance campaign as they 
gained middle-class status.  
 Minnesota received mixed results from a high license campaign in 
the 1890s and adopted county option in 1915. As a result, 51 of 86 coun-
ties went dry. American entrance into the Great War branded the Ger-
man American liquor stance as unpatriotic, dooming efforts to stave off 
the growing prohibition campaign. The war, specifically women’s ex-
tensive work in support of it, also convinced male officeholders to sup-
port woman suffrage.  
 Sabine extensively cites a rich temperance literature yet charts her 
own course in explaining dry success and wet failures in Minnesota. 
She builds on Joseph Gusfield’s work on status anxiety in explaining 
the Irish abstinence campaign. Her discussion of local civic identity as 
shaping and being shaped by the temperance campaign represents a 
new direction in liquor studies, one that warrants further examination. 
She asserts that ethnicity, religion, and place shaped the civic identity 
of St. Paul as much or more than economic class, although she accepts 
Roy Rosenzweig’s characterization of the saloon as a working man’s 
club. She notes that Irish Americans of all economic classes joined ab-
stinence organizations, although social elites typically led these groups. 
She also notes that German American businessmen organized the wet 
opposition to temperance but gives little attention to the working-class 
culture that formed in saloons. Her acknowledgment that temperance 
leaders typically were middle class also suggests that economic class 
factored into the liquor issue in addition to ethnicity, religion, and place. 
She asserts that Minnesotans’ varied stances on liquor shaped their 
identities. Building on Claude Fischer’s contention that the food we eat 
shapes our sense of self, Sabine argues convincingly that we are what 
we drink (or choose not to drink).  
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Coxey’s Army: Popular Protest in the Gilded Age, by Benjamin F. Alexander. 
Witness to History Series. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 
2015. 159 pp. Illustrations, map, notes, bibliographical essay, index. 
$50.00 hardcover, $19.95 paperback & e-book. 
Reviewer Carlos A. Schwantes is St. Louis Mercantile Library Professor of Trans-
portation Studies at the University of Missouri–St. Louis. He is the author of 
Coxey’s Army: An American Odyssey (1985) and “Soldiers of Misfortune: Jack Lon-
don, Kelly’s Army, and the Struggle for Survival in Iowa” (Annals of Iowa, 1983). 
During the spring of 1894 Americans were fascinated by their new na-
tional “soap opera” popularly known as Coxey’s Army. For most of the 
past year as the United States suffered through the most devastating 
economic depression it had yet experienced, the news had been uni-
formly bad. But here was something new and even entertaining: during 
the six weeks that Coxey’s Army marched from northern Ohio to Wash-
ington, the unscripted drama captured newspaper headlines and the 
nation’s attention as Americans wondered each day what would hap-
pen next.  
 At one level, the daily details of the march as published in newspa-
pers across the United States offered comic relief from the grim news of 
the depression: it was a dramatic performance that featured a colorful 
and often comedic cast of characters. But Coxey’s Army was also inter-
esting for the same reason that television contests capture their audi-
ences today—because their outcomes are uncertain. The serious side of 
the march by the unemployed was captured in a single question: What 
would happen once Coxey’s unprecedented “petition in boots” reached 
Washington and sought to present to Congress its proposal for depres-
sion relief? Adding to the national foreboding were the many copycat 
armies that sought to rendezvous with Coxey in the District of Colum-
bia and add their number to his 200 or so marchers headed to Capitol 
Hill. Among the best known of the other protest groups was Kelley’s 
Army, which had the good fortune to have as its chronicler the future 
novelist Jack London, who kept a diary as he plodded across Iowa.  
 For his retelling of the Coxey saga, Benjamin F. Alexander has done 
an impressive amount of research, combing through every conceivable 
source for information. Still more impressive is how the author places 
the saga of Coxey’s Army in its historical context as a chapter in the 
history of American reform and among the key events that defined the 
Gilded Age. Readers of Coxey’s Army will find that Alexander has wo-
ven together a satisfying blend of colorful narrative and serious analysis 
of how yesterday’s seemingly crackpot proposals later became a favored 
solution to massive unemployment such as took place during the Great 
Depression of the 1930s. 
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 Interestingly, there is one source that neither Alexander nor I knew 
about when we wrote our respective books on Coxey’s Army: an un-
published autobiography written by Coxey’s grandson titled “82 and 
Still Counting.” A couple of years ago a Coxey descendant mailed me a 
copy of the thick manuscript. The document is interesting for the per-
sonal details it provides about “The General” from the perspective of a 
close family member. The author recalled, for example, that, as a boy, if 
he met his grandfather while walking down the streets of Massillon, 
Ohio, the family’s home town, the old man usually failed to recognize 
him, Coxey’s mind apparently being focused instead on his many ideas.  
Indeed, Coxey provided the philosophical impetus behind the march 
on Washington, but it was his California sidekick, the ever colorful Carl 
Browne, who turned the event into a lively spectacle beloved and occa-
sionally manipulated by journalists eager to sell newspapers. 
 Alexander’s distillation of the details of the march and its leading 
personalities together with a thorough examination of its long-term 
significance makes for good reading and a worthy addition to John’s 
Hopkins University Press’s Witness to History book series. In addition 
to his highly readable text, Alexander thoughtfully includes a detailed 
map of the route of Coxey’s march, a variety of pictures, detailed notes, 
and a list of suggestions for further reading. 
 
 
Prairie Visions: Writings by Hamlin Garland, edited by Keith Newlin; pho-
tographs by Jon Morris. Des Moines: The Iowan Books, 2015. 175 pp. 
Illustrations, notes. $21.95 paperback. 
Reviewer Elizabeth Raymond is professor of history at the University of Ne-
vada, Reno. She has written extensively about a sense of place in the American 
West and Midwest. 
Prairie Visions is a project in historical revival, reintroducing early work 
by a writer who is not today well known, and reimagining the land-
scape of the Iowa prairies as they were first being broken. The book re-
publishes articles by Iowa author Hamlin Garland that first appeared 
in American Magazine in 1888. According to biographer Keith Newlin, 
these articles were Garland’s first published prose works. Later, some-
what reconfigured, they formed the basis of Boy Life on the Prairie, pub-
lished by Macmillan in 1899 and frequently reprinted. This earliest ver-
sion of Garland’s boyhood sketches, however, appears here for the first 
time since 1888. Garland was an important regionalist writer at the turn 
of the century, perhaps best known for his short story collection Main-
Traveled Roads (1891). In that volume he realistically depicted the drudgery 
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and tedium of the farmer’s existence, a theme that is apparent in the 
American Magazine articles as well. 
 The six articles in the series focus on the seasonal round of farm 
work and especially the ways boys participated. While Garland recounts 
the exhausting demands of cultivating, planting, harvesting, husking 
corn, and threshing wheat, he also describes the utter freedom and de-
light of herding cattle or haying on the open prairie that was then still 
accessible in Mitchell County. He begins with “The Huskin’” in late Sep-
tember and moves through “The Thrashin’” in October and November. 
He largely ignores winter, when youngsters were presumably occupied 
with school, ending during “The Voice of Spring,” about mid-March. 
The year continues with “Between Hay an’ Grass” in early May and 
“Meadow Memories” of summer haying and thunderstorms. The arti-
cles end with “Melons and Early Frosts,” which records the work of 
plowing for the next crop amid the cold November rains. 
 The accounts are keenly descriptive and richly observed. The me-
chanics of corn husking and stacking hay are described at length, with a 
running commentary on the intermittent ways boys participated in the 
work. Garland clearly recognizes the differences between the boys’ la-
bor, grueling as it sometimes was, and that of the hired men and farmers. 
He writes also with an awareness of how alien these things will be to 
most of his readers, as suggested by his indifferent attempt to render the 
local dialect in his titles. The editor provides useful annotations of some 
of the more arcane farm equipment and methods that Garland describes. 
 The articles are accompanied by a series of 40 contemporary photo-
graphs by Jon Morris that depict both farm fields and prairie landscape 
but do not allude to the work so exhaustingly recounted by Garland in 
the sketches themselves. They reflect instead the quiet beauty and ex-
pansive landscape that Garland also recorded in the American Magazine 
articles. Morris made all the images in Mitchell County, Iowa, where 
the Garland family was living when the author had the experiences de-
scribed in the book. A list of plates at the end of the volume identifies 
the images, but they appear in the text accompanied only by quotations 
from other Garland works, which sometimes have a relatively obscure 
relationship to the particular image. The photographs are alternately il-
lustrative and evocative but necessarily depict a landscape far different 
from the one Garland encountered in the 1870s, when he lived there. 
 Hamlin Garland scholars will appreciate Prairie Visions, informed by 
Newlin’s graceful introduction to Garland’s themes and method; but it 
will be of interest as well to a broader readership that includes scholars 
of nineteenth-century midwestern childhood or farming methods and 
general readers interested in how one perceptive observer understood his 
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and his family’s place in the opening of the western prairies. Ultimately, 
Prairie Visions depicts the hard work that produced modern Iowa. 
 
 
The Selected Letters of Laura Ingalls Wilder, edited by William Anderson. 
New York: HarperCollins, 2016. xxvii, 400 pp. Illustrations, maps, index. 
$26.99 hardcover. 
Reviewer John J. Fry is professor of history at Trinity Christian College, Palos 
Heights, Illinois. An authority on the life and works of Laura Ingalls Wilder, he 
is also the editor of Almost Pioneers: One Couple’s Homesteading Adventure in the 
West (2013). 
Laura Ingalls Wilder’s eight Little House books provide fictionalized 
accounts of Wilder’s childhood in Wisconsin, Kansas, Minnesota, and 
South Dakota. They became instant best-sellers when they were pub-
lished during the 1930s and 1940s, and they remained popular for the 
rest of the twentieth century, especially when the television series Little 
House on the Prairie aired from 1974 to 1983. It is unclear whether the 
books are as popular now as they were during the twentieth century, 
but there is still publishing interest in Wilder. During the past ten years 
there have appeared new biographies (Pamela Smith Hill’s Laura Ingalls 
Wilder: A Writer’s Life [2007] and Sallie Ketcham’s Laura Ingalls Wilder: 
American Writer on the Prairie [2015]), her final previously unpublished 
work (Pioneer Girl, edited by Hill [2014]), and a memoir of engagement 
with the books (Wendy McClure’s The Wilder Life [2011]). Now William 
Anderson, the foremost living authority on Wilder, has edited this col-
lection of over 400 letters Wilder wrote between 1894 and her death in 
1957. The volume is a worthy addition to the body of Wilder’s work. 
 The letters are arranged in strict date order and divided chrono-
logically into six chapters. Each chapter begins with an overview of the 
events in Wilder’s life during that period. Anderson has added a de-
scriptive title to each letter, usually using words from the letter itself. 
Most letters also have a brief introduction that provides background on 
the correspondent and/or the context of the letter. 
 For those interested in how the Little House books were written, 
this book provides 100 pages of correspondence from Wilder to her 
daughter, Rose Wilder Lane, between 1936 and 1940, when Wilder was 
writing several of the Little House books and Lane was editing and re-
vising them for publication. The letters provide a window on the lively 
collaboration between the two women. At times Wilder, who was used 
to being able to tell her daughter what to do, had to accept Rose’s advice 
about writing. There were also occasions, however, when Wilder refused 
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to budge, and it is clear that her instincts were correct. The efforts of 
both women combined to make the Little House books memorable. 
 Other groups of letters are also fascinating. For instance, Wilder 
wrote to her husband while she took trips to California in 1915 and 
1925. Letters from the first trip were published by HarperCollins as 
West from Home in 1974, but letters from the second are published for 
the first time here. Imagining Wilder at 58 years old riding in a Buick 
through the mountains of Colorado, Nevada, and California is a treat. 
There are also multiple letters from Wilder to her literary agent and ed-
itors; she argues for more royalties, thanks them for the work they do, 
and shares news. Finally, the book reproduces dozens of letters she sent 
to fans of the books who wrote to her. During the last years of her life, 
she wrote to hundreds of these correspondents.  
 One wonders if the correspondence could have been organized dif-
ferently to bring similar letters together. The chapters are also of uneven 
length; the shortest is only 22 pages, the longest is over 150. Finally, it is 
unclear why the correspondence between Wilder and Lane is divided 
into two different chapters. 
 These are minor concerns, however. This book is a must-read for 
Wilder scholars and for anyone who loves the Little House books. 
 
 
Somewhere Over There: The Letters, Diary, and Artwork of a World War I 
Corporal, by Francis H. Webster, edited by Darrek D. Orwig. Norman: 
University of Oklahoma Press, 2016. xv, 277 pp. Illustrations, notes, bib-
liography, index. $29.95 hardcover. 
Reviewer Matthew J. Margis recently earned a Ph.D. in history from Iowa State 
University. His dissertation focuses on the National Guard’s development as 
both a social and military organization during the Progressive Era. 
During World War I, a young corporal from Iowa personified the role 
of “embedded journalist” decades before that term existed. In August 
1917 the U.S. Army officially drafted the National Guard into the Amer-
ican Expeditionary Force, and the Third Iowa Infantry Regiment be-
came the 168th U.S. Infantry Regiment as part of the newly created 42nd 
Infantry Division. Francis Webster enlisted in the Iowa National Guard 
shortly after the United States declared war on Germany. He served as 
a bugler in the Third Iowa Infantry Regiment’s machine gun company. 
In addition to drawing illustrations about life in the trenches for publi-
cation in an Iowa newspaper, Webster maintained an extensive corre-
spondence with his family and friends, and he kept a detailed diary. For 
Somewhere Over There, Darrek Orwig painstakingly edited Webster’s let-
ters, diary, and artwork. 
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 Somewhere Over There follows Webster’s journey from his enlistment 
in the Iowa National Guard until his untimely death in October 1918. 
Orwig’s edited version of Webster’s writings and drawings offers val-
uable insights into an American soldier’s life during World War I. Like 
thousands of other young men, Webster gave up his civilian life to serve 
his country in the trenches. His story reflects broader trends related to 
the World War I combat experience. Furthermore, Webster’s service 
record closely mirrors the Great War’s general combat narrative, and 
his artwork provides interesting and often humorous glimpses into the 
daily life of a National Guardsman who fought in the trenches, wit-
nessed the horrors of modern warfare, recovered in hospitals from 
exposure to poisonous gas, and suffered a mortal wound during the 
Meuse-Argonne Offensive. This book recounts Webster’s experiences 
through his own words, illustrations, and private collection of water-
colors within a historical framework.  
 Overall, Orwig does an excellent job of providing background 
information from both primary and secondary sources. Readers will 
appreciate the ways he introduces each chapter and provides historical 
context throughout the narrative. Orwig also meticulously transcribes 
Webster’s writings in chronological order and uses Webster’s own illus-
trations to give life to his words. Although the editor includes insightful 
letters Webster wrote to his family, he leaves out numerous letters 
between Webster and his friends and former fiancé. Orwig also omits 
letters written to Webster from his parents and brother. These omis-
sions are understandable because including them would vastly increase 
the length of the book, but they could provide deeper looks into Web-
ster’s personality.  
 This book will be of interest to anyone looking for an American sol-
dier’s firsthand account of the daily life of an American soldier during 
World War I, as well as one soldier’s political ideology and social 
sensibilities. As primary sources, Webster’s letters, diary, and artwork 
are valuable for scholars looking to expand their collections or their 
own studies. Webster’s story will also appeal to anyone interested in 
Iowa history. Webster spent his formative years in Iowa, graduated 
from Des Moines College, and served as a school superintendent in 
Deloit, Iowa, prior to enlisting in the National Guard. Webster carried 
a rural Iowa mentality with him into the war, and his letters and diary 
reflect his background. Webster’s artwork also appealed directly to an 
Iowa audience and often contained elements of Iowa pride and humor-
ous illustrations. Ultimately, this work offers a glimpse into the life of a 
National Guardsman during World War I, and the book places Web-
ster’s narrative in the larger context of American involvement in the war.  
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History of Transportation, Henry County, Iowa. Mount Pleasant: Henry 
County Historic Preservation Commission, 2015. 273 pp. Illustrations, 
maps, index. $29.00 paperback. 
Reviewer H. Roger Grant is Kathryn and Calhoun Lemon Professor and Cen-
tennial Professor of history at Clemson University. A prolific author of books 
and articles about railroad and transportation history, his most recent books are 
Railroaders without Borders: A History of the Railroad Development Corporation (2015), 
and Electric Interurbans and the American People (2016). 
The Henry County Historic Preservation Commission, sponsor of Aban-
doned Towns of Henry County and Unincorporated Towns of Henry County, 
has created a third title that deals with the history of this southeastern 
Iowa county, specifically its transportation history, covering four core 
areas: water, roads, railroads, and aviation. This product of the collec-
tive efforts of the Henry County organization is a charming review of 
its countywide transportation past. Although coverage is a mishmash 
of original documents, remembrances, and commentaries and not al-
ways structured chronologically, the book offers a good picture of how 
residents shattered the tyranny of distance, providing a microcosm of 
Hawkeye State transport history. 
 Water never became a practical local option. The only stream of im-
portance was the Skunk River, a shallow waterway that emptied into 
the Mississippi River near Burlington. Yet during the frontier period 
discussions took place about making this stream navigable for steam-
boat traffic. But it would require the costly construction of a slack-water 
canal system, something that had been successful on several other mid-
western streams. 
 Roads became the sensible response. Prior to the Good Roads 
movement after 1900, public roads were almost universally poor. Still, 
the county in the 1850s claimed an all-weather plank road that linked 
Mount Pleasant with Burlington. Although area enthusiasts proposed 
similar wooden roads, they never became much more than paper proj-
ects due to their high construction and maintenance costs. Then, as auto-
mobile and truck ownership expanded, better roads appeared. Not only 
were the principal routes marked, but in the 1920s some were paved, 
including a bizarre privately financed highway known as the Coleman 
Road. Ultimately, much better highways served the county, highlighted 
by the recent upgrading of U.S. 218, the “Avenue of the Saints.” As ma-
jor roads improved, county residents also benefited from intercity bus 
operations, mostly between the 1930s and 1950s. 
 The Railway Age did not miss Henry County. By the end of the 
nineteenth century, steel rails served virtually every community. The 
Chicago, Burlington & Quincy eventually dominated, with its historic 
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main line slicing through the county on an east-west axis. The Peoria, 
Illinois, stem of the Minneapolis & St. Louis also served the northern part 
of the county. But as early as the 1930s line abandonments began, re-
sulting from increasing highway competition, eventually leaving only 
the high-density Burlington main line to serve the county with freight 
and Amtrak service. 
 Resembling water transport, aviation never gained much local im-
portance. There were early balloon ascensions and aerial “barnstormers,” 
entertainment that morphed into pleasure flights and commercial agri-
cultural services. Landing strips appeared, the most notable being devel-
opment of a small, modern airport in Mount Pleasant after World War II.  
 The historic preservation commission has created an unusual type 
of localized transportation work. Readers should enjoy its efforts. Per-
haps this approach will inspire others to consider a similar study of 
their county’s transportation heritage. 
 
 
The Iron Road in the Prairie State: The Story of Illinois Railroading, by Simon 
Cordery. Railroads Past and Present Series. Bloomington: Indiana Uni-
versity Press, 2016. xvii, 216 pp. Illustrations, maps, notes, bibliography, 
index. $60.00 hardcover. 
Reviewer Scott E. Randolph is assistant professor of business administration at 
the University of Redlands in southern California. His research and writing 
have focused on railroads during the Gilded Age and Progressive Era. 
Much like its prairie neighbors to the west, railroads made Illinois. Chi-
cago remains the most important railroad hub in North America, and 
the railroads that traversed the state provided the critical infrastructure 
that linked the commodity crops of the Great Plains; the coal, dairy, and 
manufacturing of the Midwest; the timber and international trade of the 
Pacific Coast; and the cotton and timber of the South with the markets, 
specialty manufacturing, ports, and capital of the Northeast and New 
England. Simon Cordery chronicles this relationship from the 1830s to 
the present with an emphasis on the period prior to 1945. Readers fa-
miliar with the two volumes on Iowa railroads in the Railroads Past and 
Present series produced by Indiana University Press will find much to 
enjoy in this volume on railroading in Illinois. Like other books in the 
series, The Iron Road in the Prairie State is intended for railroad enthusi-
asts and general readers rather than for an academic audience. The book 
is well documented, but the author does not attempt to break new 
ground in his analysis, concentrating instead on providing a concise 
and eminently readable survey of the topic. 
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 This is a solid example of traditional, institutional railroad history. 
Author Simon Cordery possesses a detailed command of the extensive 
literature on the subject, as his endnotes reveal, and has a particular tal-
ent for concise and effective descriptions of the complex financial and 
organizational histories of the many railroads that served Illinois. Par- 
ticularly well executed is his narration of the early twentieth-century 
financial manipulations of the Rock Island lines by the Reid-Moore 
syndicate, perhaps the most egregious of the stock-watering, “robber 
baron” stories. Cordery lays out clearly the effects of this chicanery on 
the company’s long-term well-being. Likewise, his extended discussion 
of the life cycle of passenger service in the state, spread throughout the 
book, is detailed and sympathetic. He does not neglect the state’s many 
interurban railways and smaller carriers, such as the Chicago Great 
Western, but devotes the majority of the book to the largest regional and 
transcontinental systems.  
 The experiences of the passengers, investors, shippers, and citizens 
whose lives the railroads touched are largely absent from this institu-
tional history. Cordery does dedicate one chapter to railroad labor, but 
the discussion focuses entirely on the nineteenth century and is gener-
ally sympathetic to the viewpoint of management. There are passing 
references in later chapters but no substantive development of the ex-
perience of railroad workers after 1900 aside from a discussion of the 
1922 shop workers’ strike. In a state where by 1900 some 5 percent of 
workers labored for the railroads, more attention to their experience 
would have broadened the book’s usefulness. For instance, a discussion 
of the massive reduction in the state’s railroad labor force that began 
after 1960 as a consequence of mergers and the rapid demise of passen-
ger services and branch lines would have provided important local con-
text for the larger tapestry of railroading nationally. 
 Given the otherwise even-handed chronological coverage of the 
period through 1945, the dizzying changes faced by the railroads in 
subsequent decades receive comparatively little discussion. The rapid 
changes in Illinois railroading after the Penn Central and Rock Island 
bankruptcies receive only a few pages despite being, in turn, the largest 
corporate bankruptcy to that date and the largest railroad liquidation of 
all time. There is no discussion of the emergence of new regional and 
short-line railroads in the wake of those bankruptcies, or of the Staggers 
Rail Act, the creation of Conrail, or the merger wave of the 1980s and 
1990s. A more robust discussion of those changes and the resulting line 
abandonments that ensued would round out the book’s usefulness for 
those interested in the contemporary railroad industry. Railroad history 
in general desperately needs a more contemporary emphasis. 
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 The volume contains a fine selection of black-and-white illustrations, 
although the photo reproductions are generally too light. The images 
favor less well-known photographs from the collections of institutions 
such as the Library of Congress, Lake Forest College, and the Center for 
Railroad Photography and Art. Maps are interspersed throughout, an 
important visual aid in a state with a bewildering number of railroads 
and routes, especially at the turn of the twentieth century. A follow-up 
map showing the remaining routes at the time of publication would 
have been a nice addition. 
 Overall, these minor complaints notwithstanding, this is a useful 
addition to the series. It will be of interest to those who possess even a 
passing interest in the railway industry. 
 
 
The Jefferson Highway: Blazing the Way from Winnipeg to New Orleans, by 
Lyell D. Henry Jr. Iowa and the Midwest Experience Series. Iowa City: 
University of Iowa Press, 2016. ix, 213 pp. Maps, illustrations, notes, in-
dex. $29.95 paperback. 
Reviewer Thomas Gubbels is associate professor at Lincoln University. He is a 
former senior historic preservation specialist with the Missouri Department of 
Transportation who has written extensively on Missouri’s highway system. 
Travelers along Interstate 35 through Iowa rarely slow down enough to 
notice the landscape around them. However, if drivers left the interstate 
and instead traveled along U.S. Highways 65 and 69, they would en-
counter a roadside that still has much in common with early to mid–
twentieth-century Iowa. The first true “inter-state” highways were not 
established in 1956 by the National Defense Highway Act or in 1926 by 
the U.S. Bureau of Public Roads. As Lyell Henry vividly recounts in The 
Jefferson Highway: Blazing the Way from Winnipeg to New Orleans, begin-
ning in 1915 local Iowa officials and business leaders began to map out, 
mark, and create an all-weather highway across the state and the entire 
nation. Their creation, the Jefferson Highway, transformed the country-
side and represented the achievement of a uniquely progressive vision 
that helped Iowa move forward into the twentieth century. 
 Henry begins his book by analyzing the core values shared by the 
men who created the Jefferson Highway Association (JHA), the organ-
ization responsible for the creation of this early twentieth-century trail 
system. Good roads advocates such as Edwin Meredith and Thomas 
McDonald called on Iowans to join them in an effort to improve the 
state’s roads and connect them to the outside world. Although some 
highway advocates may have been motivated by personal profit, most 
Iowa supporters of the Jefferson Highway, Henry argues, shared a 
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common vision of an all-weather highway traveling from Winnipeg to 
New Orleans as a concrete monument to progressive improvement. 
Within 20 years of its creation, the JHA had replaced a confusing, hap-
hazard system of dirt roads with a mostly paved highway crossing the 
entire nation “from Pine to Palm.” Supporters saw the Jefferson High- 
way, marked with a series of colorful blue and white signs, as a north-
south counterpart to the better-known Lincoln Highway. The Jefferson 
Highway was ultimately absorbed into the federal highway system in 
the 1920s and 1930s, and today the federal government no longer offi-
cially recognizes a “Jefferson Highway.” 
 Although the Jefferson Highway technically no longer exists, seg-
ments of the original roadway, along with many structures and buildings 
from the early twentieth century, can still be found throughout Iowa. 
In the second half of his book, Henry presents a turn-by-turn tour of the 
Jefferson Highway. As he traces the route of the highway, he vividly 
describes roadside features from the early twentieth century, including 
historic hotels, cafés, barns, and other structures that are still extant. 
Henry clearly shows that while it may no longer officially exist, people 
can still travel along and experience the original Jefferson Highway. 
Perhaps someday a GIS program or detailed online map of the original 
Jefferson Highway route will be created as a supplement to Henry’s 
book to guide travelers interested in driving the Jefferson Highway 
through Iowa and beyond. 
  Overall, The Jefferson Highway marks an important contribution to 
the history of Iowa in the early twentieth century. Although faced with 
a dearth of official sources (official records of the JHA no longer exist), 
Henry delved into contemporary magazine and newspaper accounts to 
create a vivid portrait of the process by which the Jefferson Highway 
came into being. He also makes excellent use of historical maps to un-
cover the original route of the Jefferson Highway, including several un-
paved segments that are still accessible today. His detailed descriptions 
of historic buildings and structures also contribute to the field of com-
mercial archaeology by showing how the changing character of road-
side attractions and accommodations reflected changes in twentieth-
century life.  
 The one quibble that may be had with Henry’s arguments is his 
claim that progressive optimism rather than potential profits motivated 
the creators of the Jefferson Highway. Local leaders and road boosters 
outside Iowa often fought desperately to ensure that their communities 
would be included along the marked route of the Jefferson Highway. 
As a result, numerous spurs were added to the trail, and the highway 
failed to take the most direct course possible across the nation. Contem- 
Book Reviews and Notices      139 
porary magazines and newspapers may have featured lofty language, 
but the harsh battles over the highway’s route indicate that economic 
gain also played a role in the creation and routing of the Jefferson High-
way. Henry rightly concludes that further research into the Jefferson 
Highway is needed to trace the efforts to mark and construct the route 
within the other states through which it passed. Such research should 
build on the solid foundation laid by Henry and someday lead to a com-
prehensive history of the Jefferson Highway. 
 
 
Insurgent Democracy: The Nonpartisan League in North American Politics, 
by Michael J. Lansing. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2015. xii, 
353 pp. Illustrations, maps, notes, index. $45.00 hardcover. 
Reviewer Michael F. Magliari is professor of history at California State Univer-
sity, Chico.  His work on rural radicalism includes “Populist Historiography 
Post Hicks: Current Needs and Future Directions,” Agricultural History (2008); 
and “The Populist Vision: Modern or Traditional?” Journal of the Gilded Age and 
Progressive Era (2009). 
The meteoric rise of the North Dakota Nonpartisan League (NPL) is one 
of the most astounding episodes in the annals of American radicalism. 
Within two years of its sudden appearance in 1915, the angry wheat 
farmers who flocked to the NPL seized command of North Dakota’s 
Republican Party and captured control of the state government in Bis-
marck. Over the next six years, from 1916 to 1921, three-term Governor 
Lynn J. Frazier and his supporting cast of NPL legislators implemented 
nearly every plank in their visionary platform, a document that com-
bined the most appealing reforms previously championed by North 
Dakota’s Populist and Socialist parties. 
 As an economic satellite of Minneapolis and St. Paul, North Dakota 
had always been subordinate to powerful corporate interests based in 
Minnesota’s Twin Cities. Along with the Northern Pacific, the Great 
Northern, and two other domineering railroads, Twin Cities banks, 
flour mills, and grain elevators monopolized the marketing of all wheat 
grown in the region. Statehood in 1889 had done nothing to change that; 
neither had the struggles of farmer-owned cooperatives sponsored by 
the Grange, the Farmers’ Alliance, the Farmers’ Union, and the Ameri-
can Society of Equity. All fell short, as did the efforts of those who opted 
for radical third-party politics in the Populist and Socialist movements. 
 The NPL emerged out of those earlier agrarian crusades. Aiming to 
liberate North Dakota’s wheat growers from the stranglehold of corpo-
rate monopolies, the NPL called for the establishment of state-owned 
banks, flour mills, and grain elevators. It also demanded a state-run sys-
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tem of grain grading, publicly funded hail insurance, and tax exemption 
for farm improvements. All this, and much more, was signed into law by 
Governor Frazier following the epic legislative sessions of 1917 and 1919. 
 The amazing spectacle of an ostensibly Republican administration 
implementing a Populist-Socialist program resulted from the NPL’s 
defining strategy. In 1907 North Dakota adopted the direct primary 
system, which enabled voters to nominate the candidates that their re-
spective parties fielded for public office. For frustrated Socialists and 
former Populists who had concluded that third parties were hopeless 
causes in America’s formidable two-party system, direct primaries cre-
ated opportunities for radical outsiders to move indoors. Nominally 
“nonpartisan,” the North Dakota NPL effectively constituted a new 
third party that mobilized like-minded Republicans, Democrats, and 
Socialists to vote as a bloc in the state’s GOP primaries. The stunning 
results triggered a rapid expansion of the NPL among farmers through-
out the American West and the Canadian Great Plains. 
 The dramatic story of the Nonpartisan League has been well told 
by numerous historians, including Theodore Saloutos, Elwyn Robinson, 
Edward Blackorby, Larry Remele, and, most notably, Robert Morlan, 
whose Political Prairie Fire: The Nonpartisan League, 1915–1922 (1955) re-
mains a classic. Their accounts, however, focus almost exclusively on 
North Dakota. While understandable given North Dakota’s centrality 
in the NPL saga, there has long been a need for a book-length examina-
tion of the NPL as a national, or even international, movement. After 
all, as Michael Lansing points out in his new work, the NPL at its peak 
claimed nearly 250,000 members in 13 states plus the Canadian provinces 
of Alberta and Saskatchewan. Between 1917 and 1923, the NPL main-
tained a national headquarters in St. Paul from which it launched 
vigorous recruiting drives that tested the appeal and adaptability of 
the NPL beyond its home turf. However, despite winning some im-
pressive victories in state legislative races, particularly in Minnesota, 
Montana, and Idaho, nowhere did the NPL come close to matching its 
achievements in North Dakota. 
 The reasons remain unclear. Regrettably, Lansing never delivers on 
his promise to provide a “North American” coverage of the NPL. His 
concentration remains squarely centered on North Dakota, and he offers 
only scattered, uneven, and cursory glimpses of NPL activities in other 
states and provinces. For no single locale does he conduct the complete 
and systematic analysis of existing economic and political conditions 
required for a persuasive explanation of NPL performance.  
 The shortcomings of his book are well illustrated by his skimpy 
treatment of Iowa, where the NPL failed to take hold, despite winning 
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the support of James Pierce, the influential editor of the Iowa Homestead, 
and enrolling 15,000 members in 1918. Why the NPL subsequently fal-
tered in a state that would soon send Smith Brookhart to the U.S. Senate 
remains a mystery that Lansing cannot convincingly explain in the 
scant two pages he devotes to the Hawkeye State. In the end, Lansing 
has disappointingly little new to say about his fascinating topic, either 
in Iowa or anywhere else in North America. 
 
 
The Great Exception: The New Deal and the Limits of American Politics, by 
Jefferson Cowie. Politics and Society in Twentieth-Century America. 
Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2016. viii, 273 pp. Illustrations, 
graph, notes, index. $27.95 hardcover. 
Reviewer Roger Biles is professor of history emeritus at Illinois State University. 
His books include The Fate of Cities: Urban America and the Federal Government, 
1956–2000 (2011). 
Nearly three-quarters of a century after Franklin D. Roosevelt’s death 
historians are still struggling to make sense of the New Deal. Was FDR’s 
reform program more success than failure? Did it possess any coher-
ence at all or was it just a hodgepodge of programs slapped together 
hurriedly to confront a frightening economic collapse? Did its imple-
mentation signal a decisive break with the political economy that had 
prevailed in the United States since its founding in the eighteenth cen-
tury? Was it simply a form of corporate liberalism, as New Left revi-
sionists insisted, that substituted modest changes to forestall radical 
alterations at a time when a thoroughgoing transformation seemed pos-
sible? Or, somewhere in between, was it a “halfway revolution” that 
established a new liberal consensus suitable for an essentially cautious 
population seeking a modicum of change to preserve an essentially 
healthy economy temporarily thrown off its game? In The Great Excep-
tion, Jefferson Cowie presents another possibility and offers a fresh, 
original look at a perennial historical conundrum. 
 The Andrew J. Nathanson Professor at Cornell University’s School 
of Industrial and Labor Relations and the author of several books on 
twentieth-century U.S. history, Cowie uses a wide lens to examine the 
meaning of the New Deal. He shows how government policies of the 
1930s charted a new course and how those departures differed signifi-
cantly from what followed after the 1970s. Reflecting the book’s title, 
he posits that the reforms crafted during the Roosevelt administration 
constituted a singular exception to the manner in which government 
operated before and after the crises of the Great Depression and World 
War II. The remarkable expansion of the federal government’s role in 
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American life, notably to the benefit of workers and their families, trans-
formed economic institutions, altered class relations, commenced the 
realignment of the nation’s two political parties, and raised important 
questions about traditional values. Most important, the nation thrived 
as never before during a brief era of equity that spanned the immediate 
post–World War II decades. Wages rose to unprecedented levels, trade 
unions thrived, consumerism scaled new heights, economic inequality 
declined, and economists spoke glowingly of capitalism’s triumph. If 
white male industrial workers fared better during those years than 
women and minorities who remained consigned to the margins of the 
economic system, residual gains undeniably brought the benefits of 
American prosperity to all wage earners. And the legal breakthroughs 
of the 1950s and 1960s began to dispel the barriers that had cordoned 
some groups off from the societal mainstream. Yet for all its profound 
influence, the author maintains, the New Deal failed to establish a per-
manent welfare state. Even during the halcyon days of the postwar era, 
the New Deal edifice rested upon a fragile foundation. The beneficial 
changes engendered by the path-breaking legislation of 1935–1938 
amounted to a temporary respite from less salutary traditions in the na-
tion encompassing race, social class, immigration, individualism, and 
culture. Historic constraints resurfaced, and the inherent weaknesses of 
the New Deal coalition mounted during the 1970s. In this view, what 
has been dubbed the Reagan Revolution might better be termed the 
Reagan Restoration. 
 More extended historical essay than monograph, The Great Exception 
is a sophisticated reinterpretation of a crucial period in American his-
tory that readers will find as helpful for contextualizing recent develop-
ments as for understanding the events of the 1930s. Clearly written and 
cogently argued, the book should engage historians, journalists, and all 
readers interested in comprehending the nation’s current situation—
and in forecasting its future. The author’s view of the New Deal as a 
great exception to the conservative politics that held sway during most 
of the twentieth century in the United States suggests that the imminent 
return of a period when collective economic rights flourished seems un-
likely. The resurgence of the values and ideas triumphant throughout 
most of the nation’s history, dormant for a large portion of the last cen-
tury, has resulted in what Cowie sees as a new Gilded Age of economic 
inequality and unrestrained individualism. Resurrecting the ethos of 
the New Deal, which he believes led to a golden age of social respon-
sibility and economic security in the United States, will be possible only 
if the American people comprehend the influences that first created and 
later undermined the celebrated reform period. 
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Plowed Under: Food Policy Protests and Performance in New Deal America, 
by Ann Folino White. Bloomington and Indianapolis: Indiana Uni-
versity Press, 2015. x, 307 pp. Illustrations, notes, bibliography, index. 
$30.00 paperback. 
Reviewer Brian Q. Cannon is professor of history at Brigham Young University. 
His publications include Remaking the Agrarian Dream: The New Deal’s Rural Re-
settlement Program in the Mountain West (1996). 
In this stimulating study of New Deal America, theater scholar Ann 
Folino White explores protests, exhibits, and a theatrical play about the 
supply and price of food. White distinctively interprets her historical 
evidence, drawn from careful research in 11 archives, through the lens 
of performance studies. Although the book does not focus on Iowa, it 
offers detailed case studies of midwestern protest movements and ex-
amines reactions to government food policies that affected Iowans.  
 White begins by scrutinizing theatrical elements in exhibits spon-
sored by the U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA) at the 1933–34 
Chicago World’s Fair. One exhibit titled “The Shadow of Surplus” at-
tributed low farm income to agricultural surpluses, essentially blaming 
farmers’ success as producers for their low income. That exhibit was 
replaced after a few months partly because the fair’s assistant adminis-
trator believed it was overly negative. The replacement exhibit cele-
brated the income-boosting impact of production controls instituted by 
the New Deal.  
 Next, the author analyzes a milk strike organized by the Wisconsin 
Cooperative Milk Pool in 1933. When strikers stopped milk trucks and 
forcibly dumped their contents to drive up prices, local deputies and 
the National Guard deployed tear gas. White highlights performative 
aspects of the strike, including publicity leading up to it and the pres-
ence of thousands of spectators. Strikers billed themselves as the heirs 
of the American Revolution and melodramatically vilified processing 
corporations that profited from the low milk prices farmers received. 
News reporters resorted to stock, opposing portraits of strike organizer 
Walter Singler and Governor Albert Schmedeman. Singler was valor-
ized as a skilled orator and athlete while the governor was depicted as 
small and weak. Descriptions of the weapons—tear gas and nightsticks 
for the state and rocks for the protestors—“spectacularized the repres-
sive power of the state” (103). The evidence presented supports White’s 
interpretation, but it comes from only three newspapers. Using compet-
ing newspapers from Madison and Milwaukee might have enabled the 
author to uncover a more varied media treatment of the strike.  
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 In another richly textured, provocative case study that documents 
the leadership of an important Michigan activist, Mary Zuk, White an-
alyzes a meat boycott organized by women in Hamtramck in 1935 to 
protest New Deal inflationary policies. White pinpoints theatrical and 
rhetorical elements of the protest, arguing that the women shrewdly 
adopted the persona of “housewives” who needed inexpensive meat to 
satisfy their husbands’ nutritional needs. Meanwhile, opponents dis-
missed the protest as pure theatrics, or “fake.”  
 White next examines a 1939 demonstration in which 1,300 Missouri 
sharecroppers protested New Deal limitations on cotton production 
that unintentionally incentivized landlords to evict sharecroppers. Crit-
ics alleged that the protests were a charade organized by unions; others 
identified the demonstration as authentic “human drama” (155). White 
detects artifice and sleight of hand behind the protest, pointing out that 
the participants received provisions by night “in a manner analogous 
to masterful stage management,” thereby allowing the protestors to 
continue their “performance” (172).  
 A final case study involves the Federal Theatre Project’s (FTP) play 
Triple-A Plowed Under, which premiered in 1936. White surveys the 26 
scenes, which dramatized protests, including a meat strike, a milk strike, 
and the unionization of share croppers. 
 White argues that participants in these protests and productions 
demonstrated “sophisticated understanding of theatrical traditions” 
and carefully incorporated “theatrical elements from casting to dia-
logue to props to scenery” (4). They employed “theatrical strategies” in 
their “representation” of grievances and viewpoints, as did their oppo-
nents (13). She admits that even the most carefully scripted protests 
could spin out of control, though.  
 For historians, this interpretive approach works best in cases where 
memos or internal correspondence allow White to document organiz-
ers’ motives and strategies, as is the case in the USDA’s World’s Fair 
exhibit and the FTP play. Unfortunately, documentation of the plans 
and aims of the milk, meat, and sharecropping protesters is sparse. As 
White observes, acting is “intentional” and strategic in its “dissembling” 
(125); it is a carefully calculated performance. White vacillates between 
suggesting that the roles and props adopted by protesters reflected in-
tentional acting and acknowledging that they might have constituted 
“unconscious performance” (125). Similarly, she is unable to determine 
whether the media hype leading up to the Wisconsin Milk Strike was 
“intentional or not” (78). Thus, White’s book demonstrates that analyses 
of politics and protests through the lens of performance studies can be 
both wonderfully suggestive and highly conjectural.  
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The Pew and the Picket Line: Christianity and the American Working Class, 
edited by Christopher D. Cantwell, Heath W. Carter, and Janine Gior-
dano Drake. The Working Class in American History Series. Urbana 
and Chicago: University of Illinois Press, 2016. xiv, 249 pp. Notes, index. 
$95.00 hardcover; $28.00 paperback.  
Reviewer Paul Emory Putz is a doctoral candidate in history at Baylor University. 
His research focuses on urban Protestant reform movements in Iowa, Nebraska, 
and Kansas during the Gilded Age and Progressive Era, addressing intersecting 
themes of religion, region, race, class, urbanization, and consumer culture. 
Coming 50 years after Herbert Gutman’s essay “Protestantism and the 
American Labor Movement: The Christian Spirit in the Gilded Age” in 
the American Historical Review, The Pew and the Picket Line represents a 
full flowering of Gutman’s suggestion that historians pay more atten-
tion to the religious lives of working people. To be sure, some historians 
in the intervening years—such as Ken Fones-Wolf, who writes the fore-
word to this book—have heeded Gutman’s call. But more often than 
not, labor and religious historians have operated on separate tracks. 
With The Pew and the Picket Line, Christopher Cantwell, Heath Carter, 
and Janine Giordano Drake bring together an impressive group of 
(mostly) younger scholars in an attempt to demonstrate that “there is 
not a history of religion in America that is not also a history of labor 
. . .  [and] there is no history of labor in America that is not also a history 
of religion” (12). Along with linking labor and religious history, this vol-
ume’s ten essays emphasize the contingency and complexity of working-
class religious life. Puncturing broad claims about the relationship 
between Christianity and working people—for example, the notion that 
religion served as a form of social control imposed on the laboring masses, 
or that the working classes turned to religion out of desperation—the 
essayists refuse to make any overarching claims about working-class 
religious life except to say, “It depends” (13).  
 Collectively, the chronological focus of the essays ranges from the 
early nineteenth century through the 1970s. The majority, however—six 
of the nine—are set in the years following the Great Depression. The em-
phasis on place is another shared characteristic; eight are historical case 
studies set in a specific city or region. And, as the title of the book makes 
clear, all of the essays focus on Christianity. Despite these shared themes, 
the book covers a wide range of people and places. Three essays (by Erik 
Gellman, Alison Collis Greene, and Kerry Pimblott) give substantial at-
tention to African Americans; a fourth (by Matthew Pehl) includes them 
within the narrative. Latinos/as are primary subjects for Brett Hendrick-
son and Arlene Sánchez-Walsh. And places stretching from Rhode Island 
to California and Detroit to San Antonio are given prominence.  
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 Scholars interested in the Midwest will be pleased to see four essays 
connected to the region. Matthew Pehl looks at Detroit autoworkers in 
the 1950s, exploring how the experience of industrial work shaped their 
religious practices. Kerry Pimblott uses Cairo, Illinois, to show how Black 
Power activism relied heavily on the town’s black churches. Erik Gellman 
also highlights the religious dimensions of Black Power activism, exam-
ining the 1960s life of Chicago’s Urban Training Center for Christian Mis-
sion. Jarod Roll, on the other hand, looks at a more rural setting: the min-
ing town of Galena, Kansas, in the late nineteenth and early twentieth 
centuries. He explores the “belief world” of the town’s miners and how 
their faith in the myths of capitalism shaped the development of Pente-
costalism. Dan McKanan’s essay is somewhat connected to the Midwest 
as well: it provides a close reading of the popular fiction of George Lip-
pard (a Pennsylvanian) and Ignatius Donnelly (a Minnesotan). But 
McKanan’s piece is largely devoid of a sense of place, striking a bit of a 
discordant note compared to the other essays in the book. 
 Essay collections have a negative reputation in some quarters; they 
can be perceived as superfluous or incoherent, lacking thematic unity. 
But The Pew and the Picket Line is an example of a collection done right. 
With an outstanding introductory essay on the historiography of reli-
gion and labor by Cantwell, Carter, and Drake, along with cutting-edge 
research throughout the rest of the book, this collection should be 
essential reading for historians of American religion and labor. With 
substantial attention given to communities in Illinois, Kansas, and 
Michigan, it should also be of interest to scholars of the Midwest. 
 
 
Thomas Hart Benton: Discoveries and Interpretations, by Henry Adams. 
Columbia: University of Missouri Press, 2015. xi, 364 pp. Illustrations, 
notes, bibliography, index. $50.00 hardcover. 
Reviewer Breanne Robertson is a historian at Marine Corps University. She has 
published two articles in the Annals of Iowa (2011 and 2015) about New Deal 
murals. 
Thomas Hart Benton: Discoveries and Interpretations provides a retrospec-
tive look at art historian Henry Adams’s career-long fascination with 
Missouri muralist Thomas Hart Benton (1889–1975). One of American 
Regionalism’s “Big Three,” along with Grant Wood and John Steuart 
Curry, Benton painted narrative scenes of midwestern history, mythol-
ogy, and modern life that resonated with Depression-era audiences; in 
December 1934 he became the first American artist to appear on the 
cover of Time magazine. Yet Benton also regularly defied expectations 
and provoked critics with candid depictions of controversial subject 
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matter, such as the lynching of an African American at the Missouri State 
Capitol, and incendiary rhetoric about the art world establishment. In 
1935 Benton famously swapped insults with American modernist Stewart 
Davis in the pages of Art Front, and he was later fired from his teaching 
post in Kansas City for making derogatory remarks about the curators 
at the Nelson-Atkins Museum of Art.  
 Adams began working on Benton in 1986, when he joined the Nelson-
Atkins Museum of Art as curator of American art. Among his earliest 
exhibitions for the Kansas City museum was a major retrospective of 
Benton’s work to commemorate the centennial of the artist’s birth. The 
landmark show helped to restore popular and, albeit more slowly, crit-
ical appreciation for Benton’s homegrown modernism, which fell out of 
favor after World War II. Since that time, Adams has authored three 
book-length studies on Benton: Thomas Hart Benton: An American Original 
(1989), Thomas Hart Benton: Drawing from Life (1990), and Tom and Jack: 
The Intertwined Lives of Thomas Hart Benton and Jackson Pollock (2009). 
This latest volume features 13 essays drawn from previous public 
lectures, unpublished writings, and hard-to-find articles in popular 
magazines and small-run exhibition catalogs.  
 According to Adams, the collection reflects a historical moment 
when Benton and his art stood “at odds with the approved direction of 
modern painting toward ever-greater abstraction and with an art world 
that was rigidly controlled by critics and dealers in New York” (ix). The 
54-page introduction, titled “Playing with Fire: The Risks and Rewards 
of Studying Thomas Hart Benton,” presents a meandering narrative that 
integrates Benton’s biography with Adams’s professional development 
against an evolving field of study. Prominent scholars and critics appear 
both as heroes and villains, and Adams employs provocative language 
to describe his decades-long struggle to bring acclaim to Benton’s art. He 
asserts that “even today, to some New York art critics [Benton] is still the 
number-one bad boy of American art, a kind of apostate, even a Satanic 
figure, because of the way he turned his back on modern art” (3).  
 Now a professor at Case Western Reserve University, Adams 
seems still on a campaign to overturn critical aspersions that cast Ben-
ton as a bigoted, reactionary, and antimodern artist. Adams tracks the 
precipitous rise and fall of Benton’s career through individual case 
studies covering topics ranging from country music to art market fakes 
to representations of race and place. Despite their varied tone and ap-
proach, the essays cohere around several key arguments. First, Adams 
aims to rehabilitate popular assumptions about Benton’s political views 
by discrediting his adversaries, highlighting his ethnically and racially 
diverse social circle, and demonstrating a steadfast antifascist agenda 
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in his teaching and his art. Second, Adams strives to situate Benton 
alongside such Missouri cultural luminaries as Mark Twain and George 
Caleb Bingham, arguing that Benton has been unfairly vilified for fol-
lowing a similar approach to local subject matter and popular culture. 
Finally, Adams maintains that Benton translated the expressive color 
and pulsating rhythm of Synchromism, an avant-garde style of Ameri-
can modernism, into representational form and regional subject matter. 
It is in this same commitment to rhythm that Benton’s influence can be 
discerned in the paintings of his most famous pupil, Abstract Expres-
sionist Jackson Pollock. 
 Adams is at his best when he allows his breadth of professional ex-
perience to guide his analysis. In addition to university teaching and 
museum work, Adams has consulted for galleries and auction houses; 
the essays derived from these activities—his in-depth study of Benton’s 
artistic activities at Martha’s Vineyard, his insightful analysis of Ben-
ton’s technical process in drawing and printmaking, and his illuminat-
ing discussion of authentication and connoisseurship—not only add to 
our understanding of Benton, but also make a meaningful contribution 
to a scholarly field that too often excludes dealers, collectors, and other 
actors and aspects of the art market. Nevertheless, the desire to present 
a collection of essays that can each operate independently has resulted 
in a volume that is both longer and more repetitive than necessary. Ty-
pographical errors are also frequent enough to be distracting.  
 Written over the course of three decades, the book is less a reinter-
pretation of Benton’s art than it is an album of scholarly snapshots that 
tell the story, in aggregate, about the intellectual journey of a single 
scholar within the changing field of art history. As Adams himself ex-
plains, it was precisely because “attitudes about Benton and his art are 
going through a dramatic shift; the old animosity toward his work 
seems to be fading” that the time had arrived to assemble his writings 
on Benton for publication (x). As this backward-looking impetus for the 
collection suggests, some chapters seem outdated in methodology and in 
argument, particularly when compared to the rapidly expanding liter-
ature through which contemporary readers can learn about Benton and 
his art. Interested readers will want to supplement Adams’s book with 
the exhibition catalog American Epics: Thomas Hart Benton and Hollywood 
(2015), which contains essays by prominent art historians and covers 
much of the same ground as Adams’s book. Other publications of note 
include Erika Doss’s Benton, Pollock, and the Politics of Modernism (1991), 
Justin Wolff’s biography Thomas Hart Benton: A Life (2012), and Leo Ma-
zow’s award-winning Thomas Hart Benton and the American Sound (2012). 
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Des Moines Architecture and Design, by Jay Pridmore. Charleston, SC: 
The History Press, 2015. 174 pp. Illustrations (many in color), bibliog-
raphy, index. $24.99 paperback. 
Reviewer Thomas Leslie, AIA, is Pickard Chilton Professor in Architecture at 
Iowa State University. His research and writing have focused on the integration 
of building sciences and arts both historically and in contemporary practice. 
Residents of Iowa’s cultural, economic, and political capital take for 
granted an astonishing array of architecture. Since Benjamin Franklin 
Allen commissioned Chicago architect William Boyington to design 
Terrace Hill in 1869, Des Moines residents have hired leading architects, 
many of whom have done some of their best work there. This tradition 
has also inspired a parallel history of home-grown design excellence, 
creating a collection of buildings and a culture of architectural practice 
that is the equal of any comparably sized city in the country. 
 David Gebhard and Gerald Mansheim’s Buildings of Iowa (1993) cat-
alogued Des Moines’s notable buildings for the Society of Architectural 
Historians’ Buildings of the United States series, but a focused history 
of Des Moines’s architecture has been lacking. Chicago-based architec-
tural writer and journalist Jay Pridmore has risen to the task with Des 
Moines Architecture and Design, 12 essays that thematically document the 
city’s best—and best-known—buildings while providing a succinct nar-
rative of the city’s development itself. 
 Beginning with Terrace Hill, Pridmore shows how the city estab-
lished a tradition of high-minded civic and residential design, how in-
fluences from Chicago’s 1893 Columbian Exhibition found fertile terri-
tory here, and how civic classicism was challenged by both Prairie Style 
and Modernist ideas. Throughout, progressive clients, a thriving econ-
omy, and visionary city government allowed some of the Midwest’s 
finest architects to shape Des Moines. 
 But the city’s own designers soon equaled these works. Proudfoot 
and Bird produced classical monuments that were matched by com-
mercial buildings of exceptional quality from Liebbe, Nourse, and Ras-
mussen. Homes around Grand Avenue matched the splendor and qual-
ity of the Midwest’s larger cities, and Des Moines’s investment in archi-
tecture was extended to its religious buildings; Pridmore devotes one 
essay to the acropolis of church buildings overlooking the city’s finan-
cial center known as “Piety Hill.” 
 Only after World War II, however, did Des Moines gain interna-
tionally recognized architecture. The Art Center’s original building by 
Eliel and Eero Saarinen (1948) inspired other institutions in the city to 
seek out world-class architects. Drake University hired the younger 
Saarinen in 1949 for buildings that are among his most thoughtful 
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works. Drake and a local bank hired Mies van der Rohe in the 1960s, 
and the Art Center continued its patronage by hiring I. M. Pei and, in 
the 1980s, Richard Meier. Again, these were joined by local work of sim-
ilar quality. Chick Herbert, Ray Crites, and Brooks, Borg, and Skiles all 
combined international modernism with pragmatism and restraint; if it 
is possible to realize a modest monumentality, Herbert’s Civic Center 
(1975) toes this delicate line with grace and power. 
 Pridmore’s approach is admirable for its ability to show that these 
buildings were not isolated drawing-board exercises but rather were 
the result of social, financial, and cultural connections that were fos-
tered by Des Moines’s tightly knit business and civic community. He 
explains these buildings gracefully and legibly, and his choice of themes 
is apt, covering nearly every aspect of the city’s design history. Readers 
may wish for more emphasis on the vernacular, as Pridmore’s emphasis 
is on the monuments and mansions that exemplify the city’s outstand-
ing moments and characters. And scholars may regret the absence of 
footnotes, which might have inspired others to delve more deeply into 
some of the building histories that Pridmore tells so lucidly. Finally, any 
reader contemplating a driving tour will need some supplemental 
research to place these buildings into geographical context; the city’s 
relationship to its rivers and its hinterland has influenced parks and 
infrastructure that could have formed an additional essay or map. 
 Still, Pridmore has written what will deservedly be the standard his-
tory of the city’s architecture. It will be a vital source for any student of 
the city, and it lives up to the rich legacy of built work produced there 
over the last 150 years. Gebhard and Mansheim’s guidebook will still find 
a place in the back seat of any windshield historian’s car, but it has, after 
20 years, found a worthy companion that ties its catalog of Des Moines’s 
buildings into readable, enlightening, and richly elucidating essays. 
 
 
Workshops of Empire: Stegner, Engle, and American Creative Writing during 
the Cold War, by Eric Bennett. The New American Canon: The Iowa Se-
ries in Contemporary Literature and Culture. Iowa City: University of 
Iowa Press, 2015. xi, 232 pp. Notes, index. $22.50 paperback. 
Reviewer Catherine Stewart is professor of history at Cornell College. She is the 
author of Long Past Slavery: Representing Race in the Federal Writers’ Project (2016). 
Eric Bennett’s Workshops of Empire has an ambitious agenda: to prove 
that the writing programs that flourished in the wake of World War II, 
particularly at the University of Iowa and Stanford University, were the 
result of Cold War objectives. Bennett aims to identify the various intel-
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lectual, artistic, and ideological currents that contributed to the emer-
gence of MFA programs. But he has an even more audacious goal: to 
historicize and, by so doing, expose how today’s creative writing pro-
grams continue to “reflect the intellectual shape and the institutional 
form of the creative writing programs of the early Cold War” (172). 
There is an irony at the heart of Bennett’s argument that he doesn’t want 
readers to miss, namely, that programs that strove to inculcate a literary 
style that espoused humanist values of individualism in order to chal-
lenge totalitarian group think, instead squelched individual expression. 
 Bennett strives to differentiate his work from Mark McGurl’s 
groundbreaking The Program Era (2009), which established the study of 
creative writing programs as an essential part of American literary his-
tory. Workshops of Empire brings something new to this emerging field by 
unearthing and persuasively documenting how the genesis of writing 
programs like Iowa’s and Stanford’s cannot be understood without 
examining their role in the Cold War and their directors’ commitment 
to using these programs as another front for fighting an all-consuming 
battle against totalitarianism and communism. Bennett firmly establishes 
both Paul Engle and Wallace Stegner as cultural cold warriors, although 
he is less successful in making his larger claim that their agendas directly 
shaped the writing produced by numerous graduates, many of whom 
went on to establish their own writing programs.  
 Bennett argues that Engle’s and Stegner’s approaches were grounded 
in the New Humanism, a conservative literary movement predicated on 
a rejection of modernism and its moral relativism. The New Humanism 
dovetailed neatly with Cold War fears of totalitarianism, mass culture, 
and atomic warfare, elevating the stakes of literary production as both 
an antidote and a weapon. This led private institutions, such as the 
Rockefeller Foundation, to underwrite programs like the Iowa Writers’ 
Workshop and literary journals like the Kenyon and Sewanee reviews. It 
also enabled the entrepreneurial Engle to secure donations from Cold 
War funding sources by arguing that the writing program was an effec-
tive means of combatting anti-American attitudes.  
 In the book’s strongest chapter, Bennett examines Engle and his di-
rectorship of the Iowa Writers’ Workshop. Bennett’s métier is biography, 
and his skillful weaving together of archival evidence yields a portrait of 
Engle as simultaneously likeable, sympathetic, funny, and impassioned. 
Even as Engle changed his writing and politics to fit the prevailing mood, 
from 1930s fellow traveler to postwar anticommunist, he strikes one as 
sincere in his passions.  
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 Bennett is not a historian, however. He struggles to move between 
larger historical trends and the localized histories of the writing pro-
grams. Broad swaths of history are glossed in such a manner as to prove 
meaningless and unhelpful to readers: “Rapid changes touched every-
body and divided the forward-looking from the backward-glancing. 
Was the future the solution or the problem? Was the nation halfway to 
salvation or farther from it than ever before?” (18). Bennett wishes to 
destroy the canard that MFA programs were apolitical, removed from 
larger forces such as Cold War fears and strategies, but he winds up 
reiterating another one—that of a Cold War consensus. He relies on ill-
defined terms such as “Cold War agenda” and “Cold War intellectual 
consensus” without explaining or identifying whose agenda was being 
carried out. Bennett ignores the scholarship that proves the very idea of 
a Cold War consensus was another fiction, albeit a politically useful one. 
As scholars such as Alan Brinkley have documented, this “consensus” 
was an illusion, particularly when it came to intellectuals and writers. 
Writers were more often the target of Cold War apparatus than its ben-
eficiaries. However, Bennett only touches on this briefly when he dis-
cusses Engle’s dismaying encounter with Red Scare allegations in 1952 
that led to the cancellation of an invited lecture at Marshall College. 
 Workshops of Empire is not recommended for general readers, as it is 
challenging in both its prose style and its assumptions. However, it will 
certainly prove of interest to researchers of Iowa history for its treat-
ment of the Iowa Writers’ Workshop and the intriguing use of archival 
evidence from the Paul Engle Papers at the University of Iowa, a collec-
tion that deserves further study.  
 
 
A Wrestling Life: The Inspiring Stories of Dan Gable, by Dan Gable with 
Scott Schulte. Iowa City: University of Iowa Press, 2015. xvi, 155 pages. 
Illustrations, appendixes, index. $23.00 hardcover. 
Reviewer David R. McMahon is professor of history at Kirkwood Community 
College, Iowa City Campus. Much of his research and writing have focused on 
Iowa’s sport history. 
Often described as the most successful coach in collegiate history, Dan 
Gable earned the right to impart life lessons. The architect of one of the 
most dominating dynasties in collegiate sports—coaching the University 
of Iowa Hawkeyes to 15 national wrestling titles, his views on life and 
how to succeed are worth considering. Fortunately for Gable, he found 
an eager partner in Scott Schulte. Published by the University of Iowa 
Press, A Wrestling Life is an easy read but rather light fare for an academic 
press. It has merit in sports literature if only for what it ignores. 
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 For aficionados of wrestling and fans of Gable, of whom there are 
many, much here will be familiar. Movingly, he discusses the tragic in-
cident that fueled his manic ambition to become the embodiment of am-
ateur wrestling. His eldest sister, Diane, was murdered by a classmate 
in 1964 in the Gable family home. His family already had troubles, but 
this tragedy compelled Gable to become the hyper-focused athlete of 
legend and the popular cultural icon we know him to be. 
 At times, Gable can be preachy. For this he will be forgiven by those 
who idolize him. Sport historians, however, would like to know more 
than Gable’s life lessons. What scholars would like to know he does not 
seem very interested in telling. At an event in Iowa City to celebrate the 
publication of the book, Gable criticized Nolan Zavoral’s A Season on the 
Mat (1997) for not conforming to his expectations, although it is a more 
revealing book than A Wrestling Life. There are hints in this book (and 
in that book launch talk) of a darker history. For example, there is the 
abandoned run for governor prompted by Karl Rove and Gable’s ad-
mission that the drive to win made him unable to comment on the tragic 
events that unfolded around him in Munich in 1972. 
 Anyone familiar with the history of Iowa wrestling has heard the 
rumors of wild and reckless behavior by his wrestlers—drinking and 
fighting their way through Iowa City—as the program rose to promi-
nence. I would like to know more about that—again, something hinted 
at during the memorable evening that launched the book. Historians 
are often interested in things historical figures are unwilling or unable 
to talk about. 
 A Wrestling Life is a revealing choice for an academic press. Clearly, 
the publishers hoped that this book would sell, and no doubt it has. 
Gable’s website advertises the book along with motivational speaking 
engagements. A Wrestling Life is an obvious example of how academic 
presses have been forced to appeal to larger audiences. If this helps the 
cause of academic publishing, so be it. But there is more to know about 
the history of Iowa wrestling than is revealed in this book. 
 Announcements 
THE STATE HISTORICAL SOCIETY OF IOWA (SHSI) 
announces a grant program for the 2017/2018 academic year. 
SHSI will award up to ten stipends of $1,000 each to support 
original research and interpretive writing related to the history 
of Iowa or Iowa and the Midwest. Preference will be given to 
applicants proposing to pursue previously neglected topics or 
new approaches to or interpretations of previously treated topics. 
SHSI invites applicants from a variety of backgrounds, including 
academic and public historians, graduate students, and indepen-
dent researchers and writers. Applications will be judged on the 
basis of their potential for producing work appropriate for publi-
cation in The Annals of Iowa. Grant recipients will be expected to 
produce an annotated manuscript targeted for The Annals of Iowa, 
SHSI’s scholarly journal.  
 Applications for the 2017/2018 awards must be postmarked 
by April 15, 2017. Download application guidelines from our 
website (iowaculture.gov/about-us/about/grants/research-
grant-authors) or request guidelines or further information from: 
Research Grants 
State Historical Society of Iowa 
402 Iowa Avenue 
Iowa City IA 52240-1806 
Phone: 319-335-3931 
e-mail: marvin-bergman@uiowa.edu 
 
 
THE IOWA HISTORY CENTER at Simpson College is pleased 
to congratulate Seth Hedquist as the 2016 recipient of our prize 
for the outstanding master’s thesis in Iowa history. His award-
winning thesis, “The Chronicles of Agrimusic,” was completed 
at Iowa State University. 
 The Center now seeks nominations for the outstanding mas-
ter’s thesis in Iowa history for 2017. Selection will be based on 
contribution to the knowledge of Iowa history, originality of the 
subject matter or methodology, use of sources, and written ex-
pression. Nominees must have completed their master’s degree 
between July 1, 2016, and June 30, 2017.  
 The winner will be announced in the fall of 2017 and will re-
ceive a $1,000 cash prize and an award plaque. Three copies of 
the thesis and a brief letter of nomination from the thesis advisor, 
which must include contact information for the nominee, should 
be submitted to Bill Friedricks, Director, Iowa History Center, 
Simpson College, 701 North C Street, Indianola, IA 50125. Appli-
cation deadline is June 30, 2017.  
 For further information, contact Linda Sinclair, (515) 961-
1528 or linda.sinclair@simpson.edu. 
 
 Contributors 
 
 
JERRY HARRINGTON recently retired as marketing public rela-
tions manager for DuPont Pioneer, Johnston, Iowa, following a career 
at several Iowa newspapers and three public relations agencies in 
Cedar Rapids, Iowa; Rochester, New York; and Milwaukee, Wiscon-
sin. He received a B.S.S. from Cornell College and an M.A. in history 
from the University of Iowa. He recently completed a book, Crusading 
Iowa Journalist Verne Marshall: Exposing Graft and the 1936 Pulitzer 
Prize, and is currently working on a biography of Harold E. Hughes. 
 
KEITH OREJEL is a postdoctoral fellow at the University of Mis-
souri. He received his B.A. from the University of California, 
Berkeley, and his Ph.D. from Columbia University. He is currently 
working on a book project that examines the economic and political 
transformation of America’s rural heartland after World War II. 
 
WILSON J. WARREN is professor and chair of the Department of 
History at Western Michigan University in Kalamazoo. He is the 
author of Struggling with “Iowa’s Pride”: Labor Relations, Unionism, 
and Politics in the Rural Midwest since 1877 (University of Iowa Press, 
2000) and Tied to the Great Packing Machine: The Midwest and 
Meatpacking (University of Iowa Press, 2007). His book, Meat Makes 
People Powerful: A Global History of the Modern Era, is forthcoming 
from the University of Iowa Press.  
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